The State of Asian America: Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement by Paul M. Ong
The State of Asian America: 
Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
A Public Policy Report
Paul M. Ong
Editor
LEAP
Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute
2008 l Volume V
ii Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
A publication of LEAP Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute
LEAP
Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc.
327 East Second Street, Suite 226
Los Angeles, CA 90012-4210
Copyright © 2008 by 
LEAP Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 978-0-615-24234-7
Cover design: Wesley Encina
Layout: Michelle Sun
Table of Contents  iii
iv Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
List of Tables, Figures, and Graphs  v
vi Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
Preface  vii
Preface
The State of Asian America
Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
Fifteen years ago, Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc.
(LEAP) and the UCLA Asian American Studies Center published
their first joint public policy effort, The State of Asian Pacific America:
Policy Issues to the Year 2020.  With the inauguration of President Bill
Clinton and the shift from a Republican to Democratic administra-
tion, 1993 marked a dramatic change in U.S. politics.  Asian Ameri-
cans were then an emerging yet underrepresented and near
“invisible” minority.  The report’s timely release provided significant
data and policy perspectives on major issues and concerns affecting
the Asian American population.  It highlighted the increasing signif-
icance of this community, and the need for appropriate knowledge
and understanding of its unique needs.  
The year 2008 marks yet another remarkable moment in Amer-
ican politics.  Following an exciting and unprecedented primary sea-
son, the nation is poised on the brink of history, with the expected
nomination of the first African American (defeating the first viable
female candidate) for President of the United States. 
Given this dramatic backdrop, LEAP’s fifth major publication,
The State of Asian America: Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement,
published in conjunction with the University of California AAPI Pol-
icy Multi-Campus Research Program (MRP), is particularly salient.
The upcoming election has renewed public interest in political par-
ticipation, galvanizing women, young people and entire communities
of color.  Regardless of who wins the White House, change is sure to
come.  The issues that will define November’s election—the econ-
omy, energy, education, healthcare, immigration, globalization, for-
eign policy, the environment, race, gender and ethnicity—are issues
pertinent to all Americans, including Asians. 
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Is it safe to say that we are now part of the dialogue?
Since 1993, the Asian American community has grown and ma-
tured tremendously.  Due in large part to higher levels of civic en-
gagement, Asian American visibility has increased on all levels and
in all sectors of society. 
This report discusses the extent and variety of ways in which
Asian Americans are civically engaged—as individuals working to-
wards any collective, common good—from volunteers in religious,
professional, political and community-based organizations to citizens
exercising their right to vote.  Linked by a constructed racial category,
many have come to embrace the umbrella term “Asian American” as
a means to establish a unified identity, and therefore a more power-
ful voice in the political arena.  Still, institutional barriers continue to
limit full Asian American participation, and creative solutions are
necessary to overcome these challenges.  
As college students, grassroots activists, educators, journalists,
entrepreneurs, politicians, artists, corporate executives, foreign and
native born, transnational citizens, young and old, Asian Americans
must continue to be involved and assert influence throughout the
American landscape.  Asian Americans must strive to shape policy
and to inform politicians and the public alike about matters relevant
to Asians.  We hope this publication illustrates the nature and impact
of Asian American civic engagement and offers meaningful and in-
sightful suggestions towards future empowerment. (Due to limited
funding, this report focuses only on Asian American civic engage-
ment.  In the future, every effort will be made to include Pacific Is-
lander communities.)
The realization of this ambitious project is due to the vision of
Professor Paul Ong of the UCLA School of Public Affairs and the UC
AAPI Policy Multi-Campus Research Program.  The catalyst and
driving force behind this report, Professor Ong is the nation’s leading
expert on public policy issues facing the Asian and Pacific Islander
population.  We are extremely grateful for the leadership and com-
mitment that he provided to ensure the success of this endeavor. 
Finally, we would like to acknowledge the notable team of writ-
ers who contributed their expertise to this report.  We also express
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our utmost gratitude to the faculty and staff of the UC AAPI Policy
MRP and to the Board of Directors of LEAP for their unwavering sup-
port of our collaboration.
Margaret Ashida
Chair, Board of Directors
Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc. (LEAP)
J.D. Hokoyama
President and CEO
Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc. (LEAP)
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ASIAN AMERICAN CIVIC AND 
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENTi
Paul Ong and Megan Emiko Scott
UCLA School of Public Affairs
UC AAPI Policy MRP
Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc.
Introduction
Increasing Asian American civic and political engagement has
emerged as a central concern and goal among community leaders
and organizations, in large part because high levels of participation
translate into tangible benefits to the community and a more active
role in influencing public policy.ii As one community leader charac-
terized it in a survey conducted by Leadership Education for Asian
Pacifics, Inc. (LEAP), “civic engagement is being able to be involved
in your community on a very broad level. It’s about knowing what
you want to see in your community and making that happen…[and]
it means helping your community empower itself.” Looking forward,
a different leader hoped that “the API voice will be[come] much
stronger both from the top, elected [officials and] decision makers,
and from the bottom, voting [and grassroots] engagement.“ Another
optimistic leader said, “I think civic engagement will increase in the
next 10-20 years. [Foreign-born] Asians being in the U.S. longer and
having the time to acculturate and become well versed in English,
will start to realize that to make a difference, they will have to come
together with other groups they identify with to form a common
agenda.”iii
Voluntarism and voting, the two most widely accepted forms of
engagement, are seen as keystones to being a full and active member
of American society. The actions are performed by individuals of their
own volition, grounded in a sense of communal responsibility. This
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nation provides few material incentives to do either, nor impose any
sanctions for failing to participate. Nonetheless, there are broader im-
plications for the nation. Participating in these ways makes civil so-
ciety more vibrant and strengthens democracy. Conversely, a low or
declining level of civic and political engagement has been interpreted
as a weakening of the fabric that binds the country. 
For immigrants, civic and political engagement takes on a spe-
cial meaning because it is viewed by many natives as an indicator of
the degree that immigrants want to become a part of American soci-
ety by making contributions to the “greater good.”  While an immi-
grant can volunteer regardless of status, participating in voting
requires the additional step of acquiring citizenship. Naturalization it-
self is seen as a commitment and allegiance to the United States. En-
gagement is not only a symbolic indicator of self-incorporation into
the nation’s fabric, it also promotes the cross-group interaction that
promotes greater understanding and strengthens networks across
ethnic lines. 
Asian American civic and political engagement has become a
major concern because this population has grown to be a significant
group and will continue to grow in absolute and relative terms. From
1990 to 2007, the number of Asian Americans increased from 7.3 mil-
lion to 13.4 million, and from 2.9% of the total population to 4.4%.iv If
we include those who are part Asian American, then the respective
figures for 2007 are 15.2 million and 5.0%. By 2030, the Census Bu-
reau projects that there will be 22.6 million single-race Asian Ameri-
cans, comprising 6.2% of the total population. If we add in those who
are part Asian American, then the combined population would com-
prise over 7% of all Americans. There will also be a recomposition of
the Asian American population by 2030 as the number of U.S. Asian
Americans will grow faster than the number of foreign-born, but even
then, immigrants will comprise a majority of Asian Americans, par-
ticularly adult Asian Americans. 
The population growth has made Asian Americans a potentially
important political and civic force. They have already achieved that
status in Hawaii, where Asian Americans form a plurality, and they
have emerged as a potential key swing vote in California (Ong et al.
2006). However, as we will discuss later in this chapter and the next,
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there are barriers limiting their political impact. As a growing popu-
lation, Asian Americans can also have an impact on civil society
through volunteerism.v The growing number of Asian Americans also
make them a potentially important source of volunteers, particularly
in communities where they comprise a large share of the total popu-
lation. Voluntarism is critical in helping organizations fill niches that
the governmental sector is unable to fill.
Given the importance of Asian American civic and political en-
gagement, Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc. (LEAP), with
collaboration from the UC AAPI Policy Multi-Campus Research Pro-
gram (MRP), established a project to study this phenomenon. LEAP
is a national, nonprofit organization aiming to achieve full participa-
tion and equality for Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders through
leadership, empowerment, and policy. Implicit in LEAP’s mission to
increase both the quantity and quality of Asian American leaders is
the idea that those leaders will spur Asian American communities to
greater levels of integration and civic participation in the larger U.S.
social, economic, cultural, and political spheres. The UC AAPI Pol-
icy MRP promotes and coordinates applied and policy research on
topics relevant to California’s growing Asian American and Pacific
Islander population. The MRP serves as a bridge linking UC re-
searchers to community organizations, the media, and elected offi-
cials and their staff to integrate research, teaching, and community
outreach in ways that inform and enlighten public discourse on im-
portant public policy issues.
This current project is a part of LEAP’s series on The State of
Asian Pacific America, which was started jointly with the UCLA Asian
American Studies Center in 1993. The series has covered policy is-
sues ranging from immigration, economics, and race relations, to
questions related to culture and the arts.vi The current project focuses
on the issues that are key to the current immigration debate and
which lie at the heart of achieving full participation by Asian Amer-
icans — immigration, labor and the economy, civic participation, pol-
itics. Without a clear picture of the shape, character, and likely
movements of Asian American communities, local, regional, and na-
tional leaders will be left to speculate on what issues and policies are
most important to Asian Americans and what those policies might
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mean in and to Asian American communities in the future. One of
the project’s goals is to provide a road map for Asian American civic
engagement. To that end, this project was conceived as a means to
initiate increased levels of civic participation amongst Asian Ameri-
cans at the local level as well as make current regional and national
efforts more effective.
One of the project’s major objectives is to produce a policy report
examining the forms and levels of participation, the challenges and
barriers, and the opportunities and potentials. To accomplish this, the
project assembled a team of renowned Asian American scholars
trained in economics, political science, sociology, ethnic studies, pub-
lic affairs, and law.vii Contributors were asked to evaluate the posi-
tive and negative aspects of trends, and then propose ways to
promote beneficial activities and to address the likely barriers in the
future. To assist the writers to explore what lies ahead, the project has
developed a population projection that breaks the Asian American
population by nativity given the importance of immigrants in the
equation. (See Appendix C for a 2030 Asian American population
projection by nativity.) We believe that the information in the essays
will help community leaders and organizations, elected officials and
policy makers, and other stakeholders understand the enormous task
before us if we are to improve the civic and political landscape for
Asian Americans. There is a critical need to stimulate and focus dis-
cussion about ways to intervene to take advantage of potential op-
portunities and to meet new challenges as we strive to promote
greater civic and political engagement within the Asian American
community.
The contributors use their respective orientations within their
disciplinary fields to frame the discussion. Economists focus on the
market, problems of collective action, and direct economic gains. Po-
litical scientists, on the other hand, are concerned with political en-
gagement and participation in relation to the state. Finally,
sociologists concentrate on the social dimensions of group action.
They are interested in social capital, networks, and cultural aspects
that enable or hinder civic engagement and influence the capacity to
participate. They recognize that engagement is not a purely individ-
ual activity but that it is related to social structures and institutions.
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Ultimately, the writers pick up on many of the themes touched on by
survey respondents in Appendix B.
Levels of Participation
Four essays in this book examine the level of civic and political
engagement. They draw on a range of available data to gauge the ex-
tent and nature of participation. Karthick Ramakrishnan provides an
overview of volunteerism and voting; Pei-te Lien narrows the focus
by examining voting among Asian immigrants; Park, et al., also ex-
amines another important Asian American subpopulation – civic en-
gagement among college students; and Kang presents an interesting
view by examining engagement in an emerging arena, the Internet.
While each essay offers unique and important insights, they share a
common thread. They find that Asian Americans are active partici-
pants but at the same time face a number of barriers and challenges.
Identifying the impediments to participation is a critical step in for-
mulating policies and programs to increase civic and political en-
gagement.
Karthick Ramakrishnan’s chapter, “Political Participation and
Civic Voluntarism,” examines the extent to which Asian Americans
are equal to other racial and ethnic groups when it comes to partici-
pating in community organizations and in the political process. Par-
ticipation rates among Asian Americans are generally low compared
to other racial and ethnic groups, although there are significant dif-
ferences across various Asian national-origin groups. When Asian
Americans do participate, such as in making campaign contributions
or creating vibrant community organizations, they tend to remain
more invisible and less influential in the eyes of government officials.
Using population projections for the Asian American community
over the next few decades, Ramakrishnan projects that there will be
an increase in absolute participation rates among Asian Americans.
Yet it is possible that Asian Americans will continue to lag behind
other racial and ethnic groups due to the aging general population
that will also lead to increased participation among non-Asians. To
mitigate this effect, Ramakrishnan offers strategies to address the
major challenges related to the future of Asian American civic and
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political engagement: increasing participation rates, making com-
munity organizations more viable, and getting government officials
to pay more attention to Asian American community organizations.
Pei-te Lien, in “Political and Civic Engagement of Immigrants,”
focuses on Asian immigrants, who comprise a large majority of vot-
ing-age Asian Americans. Using public data sets and a specialized
survey of Asian Americans, the chapter addresses several important
questions: Is this a barrier or an asset to political participation, and to
what extent? How does the political participation of foreign-born
Asians in the U.S. compare to U.S. born Asians, as well as other for-
eign-born and native populations?  Lien answers these questions by
exploring Asian American political participation with a focus on the
role of nativity and the growth of foreign-born Asians in the U.S.
While the process of political engagement often presents barriers for
immigrants, there are also potential incentives to political participa-
tion. Using survey data to analyze trends in recent Asian American
political participation, Lien debunks the notion of an absolute for-
eign-born disadvantage. Lien then explores differences within the
Asian American population that are easily hidden in aggregated data
and briefly examines political participation beyond voting. Finally,
Lien offers reasons for optimism about the future of Asian American
political and civic engagement, suggesting that political parties and
civic institutions can foster this engagement through strong support
of immigrants’ rights, as well as the maintenance and enforcement of
voting rights.
Julie Park, Monica Lin, Oiyan Poon, and Mitchell Chang’s chap-
ter on “Asian American College Students and Civic Engagement”
provides some insight into a generation that has just become of age.
Opportunities to become civically engaged in college are an impor-
tant way for students to develop social responsibility that benefits
both the individual and society. The current trend indicates increas-
ing participation rates among college students in community and po-
litical activities, but where do Asian Americans fit in the picture? The
authors address that question by analyzing data about Asian Amer-
ican college freshman in the areas of community service, political en-
gagement, and capacity for civic engagement. The authors aim to
move beyond stereotypes that focus on Asian American performance
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in the classroom and instead provide a broader scope of the Asian
American college experience as it pertains to civic and political par-
ticipation. While Asian Americans have the highest volunteerism
rates among young adults ages 18-24, their political participation
rates are much lower. The data also reveal important differences
within the Asian American population by gender, citizenship, and
native language. Immigration and population projections therefore
shed light into the future of Asian American undergraduate civic en-
gagement. Ultimately, the authors suggest strategies for students to
influence their community through volunteer service and political in-
volvement over the course of their studies and beyond.
Jerry Kang’s chapter, “Engaging Online,” also provides a
glimpse into the future by studying Asian American participation in
the new technological arena in the form of the Internet. The Internet
has rapidly become a familiar mode of communication at work, at
home, and on the street. Notwithstanding substantial variance among
subpopulations, Asian Americans on average are well connected to
the Internet. How does this connectivity affect Asian American civic
engagement? Jerry Kang first addresses that question by examining
how Asian Americans use the Internet. While some Asian American
online communities are ethnic-specific and link immigrants to their
countries of origin, others are pan-Asian with a more domestic or po-
litical focus. Because the Internet allows individuals that are physi-
cally separated to interact in a meaningful way through shared
interests, Asian diasporas can use online networks to bridge physical
distance. Kang then discusses the untapped potential of the Internet
to influence Asian American voting behavior and inform and facili-
tate the electoral process. Finally, Kang explores how online engage-
ment can alter the ways that race functions both off- and online, and
the meaning this holds for Asian Americans.
Racial and Ethnic Identification 
While voting and volunteerism are actions taken by individ-
uals, it is impossible to escape the reality that we are tied to and in-
fluenced by our association with socially constructed groups. One of
the most enduring classification schemes in American society is along
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race lines.  In her chapter, Yen Le Espiritu examines how the forma-
tion and reification of Asian Americans as a racial group can be
driven by efforts within the population to achieve a greater voice in
the civic and political arena in a racialized society.  However, such ef-
forts are a response to a reality that is manufactured and codified by
governmental practice, and a primary example of that is the way the
U.S. Bureau of the Census collects demographic data. Because so
much is at stake in being included in the official statistics, it is critical
that Asian Americans be represented in the decennial enumeration
of the population, a position clearly articulated by Terry Ao. Finally,
the essay by Claire Kim examines how powerful forces external to
the population impose a pernicious identity on Asian Americans.
Racial identity’s influence on politics is inescapable, and the challenge
is how to use this influence constructively while combating its worst
features.
Yen Le Espiritu, in “Asian American Panethnicity: Challenges
and Possibilities,” examines the role of panethnicity in Asian Ameri-
can civic and political engagement, paying particular attention to the
role of post-1965 immigration. Espiritu suggests that although Asian
ethnic groups were always civically engaged, the notion of Asian
American civic engagement was borne out of the Asian American
movement in the 1960s alongside the concept of Asian American
panethnicity. At the same time, changes to immigration law resulted
in shifting demographics of the Asian population in the U.S. As this
population became more diverse, Asian American panethnicity was
increasingly contested. Espiritu’s analysis shows that ethnic-specific
identities and panethnic identities are not mutually exclusive; both
exist simultaneously and both serve as a resource for the develop-
ment of Asian American political participation and empowerment.
In the next two decades, as the United States competes internationally
with China’s and India’s growing economic influence, it is likely that
domestic anti-Asianism will correspondingly rise, making pan-Asian
efforts a political necessity. The challenge for Asian American leaders
will be to identify and articulate shared interests and ideology within
the socially and economically diverse Asian American community, to
solicit new membership, and to groom fresh leadership, especially
from within the ranks of the less affluent, underrepresented Southeast
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Asian communities.
The social construction of Asian Americans as a racial group is
codified in governmental practices, and Terry Ao explores one im-
portant aspect: the collection of demographic data by the U.S. Bureau
of the Census. In “Connecting the Dots: Understanding the Impor-
tance of Census Participation to Civic Engagement,” Ao argues for
active participation by Asian Americans in the decennial enumera-
tion because of the down stream implications. Non-participation in
the Census among Asian Americans may lead to an undercount,
which can create future problems for appropriating funding, enforc-
ing voting rights, addressing language barriers to voting, and reap-
portionment and redistricting.  To increase Asian American
participation in census surveys, Ao proposes strategies for breaking
down barriers to participation. Increasing the accuracy of the Asian
American census count, she posits, ultimately strengthens the back-
bone of future civic engagement in the community.
Claire Jean Kim examines the implications of Asian Americans’
presumed foreignness for their civic engagement. Her chapter, “The
Usual Suspects: Asian Americans as Conditional Citizens,” addresses
this issue by analyzing how Asian American political officials, advo-
cates, and scholars have responded to the campaign finance scandal
associated with the U.S. presidential election of 1996, a watershed
event in which Asian Americans were racialized as politically sus-
pect by both political parties and the media. Kim begins by stating
that while all agree that the event powerfully invigorated the endur-
ing notion of Asian Americans as foreigners inclined toward treason,
they differ on whether the scandal was a temporary setback in the
narrative of Asian American political incorporation or merely a re-
minder of the ideological processes that will always relegate Asian
Americans to the margins of the nation’s political life. Kim concludes
with the proposition of “conditional citizenship” as a way of con-
ceptualizing the political status of Asian Americans and discusses the
implication of this status for Asian American civic engagement.
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Institutional Factors
The last three essays focus on how institutions can facilitate and
hinder Asian American civic and political engagement. An institu-
tion, in the abstract form, is a set of norms and values that influence
behavior, but the institutions discussed here are the more concrete
forms. Chi-kan Richard Hung examines the relative size and compo-
sition of Asian American nonprofits, which traditionally have played
a critical role in bridging Asian Americans, and especially Asian im-
migrants and the larger society. Taeku Lee focuses on another key
American institution, political parties, and analyzes how partisan-
ship is associated with attitudes and other forms of engagement. Fi-
nally, Marlene Kim examines both the historical and contemporary
relationship between organized labor and Asian Americans. While
changing individual behavior is fundamental to the goal of increas-
ing Asian American civic and political engagement, these essays re-
mind us that this also requires strengthening Asian American
community organizations and making other institutions more inclu-
sive of Asian Americans.
In “Growth and Diversity of Asian American Nonprofit Organ-
izations,” Chi-kan Richard Hung points out that civil society has been
an important part of Asian American life since the early days of im-
migration. As the Asian American population grows, nonprofit or-
ganizations are playing an increasingly important role for the
community and civil society at large. In this chapter, the author Hung
looks at Asian American nonprofit organizations in the ten largest
U.S. metropolitan areas and investigates patterns of development. He
categorizes these organizations into four functional types: religious,
cultural, service, or public interest organizations. The distribution of
organizations between these groups illustrates the heterogeneity of
the Asian American community, as does the balance between non-
profits that serve a particular Asian ethnic group and pan-Asian or-
ganizations that serve the entire Asian American community. Hung
also looks at the distribution of organizations across regions. While fi-
nancial records indicate that Asian American nonprofits are relatively
small, public interest and service organizations are typically larger
than religious and cultural groups and tend to have more of a pan-
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Asian focus. As the Asian American population grows, especially out-
side central cities where current Asian American nonprofits are con-
centrated, some organizations will need to expand into these new
communities to continue addressing Asian American needs that go
unmet by mainstream organizations.
Taeku Lee’s chapter “Civic Engagement as a Pathway to Parti-
sanship Acquisition for Asian Americans” focuses on how party af-
filiation is an important marker of political orientation and activism.
Historically, political parties in the U.S. were more willing to incor-
porate immigrants and new citizens into their ranks than they are
today. Given this reluctance to include Asian Americans, how does a
majority (and growing) immigrant Asian American electorate become
politicized? What barriers exist to Asian American political partici-
pation and what factors can encourage participation? The author ex-
amines the relationship between civic engagement, partisanship,
panethnic identity, and the political incorporation of Asian Ameri-
cans. Lee also focuses on the institutional role of political parties and
their relationship to Asian Americans. When choosing party affilia-
tion between Democrats and Republicans, the emerging trend among
Asian Americans is toward Democratic partisanship. Yet in many sur-
veys the majority of Asian American respondents choose not to iden-
tify with a party at all. Lee considers this absence of partisanship and
ultimately looks to civil society and different expressions of civic en-
gagement as an alternative arena to political parties for the politi-
cization of Asian Americans.
Marlene Kim, in “Organizing Asian Americans into Labor
Unions,” examines labor unions as an important institution for en-
gaging workers in a wide variety of civic activities. Although histor-
ically some labor unions reflected the racist views and practices of
society and excluded Asian workers from belonging to unions, today
this is no longer true. Union membership among Asians is on the rise
due to successful organizing efforts by a new generation of Asian
American labor organizers, and tens of thousands of Asian workers
have already joined unions with diverse memberships. The author
assesses the future of Asian American unionization and potential
challenges. The major barriers to union organizing faced by Asian
Americans today are the same barriers faced by all workers: weak
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U.S. labor laws and resistance from employers. The diversity within
the Asian American community, as well as projected community de-
mographics over the next few decades, also presents an obstacle to or-
ganizing Asian workers. While the perception of Asians as apolitical
may still be a challenge to overcome, the increase in union participa-
tion among Asian Americans has had important spillover effects that
continue to increase other types of civic engagement in the commu-
nity. Unions are instrumental in the legislative and electoral process
— educating their members about the legislative process, lobbying
their elected representatives, and participating in mobilization efforts
for legislation that advances Asian workers and communities. Union
voter education, registration, and mobilization efforts have elected
worker friendly representatives, and efforts that have targeted Asians
have led to large increases in the Asian vote and to Asians having a
political voice and newly acquired political clout.
Concluding Remarks
Collectively, the essays in this policy book provide insight into
the nature and extent of Asian American civic and political engage-
ment, and into the forces that shape participation in civil society. In
the absence of any intervening action, recent history can indicate the
direction in which we are headed. Demographic dynamics, institu-
tional practices and individual behavior have systematic and pre-
dictable impacts on outcomes. These same factors will influence what
will unfold over the next two decades. The Asian American popula-
tion will grow, and the increase will translate into more engaged
Asian Americans. At the same, there will also be more who will not
be engaged. Past trajectories, however, do not define our destiny. It is
important to recognize that the future is not necessarily preordained
unless we fail to act. It is naïve to believe that we can overcome all
barriers to civic and political engagement, but it is not unrealistic to
close the racial and ethnic gap in participation through concerted and
self-conscious action. The challenge is to help more Asian Americans
to become meaningfully incorporated into American society and pol-
itics, to have a more effective voice in multiple public arenas, and to
make greater contributions to the collective good. This should occur
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both within Asian American communities and within the larger so-
ciety, thus strengthening these communities internally and building
bridges to non-Asian ones. There are no simple solutions. Directed
social change requires both large and small acts, and innovative
thinking. Hopefully, this book will enhance the effort to inform, iden-
tify, formulate and implement policies and programs that will enable
us to promote greater Asian American civic and political engagement. 
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Poverty: Community Economic Development Policies and Strategies, Asian Pacific
American Public Policy Institute, LEAP, Los Angeles, CA., 1993 and 1999; Paul
M. Ong, editor, The State of Asian Pacific America: Economic Diversity, Issues and
Policies, Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute, LEAP, Los Angeles,
CA., 1994; Bill O. Hing and Ronald Lee, editors, Reframing the Immigration De-
bate, Los Angeles: LEAP Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute and
UCLA Asian American Studies Center, 1996, Paul M. Ong, editor, The State of
Asian Pacific America: Transforming Race Relations, Asian Pacific American Pub-
lic Policy Institute, LEAP and UCLA AASC, Los Angeles, CA., 2000.
vii While the essays in this volume cover a wide array of themes related to Asian
American civic and political engagement, more needs to be written on this
topic. It is ultimately impossible to cover everything in this report alone. In
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particular, a detailed discussion of the role of religion and the media in Asian
American civic engagement is missing from this report. Among the themes
that are covered, there is greater focus on political engagement and less dis-
cussion about broader civic engagement and volunteerism outside the politi-
cal realm.
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Appendix A:
Concepts and Terms Related to 
Civic and Political Engagement
This appendix lists the definitions and concepts of civic and po-
litical engagement that are most relevant to this policy book. The cov-
erage here is not intended to be comprehensive, and there are other
conceptualizations that are appropriate in a different context. A start-
ing point is situating engagement within society.
Modern societies are organized between three sectors: the mar-
ket, the state, and civil society. These sectors, and the institutions
within them, can operate independently or interact with one other.
The market is the site of production of goods and services, where pri-
vate institutions undertake economic activities that are motivated by
profit. The norms and values of the market, such as utility maxi-
mization and consumer autonomy, stress the role of the individual
and therefore undermine activities that focus on collective outcomes.
The state is a set of governing institutions with a formal structure,
where political decisions take the form of laws, rules, and regulations.
Within this setting, public institutions deliver public goods and serv-
ices. The state typically regulates the market, to address market fail-
ure or equity concerns, though some believe that the state
over-regulates the market and therefore limits its efficiency. The con-
cept of political economy, based on the relationship between the mar-
ket and the state, explores the overlap between these sectors. Within
a capitalist or socialist society, the political economy is a particularly
large configuration.
Civil society includes institutions and organizations that fall out-
side of the market, the state, and the family (Carnegie UK Trust, Lon-
don School of Economics Centre for Civil Society, and UCLA Center
for Civil Society, nd). However, civil society increasingly overlaps or
interacts with these other sectors, blurring the boundaries between
them (Ibid). Thus, civil society is defined in many different ways. We
characterize civil society as being comprised of voluntary organiza-
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tions and institutions that serve a collective good, including groups
such as nonprofit organizations, professional associations, and labor
unions (Ibid). In part, civil society addresses normative notions about
how the market and the state should function, and attempts to make
up for deficiencies. As the role of the state declines, the public sector
increasingly depends upon civil society to help deliver public serv-
ices.
Civic engagement is vast, nuanced, and, like civil society, can be
defined in a multitude of ways. Civic engagement takes place within
civil society or through interactions between civil society and other
sectors, and can include both individual and collective action. Be-
cause the definition of civic engagement is subjective, we will be pre-
cise in our use of the term. In contrast to civics, the study of
government and the role of citizen participation and input, civic en-
gagement has two main components: voluntary action and the pro-
duction of public goods.i
Volunteerism is central to the notion of civic engagement. If an
activity is mandatory or prohibited, it is no longer civic engagement.
As such, the state can greatly influence this engagement through
laws, or a lack of laws, that govern individual interaction with the
state. In order for an activity to fall within the scope of civic engage-
ment, it must not be coerced but should happen voluntarily out of
social responsibility or obligation (Carnegie UK Trust nd; London
School of Economics Centre for Civil Society nd).
Volunteerism that contributes to public goods is, however, prob-
lematic because there are economic disincentives.ii By definition, pub-
lic goods are goods (and services) that are non-exclusionary, that is,
everyone benefits. The classical example is the security provided by
a nation’s armed forces. This creates a problem of free riders, which
occurs because individuals benefit regardless of whether they pay for
the production of the public good. One way of overcoming this prob-
lem is requiring compulsory contributions, and the government does
this through taxes that are then used on public goods. There is no
similar mechanism in civil society, so volunteerism entails a degree of
noncompulsory sacrifice and altruism.  
Political engagement is a subset of civic engagement that occurs
through interaction between civil society and the state. It includes
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voting, participating on neighborhood councils, and working with
political parties. The state plays an important role in facilitating civic
and political engagement through allowing, or prohibiting, activities
such as voting. In the U.S., voting is voluntary rather than compul-
sory and produces the public good of an engaged citizenry. The
American regime of civic engagement allows citizens to interact with
the state through the electoral process. Historically, however, there
have been significant barriers to voting in the U.S., particularly for
immigrants and people of color. The shift from prohibiting to allow-
ing voting is a relatively recent one, particularly for a large number
of Asian immigrants.
Outside of political engagement, civic engagement activities do
not necessarily involve interactions with the state. Civic engagement
often comes about when civil society interacts with the nonprofit sec-
tor to address market externalities such as pollution.iii Pollution clean-
up campaigns encourage and facilitate volunteerism and result in a
public good of lower levels of pollution. Civil society also interacts
with the market to produce civic engagement. This is evident through
citizen action to promote regulations that affect businesses, advocate
for solutions to problems that concern the private sector, or distribute
information, such as a list of reputable service providers. This serves
to indirectly regulate the market for a particular service and reflects
opinions about how the market ought to function and regulate itself.
Civic engagement is sometimes a precursor to social capital, the
connections within and between social networks (Putnam 2000).
Robert Putnam famously charted the decline of American social cap-
ital through waning participation in civic groups such as labor unions
and bowling clubs. In following up to his work, economists have
found that civic engagement declines as communities become more
heterogeneous (Costa and Kahn 2003). While the definition of com-
munity is limited by the data being used, this finding generates some
important questions about civic engagement for a group as diverse as
the Asian American community (Ibid). Because civic engagement pro-
duces social capital through relationships and networks, lower en-
gagement rates ultimately lead to lower levels of social capital. At the
same time, the level of civic engagement is simultaneously influenced
by the amount and nature of social capital. When a society undergoes
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a demographic change, such as that associated with immigration, the
networks across ethnic groups (bridging social capital) are initially
weak. One way to build those networks is through encouraging civic
engagement that transcends ethnic divides. 
Institutions play an important role in facilitating, hindering and
shaping civic engagement. The market, state, and civil society are
largely organized through institutions, and an institution is defined
as a set of shared norms and values that govern behavior (Carnegie
UK Trust nd; London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society
nd). Institutions such as labor unions, churches, and families can also
interact with civil society to influence individual behavior both
within and beyond an institution. Ethnicity and culture, though not
thought of as formal institutions, clearly have a set of shared norms
and values and therefore also fall into this category.
An institution may or may not be a site of civic engagement and,
when it is, the degree of civic engagement may vary. The more that an
institution is closed off, by distinguishing between members and non-
members, the less it can be an arena for civic engagement because it
is unlikely to produce a public good. In this case, the benefits of an ac-
tivity are concentrated and bestowed upon the institution’s members.
Institutions with porous barriers between members and nonmembers
yield more diffuse benefits and therefore are much more likely to fall
within the arena of civil society. Business district associations that ad-
dress problems of their district members are an example of a group
with concentrated benefits. In contrast, the Lions Club may draw
members from the business community but the benefits of their ac-
tivities, often community-wide service projects, are more diffuse. The
League of Conservation Voters creates very diffuse benefits through
a focus on broader civic engagement.
Of course, not all actions within an institution can be classified
as civic or political engagement. Country clubs are a prime example,
since most, if not all, activities do not produce a public good. Labor
unions and religious institutions also engage in activities that include,
but are not limited to, civic and political engagement. For example, re-
ligious institutions have a spiritual aspect that falls outside of the
realm of engagement.
Despite declining membership, labor unions continue to play an
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important role in promoting and facilitating civic and political en-
gagement at the institutional level. They are organized in a way to
encourage public service, set up volunteer opportunities, and pro-
mote political participation. This can take the form of nonpartisan en-
couragement to vote or partisan influence to vote for a particular
candidate or issue position. When unions engage in partisan activity,
they tend to align with the Democratic Party. Critics of unions assert
that they are too focused on group interests, sometimes at the expense
of the individual.
Religious group membership is perhaps the most common
group affiliation in the U.S. Religious groups often have nonprofit
legal status granted by the state. Similar to other types of membership
groups, religious groups foster a sense of group belonging and es-
tablish norms that dictate compulsory behaviors associated with
group membership. The act of bringing people together produces a
good that may or may not exclusively benefit members, depending
on the intent of the institution and whether or not the good is ex-
cludable. By internalizing the benefits of membership, religious in-
stitutions, like other membership groups, can prevent free riders and
encourage membership. On the other hand, religious institutions may
decide or be mandated to encourage civic and political engagement
through activities with diffuse benefits. These benefits, real or per-
ceived, may accrue to the religious institution’s members or society at
large.
Finally, family is another important social institution and refers
to a group of people that share a genetic, emotional, and/or co-habi-
tational relationship. Family units may, but do not necessarily, serve
a reproductive function through child bearing and rearing. Similar to
unions and religious groups, the institution of family can interact
with civil society to influence an individual’s civic and political en-
gagement activities.
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Notes
i By definition, public goods are subject to free riders. The free rider problem,
which occurs when individuals lack the incentive to pay for their consump-
tion of a good, has two components. First, free riders reap the benefits of a pub-
lic good but do not contribute anything in return. Second, free riding can create
a spillover effect that discourages others from paying for their consumption,
thereby creating more free riders. If membership is excludable, a group can
avoid the problem of free riders and their spillover effects.
ii See for example, Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
iii Nonprofit organizations are economic units legally defined and recognized by
the state. Often times, nonprofit legal status allows an organization to accept
tax-deductible contributions from private and public institutions. Nonprofits
exist to fulfill a mission in the private or public interest and, in contrast to pri-
vate institutions, nonprofits do not earn accounting profit.
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Appendix B: 
LEAP Survey of 
Community Stakeholders
To examine how engagement plays out among Asian Ameri-
cans, LEAP conducted a survey of staff and leadership within Asian
American community organizations. Participants in LEAP’s Civic En-
gagement Conferences, as well as recipients of the LEAP e-newslet-
ter, were asked to provide their opinions of issues related to civic and
political engagement, the level of participation among Asian Ameri-
cans, barriers facing this population, and future trends. Although the
respondents are not a random representative sample of typical Asian
Americans, their responses nonetheless provide insight into what
Asian Americans think about civic and political engagement.
Like the literature on the topic, individuals have broad and wide
ranging definitions of civic engagement. Stakeholders most fre-
quently defined civic engagement through community involvement
in settings such as schools, community organizations, churches, and
government institutions. Some specifically mentioned involvement
on a voluntary basis; others were vague about whether the involve-
ment should be voluntary or could be paid. Stakeholders often dis-
tinguished between individual and institutional engagement.
Individual engagement includes knowledge gathering activities, such
as discussing politics and following current events, as well as action
oriented activities, such as voting, volunteering, serving on a jury, or
running for public office. Institutional engagement occurs when or-
ganizations engage with government, politicians, or other decision
makers on behalf of constituents or interests.
The survey responses did not provide much insight into unique
forms of engagement in the Asian American community or unique
organizational or institutional avenues in which engagement takes
place. Although stakeholders were not detailed in their answers, we
believe that engagement can have a cultural dimension that makes it
unique. Engagement can also take the form of a unique organiza-
tional or collective effort. Within the Asian American community,
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unique organizational engagement happens through independent or-
ganizations that serve the Asian American community. Other types of
organizational engagement involve Asian American branches of
mainstream organizations, such as the Bar Association or the Cham-
ber of Commerce.
Stakeholders had more to say about general barriers to civic en-
gagement. Cultural barriers were cited most often and survey an-
swers leaned toward a narrower discussion of barriers to political
engagement rather than a broader discussion of barriers to civic en-
gagement. Apathy, which can take the form of passive indifference
or active refusal to take action, was often cited as an initial barrier.
The latter is most evident among those who distrust the U.S. politi-
cal system. A lack of access to information about the political process
and current events was also frequently mentioned as a significant
barrier to engagement. This can result from a lack of available mate-
rials in a particular language, lack of access to the Internet or other
sources of information, and lack of educational outreach by commu-
nity organizations.
Some barriers suggested by stakeholders are particular to dif-
ferent populations. For low-income individuals struggling to make
ends meet, political and civic engagement is often perceived as a lux-
ury that takes resources, such as time and money, away from basic
needs and responsibilities. For these individuals, the opportunity cost
is too high to warrant their engagement. Elderly and disabled popu-
lations lack mobility to participate in activities that require traveling.
People of color and immigrants can be dissuaded from political and
civic engagement activities after encountering racism in the process,
not to mention the other forms of prejudice that can deter participa-
tion among a variety of populations.
Within communities and organizations, a lack of intergenera-
tional mentors and role models can limit engagement opportunities
for new individuals or groups. Even if role models do exist and
knowledge sharing takes place, established or entrenched leader-
ship—in government, on boards, and among high-level staff—can
also limit leadership opportunities and engagement, particularly
among the young, immigrants, and others that are not currently rep-
resented in leadership roles.
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When asked about specific barriers to engagement in the Asian
American community, stakeholders discussed some of the barriers
already mentioned, but in a more nuanced way. One person pointed
out that for Asian immigrants or those with close ties to their coun-
try of origin, the corrupt political system of their home country may
lead to a distrust of politics that dissuades engagement in U.S. poli-
tics. As another person put it, “I believe that culturally among Asians
there’s a certain amount of cynicism about how much the political
system can do for them.” And while people of color collectively face
significant barriers to political and civic engagement due to individ-
ual prejudices and institutional racism, yet another person felt that
Asian Americans sometimes experience more subtle forms of racism
than Blacks and Latinos.
Language was the most frequently cited barrier to engagement
in the Asian American community. Language barriers between the
Asian American community and other communities, as well as lan-
guage barriers between different Asian American ethnic groups, cre-
ate significant challenges for engagement by and within the Asian
American community. A lack of media coverage about important po-
litical and policy issues, especially within the Asian American ethnic
media, was also cited as a huge barrier to accessing knowledge to in-
form political and civic participation. Stakeholders acknowledged
that the complexity of the Asian American community can also make
it difficult to find a unifying message that engages and mobilizes the
entire community. Diversity can lead to divisions between and within
Asian American ethnic groups which undermine not only political
and civic engagement activities but also the very notion of a unified
Asian American community.
Because Asian Americans sometimes experience, as one stake-
holder put it, a “reluctance to speak up/speak out based on cultural
norms,” political and civic engagement activities are sometimes in-
compatible with the cultural norms of a particular Asian American
ethnic community. Spending time and money on such activities may
conflict with cultural values or expectations to share those resources
with family. The insular nature of some Asian American ethnic com-
munities may also dissuade civic engagement activities that reach
outside one’s own community.
24 Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
Looking forward, stakeholders were asked about specific ways
to facilitate greater civic and political engagement in the Asian Amer-
ican community. At an individual level, they felt that civic engage-
ment within the community could be facilitated through improved
media education via television, newspapers, radio, and the Internet.
Opportunities for skills building and leadership development, per-
haps through increased participation on volunteer boards, would also
heighten civic engagement. Additionally, individuals could promote
engagement by helping to leverage financial resources for nonprofit
organizations and political campaigns and parties. Boosting voter
registration and participation among Asian Americans is an obvious
way to increase political engagement, and stakeholders felt it would
likely be associated with more Asian Americans running for, and get-
ting elected to, public office.
Ultimately, stakeholders felt that civic engagement would in-
crease if the Asian American community mobilized around a com-
mon platform seeking visible, sustainable outcomes. Such a platform
should be built around an understanding of a common problem and
a common solution and would be, according to one stakeholder, “so
compelling that it overcomes cultural norms not conducive to civic
engagement” in the Asian American community. Yet, as another said,
the challenge is “getting folks to find value in shared heritage and
culture.”
When discussing best practices in Asian American civic en-
gagement, stakeholders did not distinguish between organizations
that simply offer opportunities to volunteer and organizations that
actively promote civic engagement, such as referral organizations for
volunteers to connect with organizations that need assistance or
groups that promote political engagement through voter registration
While there are a number of mainstream groups that fulfill this func-
tion, it is unclear whether an Asian American organization has
sprung up to fill this void in the community.
Stakeholders also touched on arenas for engagement outside of
community organizations. College campus-based organizations,
while typically more social in nature than community-based groups,
were also mentioned as an important site for Asian American civic
engagement. Business community activities through the Asian Amer-
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ican Chamber of Commerce and Asian American media programs
were also mentioned. Conferences and summits were discussed as
another important venue for networking and information gathering
to increase civic engagement in the community.
Most stakeholders were hopeful that political and civic engage-
ment would increase in the Asian American community over the next
10-20 years. They acknowledged that engagement would depend on
shifting demographics, such as age and immigration. They hoped to
see more Asian Americans running for elected office, more Asian
Americans donating to political campaigns, and higher Asian Amer-
ican voter turnouts. To achieve this, they felt it is not only important
to build leadership capacity and raise awareness within the Asian
American community, but that it is also essential for the community
to strengthen cross-cultural collaborations and alliances with other
communities.
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Appendix C: 
Asian American Population 
Projection by Nativity
The projection of the Asian American population in 2030 by na-
tivity starts with the two sets of projections produced by the Census
Bureau.  The first dataset, the 1996 National Population Projections,
uses the cohort-component model to generate U.S. population pro-
jections by age, sex, race, and Hispanic-origin for the period of 1995-
2050.  These projections are based on a 1994 population estimates
using 1990 Census data, and updated with observed fertility and sur-
vival rates, and net immigration statistics. The Bureau used three dif-
ferent sets of assumptions about fertility, mortality, and net
immigration to produce a low, middle, and high series of population
projections.  Net immigration incorporated projected changes in legal,
refugee, and undocumented immigration. The projections are created
for 5 race groups: American Indians, Eskimo, and Aleuts; Asian and
Pacific Islanders; Blacks; Hispanics; and Whites.
The second dataset from the Bureau of the Census is the 2004
Interim Projections released by the U.S. Census Bureau in March of
that year. Similar to the previous dataset, the cohort-component
method is used to produce national projections by age, sex, race, and
Hispanic-origin for the period 1999-2100.   Compared to the demo-
graphic assumptions used in the 1996 National Population Projec-
tions, the Bureau slightly reduced fertility, left mortality unchanged,
and slightly elevated immigration rates.   The projections were de-
veloped for the following race groups: non-Hispanic White alone,
Hispanic White alone, Black alone, Asian alone, and all other groups
(American Indians and Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians and other
Pacific Islanders, and everyone who reported more than one of the
major race categories on the 2000 Census.)
According to the Census Bureau’s 2004 projections, there will be
22.6 million Asian Americans (not including Pacific Islanders) in 2030.
This is only slightly lower than the earlier 1996 projection of 24.8 mil-
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lion for APIs in 2030. However, some care needs to be taken in com-
paring the two numbers because of a change in definition. The two
sets of projections are based different racial classifications. Starting
in 2000, individuals could declare one or more races, while earlier
decades allowed for only one response. Moreover, 2004 projections
do not contain a breakdown by nativity.
To produce a 2030 projection of Asian Americans by nativity, the
following approach was used. One, the 1996 National Population Pro-
jections for APIs were decomposed into separate projections for Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders. This was done first by making pro-
jections of PIs, and then subtracting the PI projections from the API
projections. Two, the Asian American projections are refined by
breaking them down by nativity. The major assumption is that Asian
Americans comprise most of the projected immigration assigned by
the Bureau to its API projections. Three, the projections of immigrants
are further refined by decomposing their counts into those who ar-
rived during the decade between projections and those who survived
from the start of the decade to the end of the decade. Four, the infor-
mation from the previous steps are used to estimate the nativity com-
position of the Asian Americans in the 2004 Interim Projections.
The figure below summarizes the final Asian American projec-
tions by nativity based on the mid-range series. In 2000, an estimated
6.9 million APIs were foreign born, comprising about 60.9% of the
total estimated API population. Most adult APIs were foreign-born
(78.3%). Using the mid-projections for 2030, an estimated 13.0 mil-
lion APIs will be foreign born, comprising about 52.2% of the total
estimated API population. Most adult APIs will continue to be for-
eign-born (66.4%).i
Notes
i Using the low-projections for 2030, an estimated 7.5 million APIs will be foreign
born, comprising about 44.9% of the total estimated API population. However,
foreign-born will be a majority of adult APIs (56.3%).
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Political Participation 
and 
Civic Voluntarism
S. Karthick Ramakrishnan
University of California, Riverside
Political participation and involvement in community organi-
zations are the hallmark features of civic engagement in a democratic
society. Public involvement plays an important role in ensuring that
political institutions and leaders take the voices of residents into ac-
count when making decisions affecting their communities.  While
scholars have concerned themselves about overall declines in politi-
cal and civic participation (Putnam 2000), it is also important to pay
attention to inequalities in participation across different racial and
ethnic groups.  This is especially true for political outcomes, where
absolute levels of participation are less important than relative dif-
ferences in participation, with the latter playing a significant role in
determining which groups have more say than others in the formu-
lation and implementation of policy decisions.  However, group dif-
ferences are also relevant for civic participation: not only do civic
inequalities lead to political inequalities, but the ability of communi-
ties to provide public goods and services also depends critically on
the civic infrastructures already in place.  Thus, it is important to pay
attention to group inequalities in civic participation and political par-
ticipation because they pose significant challenges to the vitality of
American democracy.
This chapter examines the extent to which Asian Americans are
equal to other racial and ethnic groups when it comes to participat-
ing in community organizations and in the political process — with
activities ranging from voting to making campaign contributions,
writing to elected officials, and attending local government meetings.
We make these comparisons using national data where available, and
also using state-level data from California, the state that accounts for
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about 35% of the Asian American population in the United States and
serves as a harbinger of the country’s anticipated “majority-minor-
ity” status by mid-century.  The general finding is that participation
rates among Asian Americans are low compared to other racial and
ethnic groups.  We also show that even when Asian Americans do in-
deed participate, such as in making campaign contributions or creat-
ing vibrant community organizations, they tend to remain more
invisible and less influential in the eyes of government officials.
We also examine the extent to which participation may be af-
fected by such factors as age, length of residence in the United States,
and residence in ethnically concentrated areas.  Given the changes in
all of these factors over time — with longer-term immigrant residents
in the United States, the growth and aging of the immigrant second
generation, and the growth of Asian American populations in various
metropolitan areas — we project the likely trajectories of Asian Amer-
ican participation in the coming decades.  Finally, we offer sugges-
tions on ways to address the major challenges related to the future of
Asian American civic and political participation: increasing partici-
pation rates, making community organizations more viable, and get-
ting government officials to pay more attention to Asian American
community organizations.
Political Participation
Many scholars who study political behavior define civic en-
gagement as including activities that are explicitly political — such as
voting, attending public hearings, and writing to elected officials —
as well as activities related to voluntary participation in sectors of so-
ciety that are outside the realm of politics, the family, and the market
(Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995).  For a small proportion of individu-
als, engaging in civic voluntarism serves as a substitute for political
participation; this is especially so for youth who tend to favor com-
munity service over political participation as a more direct means of
improving their communities (Longo and Meyer 2006).  For most oth-
ers, however, civic participation is intimately connected to political
participation (Verba et al. 1995).  Participation in community organi-
zations connects people to politics in several ways: it helps individ-
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uals develop skills that are relevant to politics (such as writing to pub-
lic officials and mobilizing groups towards a common cause); it pro-
vides them with greater knowledge of politics by facilitating
interactions among people who share common interests and con-
cerns; and it provides them with opportunities to be mobilized by polit-
ical campaigns that look to organizations as sources of votes,
campaign contributions, and campaign volunteers (Rosenstone and
Hansen 1993).  Thus, for several reasons, understanding the role of
participation in civic engagement requires us to pay attention to in-
volvement in activities that are explicitly political as well as those that
are commonly classified under “social capital” or “civic volun-
tarism.”
Voting: Voting is the most common type of political activity in
the United States today and is arguably one of the hallmark features
of participation in a democratic society.  Voting in U.S. elections has
consistently been lower than in other advanced industrialized coun-
tries, although in the past two decades, gaps in voter turnout between
the United States and other countries have diminished considerably.
Still, in 2006, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) estimated that turnout in the United States was
about 20 percent below that of Germany and France, and 55 percent
below Italy’s (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment 2007). 
Voter participation in the United States is notable not only for
its generally lower levels of turnout, but also for its significant levels
of participation inequality across racial and ethnic groups and along
socioeconomic lines.  For instance, in the 2004 Presidential election,
the voting rate among Asian American adults (37%) was comparable
to voting among Latino adults (32%), and considerably lower than
the rates for African Americans (68%) and Whites (73%).  As Table 1
indicates, varying rates of citizenship among adults accounts for a
large portion of this gap, as only two-thirds of Asian American adults
were citizens while 95% of Black adults and 98% of White adults were
citizens in November 2004.  Still, even after taking citizenship gaps
into account, voting among Asian American adult citizens is about
40 percent (or 20 percentage points) lower than voting among eligi-
ble African Americans and Whites.
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Table 1. Citizenship and Voting Rates in November 2004
There are several reasons why voting among Asian American
citizens lags behind Whites and Blacks.  Length of stay in the United
States plays an important role, as recent immigrants are less likely to
hold strong party identification and be mobilized by political cam-
paigns (Ramakrishnan 2005; Wong 2006; Hajnal and Lee 2006).  A
similar story holds true for the immigrant generation, and the rela-
tively high proportion of first-generation immigrants among the
Asian American electorate helps account for the gaps in participation
with Whites and Blacks.  Participation among Asian Americans also
increases with age and indicators of socioeconomic status such as ed-
ucational attainment, income, and homeownership (Lien et al. 2004;
Ramakrishnan 2005).  Still, even after controlling for all of these fac-
tors, Asian Americans lag considerably behind African Americans
and Whites in terms of voting participation.
Campaign Contributions: Giving money to political causes may
affect policy outcomes directly by improving the likelihood of vic-
tory or defeat for ballot propositions.  Money can also influence pol-
icy outcomes indirectly, both by shaping access to elected officials and
by affecting the election outcomes of candidates who are friendly to
a group’s issues.i The question naturally arises as to whether mem-
bers of certain racial or ethnic groups have greater access or influence
than others when it comes to campaign finance.  Results from sur-
veys in California indicate that there are indeed significant gaps in
Voting
Rates
Among 
Adult
Residents
Citizenship 
Rates
Among 
Adult
Residents
Voting Rates 
Among Adult 
Citizens
Asian American 
and Pacific Islander 37 68 55
White 73 98 74
Black 68 95 72
Latino 32 59 55
Source: Current Population Survey Voter Supplement, 2004
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the rate of political contributions across racial and ethnic groups (Ra-
makrishnan and Baldassare 2004).  Just as in the case of voting and
signing petitions, Whites are the most likely to give to political causes
and candidates (26%), followed by Blacks (20%), Asian Americans
(17%), and Latinos (10%).  These gaps in giving remain even after
controlling for age and socioeconomic status.  There is no national
survey that compares Asian American campaign contribution activ-
ity with those of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos.  Evidence from the Pilot
National Asian American Political Survey (Lien 2004) indicates that
contribution rates among Asian Americans (12%) are similar to those
found in the general population in surveys such as the American Na-
tional Election Studies (Mutz and Sapiro 2000).  However, variation
in sampling design and questionnaires limit the comparability of the
data, and so we cannot say for certain whether or not Asian Ameri-
cans lag behind Whites in their giving to political causes and candi-
dates.  
Signing Petitions: In regions with state and local ballot proposi-
tions, participation in petition signatures is another important type of
political participation.  Gathering petition signatures is important to
civic engagement because it helps set the agenda on what questions
appear on state and local ballots and, just as importantly, what ques-
tions or issues do not appear.  As past studies have indicated, there
are sizable differences in the rate of petition signing across racial
groups (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare 2004).  For instance, in Cali-
fornia, Whites have the highest rates of participation (44%), followed
by Blacks (39%), Asian Americans (38%), and Latinos (29%).  Na-
tional-level data show an even greater gap in petition signing among
Asian Americans when compared to Whites.  For instance, the Social
Capital Benchmark Survey (Putnam 2000) shows that Asian Ameri-
cans are about one-third less likely to sign petitions as Whites (29%
versus 42%, respectively).  Also, just as in the case of voting, these
differences are not solely the result of differences in age and socioe-
conomic status.  Controlling for these factors still leaves intact the
lower rates of participation among Asian American citizens when
compared to Whites.  
To the extent that Asian Americans share the same policy prior-
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ities as other groups, this difference in petition gathering may not
lead to any racial differences in policy influence.  However, petition
gatherers may be less likely to target Asian Americans precisely be-
cause they do not share the same policy priorities as Whites.  Also,
even if Asian Americans are asked to sign petitions, they may be more
likely than Whites to feel that such petitions are tangential to their
concerns or run contrary to their interests.  Thus, to the extent that
Asian Americans have policy priorities and preferences that are sig-
nificantly different from Whites, their lower rates of participation in
signing petitions represents less power in setting the legislative
agenda of ballot propositions.
Attending Public Meetings: The ability to influence politics and
policy does not stop on Election Day.  Indeed, much of the task of
governance occurs between elections, and involves public officials
who have never run for elected office. The types of issues brought up
in public hearings and meetings are usually local in nature, relating
either to schools, land use, or the provision of government services.
Through public hearings and meetings, citizens and non-citizens
alike have the opportunity to influence the policy process.  However,
participation rates in public meetings are generally much lower than
for voting because they require greater time commitments to partic-
ipate and to get informed about particular issues, meeting times, and
locations.  Participation in public hearings also tends to be more chal-
lenging for first-generation immigrants who are more likely to face
linguistic and cultural barriers to speak up in front of government of-
ficials (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006).  The only data that
allow for comparisons in public meeting participation between Asian
Americans and other groups comes from the Public Policy Institute of
California (PPIC).  There, the data indicate that participation gaps
with Whites are small relative to the other gaps we have seen so far:
36% of Asian Americans and 38% of Whites have participated in
meetings on local issues, and the differences between the two are not
statistically significant.  Latinos and African Americans have slightly
higher rates of participation (42% and 43%, respectively), but these
differences lose their statistical significance when controlling for var-
ious demographic factors.
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Writing to Elected Officials: In addition to responding to those
who attend government meetings and public hearings, elected offi-
cials also pay considerable attention to letters from constituents.  Con-
stituents send emails and letters to express opinions on policy (Lee
2002), but also often request assistance with navigating federal, state,
and local bureaucracies.  As other studies have shown (Verba et al.
1995), requests for assistance are most common among those writing
their local and state representatives, while expressions of policy opin-
ion are more common among those writing elected officials at the na-
tional level.  Both these types of requests have implications for
influence over public policy.  If some groups are more likely than oth-
ers to write their elected officials for assistance, they are also likely to
enjoy a greater ability to navigate government bureaucracy in ways
that benefit their interests.   Group disparities in writing letters on
policy issues also have significant implications for the relative ability
of each group to influence legislative agendas and agency enforce-
ment.
Data from the PPIC statewide surveys in California indicate that
Asian Americans are considerably less likely than White residents to
write to elected officials (24% versus 35%, respectively). This gap re-
mains significant even after controlling for age, socioeconomic sta-
tus, and immigrant generation.  Finally, gaps in participation are also
evident at the national level when comparing participation rates in
the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (12%) and the
American National Election Study (25%). 
Attending Political Rallies: Attending rallies and speeches have a
less obvious effect on public policy than many of the other activities
considered so far because they play only a minor role in influencing
the election outcomes and setting the legislative agenda.  Still, rallies
provide an avenue for participation and political expression for those
who lack the monetary resources to contribute to campaigns or the
political knowledge necessary to participate in local meetings.  In-
deed, attendance at local rallies is also open to those who are not cit-
izens of the United States, a fact that could influence the relative level
of participation among Asian Americans.  However, research from
California and elsewhere suggests that Asian Americans lag behind
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other groups in this measure of political participation (Ramakrish-
nan and Baldassare 2004; Putnam 2000).  Regardless of whether one
is looking at citizens or noncitizens, Asian Americans are consider-
ably less likely to participate in political rallies than Whites or Blacks,
a finding that holds true even after controlling for various demo-
graphic factors.
Civic Participation
While much is known about the relationship between race, im-
migration and political participation in the United States, far less is
known about the “other half” of civic engagement — those activities
relating to volunteerism and civic association.  The study of group
differences in volunteerism and civic association (hereafter civic vol-
untarism) is important to the study of politics for several reasons.
First, civic associations often serve as important conduits to more for-
mal means of political participation, either through the acquisition of
relevant political knowledge and skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady
1995), or through attempts by political actors to mobilize those who
are already involved in the civic life of their communities (Rosenstone
and Hansen 1993).  Thus, while the group differences in writing
elected officials and contributing money to politics may point to in-
equalities in political access in the contemporary period, group dis-
parities in civic voluntarism may lead to continued inequalities in
political participation over the long term.  Finally, civic voluntarism
also has significant implications for public policy since community
organizations are important actors in the provision of public goods.
With state and local governments in various regions experiencing se-
vere budget shortfalls, many expect civic associations, religious
groups and charities to provide public goods in the absence of gov-
ernment spending (Marimow 2003).
The Current Population Survey Volunteer Supplement allows
us to compare participation rates of Asian Americans to other racial
and ethnic groups.  As shown in Table 2, there are significant differ-
ences across racial groups in civic volunteerism.  The table presents
results for the most basic measures of volunteerism — rates of par-
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ticipation in the previous 12 months, the number of organizations in
which volunteers participate, and the intensity of participation as
measured by the number of hours spent volunteering. 
Table 2.  Volunteerism among adult residents, by race/ethnicity
When we consider the most basic metric of volunteerism —
whether or not the respondent has done any volunteer work in the
previous 12 months — Whites have the highest levels of participa-
tion.  Nearly one-third of White respondents report having volun-
teered, while only about one in six Asian Americans had done so, a
level comparable to the participation rate among African Americans
and slightly higher than the participation rate among Latinos.  The
gap in volunteerism between Whites and non-Whites is also appar-
ent in the number of organizations in which volunteers participate.
Whites who volunteer participate in an average of 1.5 organizations,
while the corresponding figures are 1.4 for Blacks, 1.3 for Asian Amer-
icans, and 1.3 for Latinos.  Asian Americans are also less likely than
Whites to be recruited to volunteer for an organization. Among those
who volunteer, 43% of Asian Americans were asked to do so or fol-
lowed the lead of a friend or family member.  By contrast, 46% of
Blacks and Latinos and 50% of Whites were recruited into volun-
teerism.  Finally, the intensity of participation as measured by hours
volunteered is lower for Asian Americans than for any other racial or
ethnic group in the United States.  It should be noted that these same
group differences in voluntarism are also present in a state such as
California, where the Asian American population is much larger and
more established (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare 2004).  This holds
Overall AsianAmerican White Black Latino 
Volunteered in organization (%) 27 18 31 19 14 
Among Volunteers 
  Number of organizations 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 
  Recruited to participate (%) 49 43 50 46 46 
  Hours volunteered per year 139 107 138 168 127 
Source: Current Population Survey Volunteer Supplement, September 2006 
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true, not only for overall participation rates, but also for the intensity
of participation among volunteers.  Thus, the growth of the Asian
American population, in and of itself, is unlikely to lead to any large-
scale changes in civic voluntarism.
Much of the differences in civic voluntarism between Asian
Americans and Latinos, on the one hand and Whites and Blacks on
the other, can be attributed to varying mixes of immigrant genera-
tions.  Even more so than in the case for voting, we find strong dif-
ferences in civic voluntarism across immigrant generations.  As we
see in Table 3, the likelihood of volunteering increases by over 70%
from the first immigrant generation to the third generation and be-
yond.  Indeed, by the third generation there are no significant differ-
ences in the participation rates of Asian Americans and Whites (32%).
Thus, while Asian Americans still lag considerably behind Whites in
terms of voting participation, the same is not true for civic volun-
tarism.
Table 3.  Differences in Volunteerism Within the Asian American Pop-
ulation
By Immigrant Generation
First-generation 17
Second-generation 20
Third generation and higher 29
By National Origin*
Japanese 25
Korean 22
South Asian 22
Filipino 21
Chinese 17
Vietnamese 14
Hmong 13
* Note: National origins are calculations based on the nativity of parents, and are therefore
unavailable beyond the second generation.  The Current Population Survey does not in-
clude information on national origin for groups other than Latinos.
Source: Current Population Survey Volunteer Supplement, September 2006
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There are also important differences in participation rates by na-
tional origin, which are in line with expectations regarding the posi-
tive relationship between socioeconomic status and civic
participation.  Japanese Americans, Korean Americans, and South
Asians, who are among the most well-to-do Asian Americans, have
the highest rates of civic voluntarism among first- and second-gen-
eration immigrants.  On the other hand, Hmong and Vietnamese
Americans, who tend to fare less well in terms of educational attain-
ment and income, have lower levels of civic voluntarism.  Controlling
for education and income wipes out any national-origin differences
in civic participation among Asian Americans.  Still, looking across
racial and ethnic groups, introducing controls for education and in-
come leaves Asian Americans less likely to participate than Whites,
suggesting that other factors related to civic outreach by existing or-
ganizations and the attitudes and priorities of Asian American resi-
dents may also play a significant role (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes
2006).
Finally, in our understanding of civic voluntarism, it is impor-
tant to examine not only whether people engage in voluntary activi-
ties, but also the types of organizations in which volunteers are
involved.  As indicated in Table 4, Asian Americans who volunteer
are most likely to do so for religious organizations (39%).   This em-
phasis on religious organizations is even stronger for Asian American
volunteers than for Whites and African Americans, suggesting that
studies of Asian American civic participation need to pay far greater
attention to religious institutions (Wong et al. 2008).  Next, Asian
American volunteers focus their energies on organizations catering to
children and youth, followed by social and community service or-
ganizations and health organizations.  These differences are in line
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with overall patterns of volunteerism in American society.
Table 4.  Differences in Volunteerism By Organization Type
So, to summarize: The relationships between race, immigrant
incorporation and voting participation in the United States are by
now well established.  Studies based on state- and national-level
datasets have shown that Asian Americans are generally less likely to
vote in elections than Whites and African Americans.  Furthermore,
factors related to immigration such as nativity, length of stay in the
United States, English language ability, and country of origin char-
acteristics all bear a significant relationship to voting participation
(DeSipio 1996; Tam Cho 1999; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001).
These gaps in voting also extend to other types of political activities
such as writing to elected officials and attending public hearings, as
well as to civic activities.  Thus, instead of finding compensation for
the lack of Asian American political voice at the ballot box with par-
ticipation in other civic and political activities, we find a worrisome
pattern of compounding inequalities in participation, with Asian
Americans at a distinct disadvantage.
Projecting Future Patterns
While the present-day snapshot reveals many significant gaps in
participation between Asian Americans and other racial/ethnic
groups in the United States, many of the anticipated changes in the
Asian American population over the next 30 years should help to im-
prove Asian American civic and political participation.  These
Overall AsianAmerican White Black Latino 
Organization types (main group) 
     - Religious 35% 39% 34% 35% 43% 
     - Children / Youth 20 20 19 28 20 
     - Social / community service 13 10 13 11 12 
     - Health 8 10 8 6 5 
     - Adult education 4 4 4 5 4 
Source: Current Population Survey Volunteer Supplement, September 2006 
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changes include the continued aging of the Asian American popula-
tion and the growing proportion of native-born residents and long-
term immigrant residents.  Given the relevance of these factors to
future trends in participation, it is worth considering why these fac-
tors have an important bearing on political and civic participation.
Previous studies have consistently shown that age bears a sig-
nificant relationship to political participation, with low levels of in-
volvement among young adults for virtually every type of political
activity — from voting and signing petitions to writing elected offi-
cials and working on political campaigns (Rosenstone and Hansen,
1993; Verba et al. 1995).  The reasons for low participation among the
young are also relatively well established.  Apart from the fact that
they are less likely to be homeowners or have children and that they
are more residentially mobile than older adults, the young are less
likely to participate because they have had fewer experiences that
produce the knowledge and skills necessary to participate in politics.
In the study of immigrant populations, length of stay in the
United States is another important factor in predicting political and
civic participation. Duration of stay in the United States can lead to
higher participation for several reasons.  First, as immigrants live
longer in the country, they are more likely to come in contact with
mainstream political and civic institutions that are beyond the con-
fines of their ethnic enclaves and institutions (Gordon 1964).  They
are also more likely to acquire politically relevant information,
strengthen their party attachments and gain experience in dealing
with government agencies (Cain et al. 1991; Wong 2000; Jones-Correa
1998).  Finally, just as longer stay in a given neighborhood gives citi-
zens a greater sense of having a stake in local and state politics, longer
stay in the United States can give immigrants a stronger stake in na-
tional politics.   It is possible that greater experience with the politi-
cal system can also lead to lower participation as immigrants
experience varying levels of distrust or frustration with government
agencies.  However, most of the empirical evidence for Asian Amer-
icans indicates otherwise — greater exposure to the political system
from staying longer in the United States has meant a higher likeli-
hood of political participation.  Longer stay in the United States has
also meant greater participation in community organizations by
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Asian Americans (Ramakrishnan 2006).
The relationships between the immigrant generation and polit-
ical participation are a little more complicated.  For Whites, there is no
straight-line generational pattern in voting participation as there is
for other types of social and economic outcomes such as homeown-
ership and income.  Instead, studies have found a pattern of “second-
generation advantage,” where participation increases into the second
generation but declines thereafter (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade
2001).  Among Latinos, voter turnout is relatively flat across immi-
grant generations.  For Asian Americans, however, voting increases
from the first generation to higher immigrant generations — sug-
gesting that assimilation-related factors play a significant role, but
that race-related barriers such as ascribed foreigner status continue to
serve as a drag on participation among second- and third-generation
Asian immigrants (Kim 1999).  This linear increase in participation
can also be found for other political activities such as signing peti-
tions and attending public hearings, and also for civic voluntarism.
In the coming decades, the Asian American population is pro-
jected to get older.  The proportion of second-generation immigrants
is expected to increase, even though first-generation immigrants
would still constitute the majority of the adult population.  Finally,
given the continuous rise in immigration since 1965, the average
length-of-stay among first-generation Asian immigrants is also ex-
pected to increase.  All of these factors should help increase the level
of Asian American participation in the years ahead.
There are, however, some important caveats.  First, other racial
and ethnic groups in the United States are also expected to get older,
with non-Hispanic Whites constituting the vast majority of residents
over age 65.  Thus, even with increases in their absolute levels of par-
ticipation, the Asian American population is still likely to lag behind
Whites in political participation.  Since participation in civic volun-
tarism tends to drop off among seniors, this may be less of an issue
for civic voluntarism.  Also, the growing size of the Asian American
population may have some unforeseen effects on political and civic
participation.  If California is a harbinger of Asian American civic en-
gagement in the rest of the United States, significant participation
gaps would continue to remain, even with increases in the number of
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Asian American elected officials in Congress and in local offices.
So, what can be done to reduce the gaps in participation be-
tween Asian Americans and other groups?  Given the high proportion
of first-generation immigrants in the Asian American population, it is
advisable for organizations providing training for the naturalization
exam to also provide training in skills that are necessary for effective
political participation.  For example, in the case of writing a letter to
a local official, relevant skills include finding out who to send a let-
ter to, knowing how to compose a formal letter, and following up on
the letter by attending local meetings. For many immigrants, limited
English proficiency may constrain their ability to engage in such ac-
tivities.  In cities where there are large proportions of Asian immi-
grants with limited English proficiency, city governments and
community organizations can encourage participation by providing
translation and other forms of language assistance.
In addition to providing relevant skills, recruitment and mobi-
lization are also necessary prerequisites to increasing the level of civic
engagement among Asian Americans.  Many studies have shown that
parties and campaigns conduct only limited outreach to Asian Amer-
ican communities.  Our research indicates that this lack of outreach
also applies to mainstream civic organizations.  Immigrants are more
likely than the native-born to say that they lack sufficient informa-
tion about volunteering opportunities.  Also, among those who do
volunteer, immigrants are less likely to say that they were recruited
to participate by someone in the organization.  These results there-
fore indicate the need for more active recruitment efforts, not just by
political parties and campaigns but also by community organizations
seeking to increase the civic participation of residents.
There are other solutions that extend beyond efforts targeted at
individuals.  For instance, there is a new body of research which
shows that, even when Asian Americans create or participate in com-
munity organizations, those ethnic associations receive far less at-
tention from public officials than more established organizations
serving White residents (Wong 2006; Ramakrishnan and Viramontes
2006; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008).  Another issue involves
redistricting: it is challenging to draw districts with sizable Asian
American voters because of their smaller numbers and greater resi-
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dential dispersion than African Americans and Latinos (Lien 2001).
Still, it is possible to draw districts for state and local government of-
fices with significant Asian American populations in several metro-
politan areas such as New York City, Central New Jersey, northern
Virginia, Chicago, Houston, and the counties of Los Angeles, Orange,
San Francisco, San Mateo, and Alameda in California (Lai and Geron
2008).
With the necessary skills, recruitment, and institutional support,
Asian Americans can finally hope to bridge the gaps in participation
with members of other racial and ethnic groups for activities that ex-
tend well beyond the ballot box.
Notes
i Past studies have shown that, although individual political donations rarely
have direct effects on legislative votes, institutional actors who give money to
legislators do have a greater degree of access to the shaping of legislation
(Hansen, 1991).
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This essay examines the current status, trend, and future
prospect of Asian American civic engagement through the lens of po-
litical participation.  It pays particular attention to the role of nativ-
ity and assesses the extent to which immigrants or foreign-born
persons of Asian descent, as compared to their U.S.-born counter-
parts, are able to participate in the formal political process as citizens
and voters as well as in other types of political and civic activities.ii
Because the Asian American voting-age population is dominated by
the foreign-born, a main purpose of this essay is to empirically ap-
praise whether being foreign-born is a barrier to or an asset in polit-
ical participation.  Another issue addressed here is whether if and
how much immigrants’ engagement with the home country of ori-
gin affects their political participation in the United States.  Support-
ing the central thesis that Asian American immigrants are vital to the
community’s growth and political empowerment, I find that the large
presence of the foreign-born is not a liability but an asset to the com-
munity’s political and civic engagement.  
Five major findings are worth highlighting:  First, foreign-born
Asian Americans not only show strong inclination to become politi-
cally incorporated through the acquisition of U.S. citizenship but
would become registered and vote once eligible—often at equal or
higher rates than their U.S.-born counterparts.  Second, Asian immi-
grants’ relative disadvantages in participation resources due to lan-
guage and socialization barriers compared to the U.S.-born may be
compensated by their concern over immigrant minority status in the
hostland and transnational ties to the ethnic homeland.  Third, the
rapid and consistent waves of new migration from Asia and Asian
immigrants’ greater aptitude for political incorporation have helped
put Asian Americans on top of the growth chart in terms of the share
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and size of the U.S. voting-age population, U.S. voting-age citizens,
as well as the American electorate in elections since 1990.  Fourth,
first generation immigrants from Asia not only have become voters
but also candidates and elected officials and have contributed more
to the community’s growth of electoral leadership than immigrants in
any other major racial and ethnic groups.  Fifth, in part driven by con-
cerns over the issue of immigration and immigrant rights, Asian
Americans are growing in their ability to be seen as a politically co-
hesive and consequential group of voters.  In light of the centrality of
the foreign-born sector, the essay ends with a speculation of the future
for political empowerment in terms of challenges and needs to better
engage Asian American immigrants in the American political process.
The Rise and Significance of the 
Foreign-Born Population
A distinctive feature of the Asian American population, as com-
pared to other major U.S. racial and ethnic groups at the dawn of the
21st century, is the rapid growth and predominance of the foreign-
born.  From 1970 to 2000, U.S. Census data show that the foreign-born
among Asians (including Pacific Islanders) increased twelve-fold or
from half a million to over 4.5 million (Gibson and Lennon 1999;
Schimdley 2001).  By comparison, foreign-born Blacks grew nine-fold
and foreign-born Latinos grew over seven-fold during the same pe-
riod.  Whereas the foreign-born sector in both the African American
and Latino communities also experienced phenomenal growth, only
foreign-born Asians were able to reverse their status in the commu-
nity from a numerical minority to a majority in the post-1965 era.  For-
eign-born persons constituted 32% among Asians in 1960 and 36% in
1970; they were 59% of the Asian population in 1980 and 63% in 1990.
In Census 2000, 8.2 million foreign-born residents in the United States
identified themselves as from Asia, which accounts for a quarter
(26%) of the nation’s total foreign-born population (Malone, Baluja,
Costanzo, and Davis 2003).  At 69% of the total Asian (alone) popu-
lation in 2000, as compared to 40% among Latinos, 20% among Na-
tive Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders, 6% among Blacks, 5% among
American Indians and Alaskan Natives, and 3% among non-Hispanic
Political and Civic Engagement of Immigrants  49
Whites, foreign-born persons constitute a disproportionally large
share of the Asian population than in any other major racial/ethnic
groups in the United States (Lien 2006a, Table 8-1).iii
The observed trend of the rapid and consistent growth of the
foreign-born sector in the Asian American population is estimated to
continue in the near future, with projected growth to 13 million in
size by 2030.  Although just over half of the total estimated Asian (and
Pacific Islander) population may be foreign-born in 2030, those who
were born as non-U.S. citizens are estimated to remain a majority con-
stituting two-thirds of the voting-age persons then.   Immigration has
been a key driver in the growth of the Asian American population in
the post-1965 era.   However, new migration from Asia is expected to
play a declining role in Asian population change, while births in the
United States to immigrants and their descendants is expected to play
a growing role in the years to come.  In fact, a new report released by
the Pew Research Center projects that by 2050, fewer than half (47%)
of the Asian (and Pacific Islander) population will be foreign-born,
while one-third (35%) will be in the second generation (Passel and
Cohn 2008).  Because foreign-born and U.S.-born persons do not share
the same political rights upon entering the United States, and chil-
dren of immigrants may have different socialization experiences than
their foreign-born parents, one key element in the following analysis
is to compare the foreign-born to the U.S.-born in their patterns of
voting and other participation in the electoral arena. 
Voting Participation as a Three-Step Process
The fascinating growth of the Asian American population in re-
cent decades portends great potential to expand the community’s
electoral base.  Nevertheless, as a majority-immigrant community,
Asian Americans’ ability to participate fully in the U.S. electoral
process needs to be understood as a three-step process (Lien et al.
2001).  In order to cast her ballot, an immigrant voter must engage in
a three-step process of becoming naturalized, becoming registered to
vote, and turning out (or mailing in the ballot before or) on Election
Day.  A set of barriers or costs is involved at each turn of the process.
Becoming a citizen requires, among other things: a minimum period
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of continuous residence and physical presence in the United States; an
ability to read, write, and speak English; a knowledge and under-
standing of U.S. history and government; and the ability to pay a con-
tinuously rising application fee which jumped from $400 to $675 in
July 2007.iv For those immigrants who have survived the naturaliza-
tion process, their franchise can be wasted by their failure to become
registered to vote, which is a procedure foreign to many Asian im-
migrants who came from systems with government initiated voter
registration.v Registering to vote and casting the vote either in per-
son or by mail require the acquisition and/or possession of informa-
tion, time, skills, and other resources (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady
1995).  This may be particularly onerous in a direct democracy state
such California where it is estimated that 40% of the Asian American
population lies.  When one adds to the equation unique factors such
as language barriers, lack of familiarity with the U.S. system, social
discrimination, and economic hardship for working-class immi-
grants, it comes as little surprise that Asian Americans have one of the
lowest citizenship, voting registration, and turnout rates among vot-
ing-age persons.  Nonetheless, because voting in the United States is
a three-step process, it is both inaccurate and premature to draw con-
clusions from these unadjusted statistics about the political aptitude
and behavior of Asian Americans.
Are Asian Americans Politically Apathetic?
To assess whether Asian Americans are intrinsically apathetic,
Table 1 reports the percentage distribution of nativity, citizenship,
voter registration, and voting across adults of four major racial and
ethnic groups in the November 2004 elections using the US Census
Current Population Survey Voter Supplement file.vi Consistent with
the population characteristics described earlier, Asians report the
highest foreign-born rate among voting-age persons.  Three in four
Asians, compared to 57% among Latinos, but only one in 10 among
Blacks and one in 20 among (non-Hispanic) Whites were foreign-born
in 2004.  This racial disparity in nativity is translated into racial gaps
in citizenship, with Whites having the highest rate (98%), followed
by Blacks (95%), and distantly by Asians (69%) and Latinos (59%).
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Underscoring the central and critical role of immigrants in Asian
American political empowerment, a lofty two-thirds of citizens
among Asians acquired their citizenship through naturalization, a
rate much higher than the 27% among Latinos and the single-digit
figures among Blacks and Whites.  
Despite having a much higher proportion of foreign-born per-
sons in the adult population, Asians were able to score better than
Latinos in overall citizenship rate because a much higher percentage
of foreign-born Asians than Latinos had become naturalized.  In fact,
at 59%, foreign-born Asians and Whites are equal in their naturaliza-
tion rates, which more than double that for Latinos.  Studies looking
at the naturalization rates from long-term perspectives consistently
find immigrants from Asia to have become naturalized at an earlier
time and at rates higher than immigrants from Mexico and many
other parts of the world (Baker 2007; Simanski 2007).  Asian immi-
grants’ exceptional speed of naturalization may be attributed to their
greater employment of early naturalization (Barkan 1983) which may,
in turn, be related to a lack of proximity to the ethnic homeland, em-
igration driven more by political than economic motives, high edu-
cational and/or occupational background, and the ability of U.S.
citizens to sponsor the immigration of family members (Portes and
Mozo 1985; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990).  The acquisition of citizen-
ship by Asian individuals may be most influenced by their length of
stay in the U.S.  In their analysis of the 1994 census data, Ong and
Nakanishi (1996) also find that those who are younger, who are Eng-
lish proficient, and who have more education are more likely to be-
come citizens as well.   The effect of education diminishes after the
level of bachelor’s degree because immigrants with advanced degrees
are more likely to be in the United States on temporary visas.
Because not all foreign-born persons at any given point in time
are eligible to or able to successfully petition for naturalization, the
racial disparities in nativity and citizenship directly impact the rates
of voter registration where only slightly over one-third of voting-age
Asians (and Latinos) were registered to vote—rates that are half of
the national average and less than half of the rate among Whites.  A
similar pattern of racial gaps is found in the rates of voting among
voting-age persons.  Yet, when voting and registration rates are ex-
52 Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
amined among eligible persons (citizens for registration and regis-
tered voters for voting), at least half of Asian American citizens (53%)
reported registered and as high as 85% of registered Asians reported
voting in 2004.  Although there is still a deficit of 22 percentage points
between the registration rate of Asian American citizens and their
White counterparts, and Asians are still at the bottom in terms of reg-
istration rates among eligible persons, the voting rate of registered
Asians exceeds that of registered Latinos and is only a few percent-
age points less than registered Blacks or Whites.  This exercise shows
that, for a majority-immigrant community such as Asian Americans,
the major source of the apparent deficit in their voting participation
lies in the first two steps of voting.  Once these institutional barriers
are crossed, there is no evidence that Asian Americans are apathetic
in voting participation.
Is There a Foreign-Born Disadvantage in 
Voting and Registration?
Are immigrants inherently disadvantaged by their foreign-born
status in voting participation?  Foreign-born persons do not possess
U.S. citizenship unless through naturalization.vii Not all foreign-born
persons are ready, able, or willing to petition for naturalization even
if they meet the length of residency requirement.  Although a recent
research shows that as high as seven in ten non-citizens among
Asians expected to become US citizens in the next few years (Lien,
Conway, and Wong 2004), only a fraction of the voting-age persons
who are foreign-born may be eligible to become registered voters at
any given point in time.   Nevertheless, being foreign-born may not
necessarily link one to a lower likelihood to participate in U.S. elec-
tions.  When voting and registration rates are calculated only among
eligible persons, the results in Table 1 show that Asians who are for-
eign-born practically registered and voted at rates equal to their U.S.-
born counterparts in 2004.  Just over half of citizens of Asian descent,
whether born in the United States or not, registered to vote, and more
than eight in ten registered voters of Asian descent, foreign-born or
not, voted in 2004 presidential elections.  Thus, for Asians, the for-
eign-born generation possesses about the same level of aptitude to-
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ward voting and registration as the U.S.-born generations.  
The myth of the foreign-born disadvantage also does hold true
for other groups of immigrants.  For naturalized Latino immigrants,
they not only do not show a lower propensity to become registered
than the U.S.-born, but the reverse is true regarding their turnout.
Close to six in ten Latinos citizens, either by birth or by naturalization,
registered to vote in 2004.  Almost nine in ten Latino immigrants who
registered to vote turned out to vote, a rate significantly higher than
the 80% turnout rate among registered U.S.-born Latinos.  The for-
eign-born sector of registered voters among Blacks and Whites is also
found to have a higher voting rate than the native-born sector.  Nev-
ertheless, the native-born sector of these two groups report a higher
voting registration rate among citizens than their foreign-born coun-
terparts.  This shows that the role of nativity in registration and vot-
ing may vary by race.  Still, among the registered of all races, the
foreign-born sector voted at rates at least on par with their native-
born counterparts.  For communities with a foreign-born majority,
the status of being foreign-born also does not form a natural barrier
to voter registration among voting-age citizens. 
How Exceptional is the 2004 Election Cycle?
Is the 2004 election cycle the exception or the norm in terms of
the effect of the foreign-born or nativity factor on voting?  We answer
this question by looking at the longitudinal data provided every other
year in the Current Population Survey which began asking questions
about respondents’ and their parents’ country of birth in 1994.  Table
2 reports the registration and voting rates among eligible persons by
nativity for the four major races in the six election cycles between
1994 and 2004.  Among Asian American citizens, the pattern of equal
registration between the foreign- and the native- born did not become
apparent until the 2002 election.  Prior to that, foreign-born citizens
registered at lower rates than the U.S.-born.  Among Latinos, the dis-
advantage of foreign-born citizens in registration rates was apparent
only in midterm elections, and nativity was a non-factor in registra-
tion rates in both 2000 and 2004 presidential elections.  For Asians
and Latinos, whenever U.S.-born persons had an edge in registration
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rates, the gap was much smaller in presidential than in midterm elec-
tions.  The heightened campaign stimuli in presidential elections
might have helped close the registration gaps.  Nevertheless, for both
Black and White immigrants who became naturalized, being foreign-
born was consistently linked to lower registration rates in all six elec-
tions.  The small share of the foreign-born population and the lack of
immigrant-targeted voter registration drives may explain the per-
sistent foreign-born disadvantage.  These observed trends in voter
registration rates suggest that the 2004 figures are not a one-time phe-
nomenon.   
The lower half of Table 2 shows that nativity as a factor in polit-
ical participation operated differently in influencing voting turnout
than registration rates among eligible persons in the six election cy-
cles.  Once foreign-born persons crossed the citizenship and self-reg-
istration hurdles and became registered voters, they typically
participated in elections at rates that were either equal to or higher
than their native-born counterparts.  This was particularly true
among Latinos where the foreign-born consistently outvoted the U.S.-
born.  For Asians, the observed pattern of foreign-born advantage in
voting turnout only applies to one election cycle (2000).  In midterm
elections, foreign-born Asians consistently voted less than U.S.-born
Asians.  Nevertheless, in presidential elections, foreign-born Asians
did not vote much differently than their native-born counterparts.
Thus, we may reject notions of absolute foreign-born disadvantage
in voting turnout even among Asians.  The longitudinal analysis also
allows us to conclude that the 2004 findings on voting turnout is
within the norm set in previous presidential elections.
How Different Are Asian Ethnic Groups in 
Their Participation Patterns?
Although the Asian population in the United States has histori-
cally been lumped together as one by U.S. society, government, and
politics, it is a population with multiple ethnic origins and a wide
range of population size, growth rate, and income and education lev-
els as well as immigration history and settlement patterns across eth-
nic groups (for a review, see Min 2006).  Japanese Americans, for
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instance, are the only Asian American group in which a majority was
born in the United States since the 1940 Census.  The unique nativity
status of Japanese Americans is shown in Table 3, which reports eth-
nic group differences in voting participation among Asian American
adults of the first two immigration generations in 2004.  The Japanese
have the lowest percentage share of the foreign-born, while Koreans
have the highest.  Correspondingly, the share of citizenship acquired
through naturalization is also lowest among the Japanese and high-
est among Koreans.  The Vietnamese report the highest citizenship
rate, in large part because of the high naturalization rate among im-
migrants who arrived mostly as political refugees.   Conversely, Asian
Indians as a community with the most rapid growth between 1990
and 2000 due to new migration from Asia report the lowest citizen-
ship rate as well as naturalization rate among the foreign-born.  As a
consequence, Asian Indians report the lowest voter registration and
voting rates among voting-age persons.  The Japanese, in contrast,
report the highest rates.  
Ethnic groups differ in members’ ability to satisfy naturalization
requirements and to become registered and vote after satisfying the
self-registration requirements.  When the citizenship barrier is con-
sidered in studying voter registration statistics, all the six major eth-
nic groups report comparable rates of voter registration—with a slim
majority among citizens having registered to vote and with only six
percentage points separating the community with the highest (Japan-
ese) and the lowest (Vietnamese) rates.  The role of nativity in voter
registration varies across ethnic groups.  Whereas U.S.-born citizens
have much higher registration rates than foreign-born naturalized cit-
izens among the Chinese and Japanese communities, exactly the re-
verse is true in Filipino, Korean, Asian Indian, and the Vietnamese
communities where citizens with immigrant background are more
likely to become registered.   When the self-registration hurdle is con-
sidered, a somewhat different set of ethnic dynamics emerges in vot-
ing turnout.  Among registered voters, the Japanese report the highest
turnout rate of 91%, while Filipinos report the lowest rate of 81%.
And whereas registered U.S.-born Asian Indians report a higher
turnout rate than their foreign-born counterparts, foreign-born natu-
ralized citizens of all other Asian ethnicities who became registered
56 Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
all report a turnout rate that is either on par with or higher than that
of their U.S.-born counterparts.    
Compared to data collected in elections 1994-2000 and reported
by Asian ethnicity in Lien (2004), there are some consistent patterns
but also important differences in findings across time.  For example,
immigrants continue to dominate the voting-age population of the
first two generations by a nearly 9 to 1 margin. Second, Asian Indians
continue to report the lowest share of citizens among voting-age per-
sons and lowest naturalization rate among the foreign-born. And
third, the Japanese continue to report the highest rate of voting
among voting-age persons and the registered.   Like other American
voters, the participation rates of all Asian groups surge in high-stim-
ulus presidential elections and decline in midterm elections.  And
true as before, once crossing the barriers in the first two steps of the
voting process, some Asian American groups may report higher rates
of turnout than those among non-Hispanic Whites.  However, per-
haps indicative of changing times, Filipinos are no longer the group
that leads others in citizenship and naturalization rates.  Also, the
Vietnamese are no longer the group that has the lowest registration
rate among citizens.  Instead of ranking at the bottom in terms of vot-
ing turnout as they did in the 1990s, Koreans are placed second only
to the Japanese in terms of turnout in 2004. 
How Unique is the Foreign-born Factor?  
Multivariate Results
To assess the unique role of the foreign-born factor in voting par-
ticipation, we need to understand and sort out the significance of
other factors that may influence participation.  We begin with four
sets of factors based on well-established theories of political partici-
pation (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980;
Conway 1991; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady 1995; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1998; Leighley 2001).  In
general, voting participation can be influenced by socioeconomic factors
such as education and income.  It can also be influenced by socializa-
tion factors such as gender and age and the degree of social connect-
edness or ties, as indicated by residential mobility, marital status,
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employment status, and union membership.  In addition, voting reg-
istration and turnout – particularly the latter – can be affected by the
amount of campaign stimuli in the political mobilization context as
shaped by media coverage, candidate and party evaluation, signifi-
cance of office, issue salience, certainty of outcome, election types,
and regional political culture (Jackson 1996).  On top of these tradi-
tional theoretical frameworks, some researchers argue for the inclu-
sion of factors related to international migration such as nativity (being
foreign-born vs. U.S.-born) and length of stay (as a percentage of po-
litical life in the U.S.), which may affect adult (re-) socialization as
well as the related institutional constraints of citizenship and regis-
tration requirements (Lien 2004; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004;
Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005).    
Findings of the applicability of these theories to predict the vot-
ing registration and turnout of Asians are not consistent, in part be-
cause of the variation in data source and methodology.  Because of
substantive differences in major population characteristics between
Asians and non-Asian groups, it seems increasingly clear that the con-
ventional indicators of voting participation such as socioeconomic
class, group- and family-based social ties (such as gender, union, em-
ployment status, and marital status) may be relatively less significant
for Asians than for whites and, to some extent, blacks and Latinos
(Nakanishi 1991; Lien 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2004; Cho 1999).  Nev-
ertheless, focusing on Asians as a whole, research using census data
shows that some of the conventional indicators such as education, in-
come, age, length of residence, and length of U.S. stay are useful pre-
dictors of the voting participation of Asians (Ong and Nakanishi 1996;
Lien 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004).  Greater length of stay in the U.S. as a
percentage of political life spent here may have a positive effect be-
cause of its relationship to immigrant political socialization (Cho
1999; Wong 2001).  Geopolitical context may have an effect in that the
heightened levels of participation for residents in Hawaii and Cali-
fornia may reflect the greater elite incorporation and participation in
the electoral processes in these two Western states (Lien 2001, 2004;
Lai 2000).  However, the net effect of mobilization context may be less
significant in shaping voting registration than turnout.  In the former
process, individual characteristics may matter more.   
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Research using the 2000 election data finds that, after control-
ling for differences in a variety of conditions, including the percent-
age of time spent in the U.S.,  naturalized foreign-born citizens as a
whole may be associated with a higher tendency to become regis-
tered than their native-born counterparts, while foreign-born regis-
tered voters as a whole may not have a significantly  different  voting
tendency than their U.S.-born counterparts (Lien 2004).  Everything
else being equal, foreign-born Latinos are observed to be more likely
both to become registered once naturalized and to vote once regis-
tered; foreign-born blacks are more likely to vote but not more likely
to become registered than their white counterparts.  U.S.-born Asians,
on the other hand, are significantly less likely to become registered
and to vote once registered than their non-Hispanic White counter-
parts.  Focusing on  Asians alone, research using pooled data from
1994 to 2000 elections similarly finds that, other conditions being
equal, foreign-born naturalized citizens are more likely to become
registered but no less likely to vote once registered compared to their
U.S-born counterparts.    Moreover, different from predicting regis-
tration among citizens which is more influenced by individual char-
acteristics, voting turnout among the registered is more likely among
those Asians who reside in higher empowerment states such as
Hawaii and California.  Looking into how the nativity factor oper-
ates in each of the six major ethnic groups, the pooled census data
show that, among eligible persons and net of other factors, being for-
eign-born may be associated with a higher likelihood to become reg-
istered but only for Chinese, Korean, and Asian Indian Americans.
Being foreign-born in general cannot be associated with a higher like-
lihood to vote except for Koreans.
How Active Are Asians in Other Means of 
Political and Civic Participation?
So far, research shows that naturalized citizens may not be
disadvantaged in the voting process by their foreign-born status.
Rather, their immigrant background may sometimes provide an extra
incentive for them to seek greater political incorporation.  This can
happen when immigrants sense a hostile political environment that
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threatens to deprive themselves or their friends, relatives, and immi-
grant children of access to education, health care, and other govern-
mental services associated with U.S. citizenship (Pantoja, Ramirez,
and Segura 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Barreto 2005; Ramakrish-
nan 2005; Bedolla 2005).  Immigrants may also seek greater political
incorporation out of concern about the people and status of the eth-
nic homeland (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Blanc, 1994; Karpathakis,
1999; DeSipio 2006; Lien 2006b; Rogers 2006).  Voting participation,
however, is only one of the indicators of political engagement and
one that is restricted to citizens and registered voters.   Legend has it
that Asian Americans, because of their affluence and immigrant back-
ground, prefer to participate in the American electoral process
through other means than voting (Erie and Brackman 1993).  How
active are foreign-born Asians in non-electoral activities that do not
require U.S. citizenship?  And is being foreign-born a positive or neg-
ative factor of participation in these political activities?    
The Pilot National Asian American Survey (PNAAPS)viii pro-
vides an unprecedented opportunity to empirically examine partici-
pation beyond voting by nativity.  Participation beyond voting is
gauged by responses to a question asking whether respondents had
participated in a range of political activities in their communities dur-
ing the past four years.  Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) find that,
compared to voting and registration, few Asian Americans partici-
pated in activities like working with others in the community to solve
a problem (21%), signing a petition for a political cause (16%), at-
tending a public meeting, political rally or fundraiser (14%), donating
to a campaign (12%), or writing or phoning a government official
(11%).  Still fewer participated through taking part in a protest or
demonstration (7%), contacting an editor of a newspaper, magazine,
or TV station (7%), serving on a governmental board or commission
(2%), or working on a political campaign and other activities (2%).
Comparing the U.S.-born to the foreign-born samples, it is clear that
in most cases those who were born in the United States are more
likely to participate across all activities than those who are immi-
grants.  For example, 30% of the U.S.–born sample stated that they
had worked with others in their community to solve a problem ver-
sus 18% of the immigrant sample.  Also, more of the U.S.-born (18%)
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report writing or phoning a government official than immigrants
(9%).  However, differences between the U.S.-born and immigrants
are less pronounced when one examines taking part in a protest (10%
of U.S.-born versus 7% of immigrants).  
Communities differ in their favored modes of participation be-
yond voting.  In the PNAAPS, a higher percentage of South Asians
than other Asians report having worked with others to solve a com-
munity problem (36%), written or phoned a government official (at
17%, they are tied with Filipinos), or contacted media (14%).  A higher
percentage of Japanese signed a petition (24%), attended political
gatherings (22%), or donated money to political campaigns (20%).
And a higher percentage of Vietnamese participated in political
protest and demonstration (14%) than other Asian American groups.
When differences in socioeconomic status, political engagement, civic
involvement and mobilization, acculturation and racial group con-
cerns, migration-related variables are controlled, multivariate results
show that being foreign-born is associated with a lower likelihood to
participate in non-electoral activities.   Among the immigrant sam-
ple, the results show that neither citizenship status nor ethnic origin
indicators are significant to predict participation likelihood, but hav-
ing received education mostly outside of the United States is associ-
ated with a lower participation likelihood.
How much do Asian immigrants get involved with people and
government of the home country and how does it affect their partic-
ipation in U.S. electoral and non-electoral politics?   Because of their
foreign-born status and the continuing influx of new immigrants
from Asia, Asian Americans may have a greater interest in politics re-
lated to their home country origins than to the host country of the
United States.  Over half of the PNAAPS respondents (56%) report
paying very close or fairly close attention to news events happening
in Asia.  Nevertheless, respondents are just as likely or even more
likely to follow news events about Asian Americans as they are to
keep up on stories about events in Asia.   Most of immigrant respon-
dents also maintain strong social ties with people in their countries of
origin.  A large majority of them report having contacted individuals
in their country of origin at least once a month.   However, when
asked if they had ever participated in any activity dealing with the
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politics of their home countries after arriving in the United States, a
lofty 94 percent answered “no” to the question. Finally, everything
else being equal, Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) find that being ac-
tive in homeland politics is associated with a greater, not lower, like-
lihood to participate in non-electoral activities while it has no impact
on voting and registration. These results clearly show that not only
do immigrants’ connections with the country of origin not take place
at the expense of their participation as voters in the United States, but
also there may be a complementary relationship to activities beyond
voting. 
Looking Forward
Historically excluded by racist immigration policies, Asian
Americans have come a long way to become a major non-White com-
munity in the United States and one that reports the highest growth
rate due to international migration at the dawn of the 21st century.  If
current population trends hold, Asian Americans not only are ex-
pected to continue their lead in the growth of the foreign-born pop-
ulation, but they are also poised to reap the most political gains from
this stellar phenomenon.  This assertion may sound counter-intuitive,
given that the foreign-born sector of the Asian American population
is one that often receives the most amounts of scrutiny and doubt in
the popular media and mainstream politics regarding their ability to
become socially, culturally, and politically “assimilated” (e.g., Wang
1998; Wu 2002).  Yet, a main purpose of this chapter is to help debunk
the foreign-born myths through the exercise of scientific data gather-
ing and analysis.  Below, I first provide four reasons for optimism
about the future of Asian American political and civic engagement.
Then, I offer comments on the areas of need to better engage the im-
migrant-majority community in the American political process. 
First and foremost, the large presence of the foreign-born is not
a liability but an asset to the community’s political and civic engage-
ment.  At both aggregate and individual levels, research shows that
Asian American immigrants not only may not be considered as less
participatory in the voting process than their U.S.-born counterparts,
but they also show strong inclination to become politically incorpo-
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rated through the acquisition of U.S. citizenship and would become
registered and vote once eligible—often at an equal or higher rates
than their U.S.-born counterparts.  Immigrants’ relative disadvan-
tages in participation resources due to language and socialization bar-
riers compared to the U.S.-born may be compensated by their concern
over immigrant minority status in the hostland and transnational ties
to the ethnic homeland.  Their foreign-born status may be a source of
political mobilization, for getting citizenship and becoming voters are
seen as safeguards against the loss of jobs and benefits related to anti-
immigrant initiatives or legislation such as the California Proposition
187 in 1994, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act, and the 2005 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and
Illegal Immigration Control Act (H.R. 4437).   Being foreign-born is
being associated with a lower likelihood to participate in non-elec-
toral activities, including making campaign donations, contacting of-
ficials and the media, and working with others to solve community
problems.  Nevertheless, contrary to popular perceptions, immi-
grants’ transnational ties and homeland concerns not only do not in-
hibit their political incorporation into the hostland, but they may also
help motivate participation in non-electoral, civic activities in the
hostland.   
Second, analysis of multi-year U.S. Census election data shows
that Asians have the highest growth in terms of the share and size of
the voting-age population (VAP), voting-age citizens (VAC), and the
American electorate in recent years than any other major racial and
ethnic group in the United States (Table 4).  Between 1994 and 2004,
the Asian American community doubled its size of the VAP, while
the Latino community gained 54%, the Black community gained 14%,
and the (non-Hispanic) White community grew by a mere 5%.
Among the VAC, Asians had a more moderate growth rate (44%),
which was still much higher than the 21% for Latinos, 4% for Blacks,
and 3% for Whites.  Likewise, among voters, Asians led others by
having a growth rate of 48%, compared to the 27% for Latinos, 10%
for Blacks, and 12% for Whites.  Similarly distinctive and steadily up-
ward trends are seen in the percentage share of the VAP where Asians
jumped from 2.5% in 1994 to 4.5% in 2004, of the VAC where Asians
moved from 1.5% in 1994 to 3.4% in 2004, and of the share of the elec-
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torate where they increased from being 1.2% in 1994 to 2.4% in 2004.
Although Latinos also experienced steady growth, their growth rates
are far less dramatic.  Black shares in the VAP, VAC, and the electorate
seem to have peaked in 2000, while White shares in all three measures
of community strength are in a steady decline.  This Asian American
distinction is inconceivable without the corresponding rapid and con-
sistent growth of new migration from Asia.  
Third, there is a dramatic growth in the number of Asian Amer-
ican elected officials at state and key local level offices in recent
decades.  The total number of these elected officials grew from 120 in
1978 to 346 in 2004 (Lien 2006a).  The growth rate is particularly sharp
at the local level where the change is from 52 to 260 during this 26-
year period.  In 2004, 35% served at the school board level, 31% at the
municipal level, and 23% at the state legislative level.  More impor-
tantly, first generation immigrants constitute 42% of Asian Americans
holding state and local elective positions, according to a recent, first-
ever nationwide survey of state and local nonwhite elected officials.ix
In comparison, only 8% of Latino and 1% of Black elected officials in
the survey are foreign-born.  Second generation Americans or those
are U.S.-born but with foreign-born parents are 26% among Asians,
28% among Latinos, and 1% among Blacks in the survey.  Those third
generation respondents who themselves and their parents are U.S.-
born but not their grandparents are 24% among Asians, 22% among
Latinos, 17% among American Indian and Alaskan Natives (AIANs),
and 3% among Blacks in the survey.  These statistics show that Asian
American elective leaders have a much closer and more personal ex-
perience with immigration than their Latino and Black colleagues.
Defying the myth of assimilation over generations (Dahl 1961), first
generation immigrants from Asia not only have become voters but
also candidates and elected officials and they contributed more to the
community’s growth of electoral leadership than immigrants in other
demographic groups.  Breaking the traditional Japanese and Chinese
dominance in electoral leadership and adding ethnic diversity to the
arena, these immigrant male and female elected officials are increas-
ingly from Korean, South Asian, and Southeast Asian backgrounds.  
Fourth and finally, Asian Americans are growing in their ability
to be seen as a politically cohesive and consequential group of voters.
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To present a more sophisticated and accurate political profile of the
immigrant-majority population at the dawn of the 21st century, Lien,
Conway, and Wong (2004) gathered and analyzed the multilingual
and semi-national PNAAPS data and make the following summary
observations:
Asian Americans are ethnically and racially diverse, socially
connected with other groups in American society, and are in-
terested in becoming politically integrated into the U.S. main-
stream.  Although most immigrants maintain a strong ethnic
bond with homeland cultures and peoples and are more con-
cerned about language barriers than other issues, the majority of
community members do not show a deficiency in using English
outside of the home nor a greater interest or involvement in
homeland politics.  Rather, an overwhelming majority of Asian
Americans believe they are informed politically, show some or
higher interest in U.S. than in homeland politics, pay attention
to news regarding Asians on both sides of the Pacific, and turn
out to vote once they have met the citizenship and voter regis-
tration requirements.  Among those who are citizens and regis-
tered to vote, the majority are not fragmented, but exhibit
similar patterns in terms of voting behavior and political atti-
tudes.  Far from belonging to a monolithic, issue-free commu-
nity, members in each ethnic group have a different degree and
set of issue concerns, but they also share a similar level of expe-
rience with racial and ethnic discrimination.  Although most
prefer an ethnic-specific rather than a panethnic identity, the ma-
jority respondents are also amenable to the panethnic Asian
American label under certain contexts.  The potential for unity
is shown as well in their favoring the election of political candi-
dates of Asian American descent and public policies addressing
the concerns and needs of the nonwhite immigrant community
(p.18).  
Their findings of a relatively cohesive political outlook among
voting-age Asian Americans are being echoed in exit polls conducted
by several leading community organizations.  In the 2006 midterm
elections, for example, the Asian American Legal Defense and Edu-
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cation Fund (AALDEF) surveyed over 4,700 voters in 25 cities in nine
states and found each Asian ethnic group voted as a bloc for the same
top-ballot Democratic Party candidates, and every group selected
economy/jobs as the most important issue for the 2008 presidential
candidates to address (AALDEF 2007).  Possibly because over eight
in 10 respondents were foreign-born naturalized citizens, each eth-
nic group in the survey also reported large proportions of support
for legalization of undocumented immigrants, for reducing the
amount of time it takes for the government to process immigration
paperwork, and opposition to criminalizing the undocumented.  In
early February of 2008, about three in four Asian American registered
voters were found to vote for presidential candidate Hillary Clinton
in the Democratic primary elections in California, New York, and
New Jersey (AALDEF 2008b). 
Asian American immigrants are vital to the multiethnic com-
munity’s growth and political empowerment.  To keep the momen-
tum going and to help deliver the full potential of the
majority-immigrant community, we need to support and maintain a
thriving, immigrant-friendly civil society.  We need tenacious, ag-
gressive, long-term efforts at the grassroots level in citizenship and
voter education and in turnout campaigns.  And we need to proac-
tively protect the voting rights of the majority foreign-born and
mostly non-native-English-speaking new Americans by ensuring
them equal access to citizenship, voter registration materials, and the
ballots.  
Civil society organizations such as labor unions, worker centers,
religious institutions, community-based nonprofits, and ethnic vol-
untary associations have taken on the leading role in immigrants’ po-
litical mobilization because mainstream institutions are not
committed to incorporating nonwhite immigrant communities into
the political system (Wong 2006b).  Political parties, as an institution
linking government to its people, were key to the successful incor-
poration of European immigrants in early 20th century America.
However, current political parties have failed to mobilize immigrants
en masse into the political system because of a weakened local party
structure and changing campaign tactics, the selective mobilization
strategies and maintenance of existing party coalitions, and wrongful
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assumptions of the political apathy of immigrants.  
Based on her study of the political incorporation of Chinese and
Mexican immigrants in New York and Los Angeles, Janelle Wong, a
professor of Political Science and American Studies at the University
of Southern California, finds that civic institutions are able to turn
new Asian and Latino immigrants into citizens and voters or to en-
gage them in other political actions such as petitioning, demonstra-
tions, and protests that do not require legal status.  Civic institutions
are better able than political parties to do so because they have a
stronger and closer connection to immigrants they serve.  Some of
these institutions are binational or transnational in their orientation.
Others may find it more efficient to serve and mobilize immigrants if
they take immigrants’ concern about the people, culture, and society
in the country of origin in mind.  Nevertheless, because civic institu-
tions are limited in resources and they often have other priorities and
goals than political mobilization to tend, and because of the rising
significance of nonwhite immigrant voters, both national and local
political party organizations should be urged to invest in and con-
struct issue-based coalitions with immigrant communities by adopt-
ing a long-term approach “through regular mass voter-registration
drives, voter-education programs, and the establishment of a stronger
presence in immigrant communities” (Wong 2006, 175).     
Asian Americans’ equal access to voting rights protection is
being ensured by the passage of amendments to the 1965 Voting
Rights Act, as well as by the 1993 National Voter Registration Act
(NVRA) and the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Yet, as shown
in Table 1, in as late as 2004, Asian American citizens still lag much be-
hind in their voting registration.  In 2006 midterm elections, poll mon-
itors and pollsters working in 25 cities in nine states received more
than 200 complaints of voting problems from Asian Americans
(AALDEF 2008a).  The language gap is an important challenge for
the non-native English-speaking immigrants to become citizens and
registered voters.  In 2000, as many as eight out of ten Asians at or
over the age of five spoke a language other than English at home.
About two in five Asians reported that they could not speak English
very well.  The need for English and citizenship classes and other so-
cial services can present a great burden to the major gateway cities
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and other localities where these immigrants tend to come in strong,
rapid, and steady numbers.  Moreover, within each of the major non-
white immigrant-impacted communities, there is often enormous di-
versity in socioeconomic class status, length of U.S. stay, ethnic origin,
religion, language, and other aspects of culture that may greatly affect
the resources and the extent of political participation.  Using English
proficiency as an example, as high as 62 percent among the Viet-
namese, but as low as 23 percent among Asian Indians and 24 percent
among Filipinos reported speaking English less than “very well” in
2000 (Shin and Bruno 2003).  
Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act amendment of 1975 and
1992 was to protect the voting rights of Asians, Latinos, American In-
dians, and Alaska Natives by offering bilingual assistance to these
language minorities who resided in jurisdictions where either the vot-
ing-age citizens of any language minority were at or exceed 5% of the
population or 10,000 in number.  A recent study on the relationship
between the voting rights act and the election of minority elected of-
ficials finds Section 203 to be more critical to the election of Asian and
Latino than Black officials (Lien, Pinderhughes, Hardy-Fanta, and
Sierra 2007).  For instance, 84.5% of school board members, 75% of
municipal officials, and 62% of state legislators of Asian descent are
elected from jurisdictions covered by Section 203.
Another study of the effect of Section 203 suggests that the pro-
vision has positive impact on Latino turnout and a neutral or slightly
negative impact on Asian Americans (Jones-Correa 2005).  Whereas
the latter study leaves open the answer as to the racial discrepancy in
result, one factor can be the compliance problems identified and re-
ported by community organizations.   For example, the Asian Amer-
ican Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF) found that ballots
had been mistranslated and the translated materials and signs could
either be missing, hidden, or otherwise unavailable to voters (Mag-
pantay 2004).  They also found that many poll sites had too few in-
terpreters or they spoke the wrong language or dialect.  Sometimes,
non-minority poll workers exerted hostile attitudes towards limited-
English voters and resisted or even thwarted the rendering of lan-
guage assistance by making rude and disparaging remarks about
language assistance and Asian American voters or by illegally creat-
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ing new voting requirements that only applied to Asians.  Many
Asian American voters were turned away from the polling sites and
further discouraged from returning to vote because of these discrim-
inatory attitudes and behavior.  Many of these problems lingered in
the 2006 elections. 
In addition to the lack of English assistance and other compli-
ance problems related to Section 203, the implementation of HAVA,
which requires identification of certain first-time voters and provi-
sional ballots for voters who may otherwise be prevented from vot-
ing, has created a new layer of barriers to Asian American access to
voting.  According to a new report released by the AALDEF (2008a),
which monitored 172 poll sites in nine states and the District of Co-
lumbia in November 2006 elections, Asian American voters were ob-
served to be improperly singled out and targeted for identification
checks.  Although HAVA only requires identification from first-time
voters who did not become registered by January 1, 2003, many long-
time Asian American voters were demanded to show ID.  When
Asian American voters’ names were missing or incorrectly tran-
scribed in voter lists at poll sites, poll workers refused to offer these
voters provisional ballots, as required by HAVA.  The report also
found poll sites to be confusing and poll workers were unable to di-
rect voters to their proper poll sites or precincts.  
About one in eight Asian American voters in the 2006 AALDEF
exit polls was a first-time voter in an U.S. election.  Over four in ten
were limited English proficient and almost half (47%) of these were
first-time voters.  Because of the greater interest and mobilization ef-
forts in presidential elections, the participation of first-time voters in
the 2008 elections is expected to be higher.   It is imperative that vot-
ing problems identified by community-based civil rights organiza-
tions be taken seriously and addressed.   We also need to encourage
congressional leaders to consider adopting changes that can
strengthen voting rights provisions.  One recommendation made by
the Asian American Justice Centerx is to lower the numerical thresh-
old for Section 203 coverage from 10,000 to 7,500 so as to enable sev-
eral Asian American language minority populations whose numbers
may still fall short of the existing threshold in 2010 to benefit from
language assistance.  Above all, greater volunteer participation by
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Asian Americans from all sectors and walks of life in community-
based citizenship and voter education, adult English classes, voter
registration drives, voter turnout drives, and election monitoring ef-
forts should be encouraged and supported.    
Table 1. Percentage Distribution of Voting and Registration by Race
and Nativity in November 2004 
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. CURRENT POPULA-
TION SURVEY, NOVEMBER 2004: VOTER SUPPLEMENT FILE [Computer file].
ICPSR04272-v1. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
[producer], 2005. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research [distributor], 2006-01-16.
Note: Entries are for voting-age persons who can be solely or partly of the racial
origin except for Latinos who can be of any race.  Each racial category is also mu-
tually exclusive of each other. Thus, Asians stands for non-Hispanic Asians,
Blacks for non-Hispanic Blacks, and Whites for non-Hispanic Whites. Native
Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders as well as American Indian and Alaskan Natives
are included in the “All” column.  Dates of interviews were Nov. 14-20, 2004;
sixty percent of interviews were conducted by phone.
 Asian Latino Black White All 
76% 57% 10% 5% 16% 
CITIZENSHIP 69 59 95 98 91 
-By Naturalization only 66 27 5 3 8 
REGISTRATION 36 34 65 73 66 
-among Citizens 53 58 69 75 72 
-Foreign-born 53 59 63 70 61 
-U.S.-born    52 58 69 75 73 
VOTING 31 28 57 66 58 
-among Registered 85 82 87 89 88 
-Foreign-born 85 87 90 91 88 
-U.S.-born 85 80 87 89 88 
Weighted N (x1000) 9,711 26,968 24,598 152,805 215,694 
Foreign-born
-among Foreign-born 59 28 50 60 44 
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Table 2. Percentage Distribution of Voter Registration and Voting by
Race and Nativity in November Elections, 1994-2004  
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Current Population
Survey: Voter Supplement File, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 [computer files].
ICPSR version. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census [producer], 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-uni-
versity Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1997, 1999,
2001, 2004, 2006.
Note: All populations are of age 18 and over.  Each racial category is mutually
exclusive of each other.  “White” stands for non-Hispanic whites. Entries in
parenthesis for registration are rates among citizens; those for voting are rates
among the registered.
 Asian Latino Black White 
% Registration Among Citizens 
1994 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 48/59 47/54 51/61 67/70 
1996 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 57/60 57/59 62/67 69/73 
1998 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 45/57 51/57 55/64 64/69 
2000 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 51/54 57/58 59/68 64/72 
2002 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 49/50 52/54 58/63 63/69 
2004 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 53/52 59/58 63/69 70/75 
%Voting Among the Registered 
1994 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 73/78 75/62 77/63 78/73 
1996 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 79/80 86/72 87/80 84/83 
1998 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 63/70 69/56 66/66 71/68 
2000 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 84/81 85/76 93/84 88/86 
2002 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 61/67 64/57 66/68 71/71 
2004 Foreign-/U.S.-Born 85/85 87/80 90/87 91/89 
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Table 3. Percentage Distribution of Voting and Registration Among
Asian Americans in 2004 by Ethnicity
Source: (see Table 1).  Note: All populations are of age 18 and over. Only Asian
adults (including mixed-race persons) who are of either first or second genera-
tion, which covers 90% of Asians surveyed, are included in the analysis.  
Chinese Filipino Japanese Korean Indian Vietnamese All
88 86 54 93 88 88 86 
CITIZENSHIP 65 68 70 64 47 82 65
-By
Naturalization 
only
82 80 34 89 74 86 78
-among Foreign- 
born
60 63 44 61 40 80 59
REGISTRATION 35 37 39 34 25 40 33
-among Citizens 54 54 55 53 53 49 51
-Foreign-born 51 57 46 54 60 54 53
-U.S.-born 66 41 61 41 34 19 46
VOTING 30 30 35 29 21 33 28
-among 
Registered
86 80 91 87 83 83 85
-Foreign-born 86 81 95 87 83 83 85
-U.S.-born 86 75 89 83 88 82 85
Weighted N 
(x1000)
2,023 1,502 412 886 1,264 992 8,5
23
Foreign-born
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Table 4. Percentage Share of the Voting-Age Persons, Citizens, and
Voters by Race in November Elections, 1994-2004
Asian Latino Black White 
Share of Voting-Age Persons 
1994     2.5%  9.2%  11.3%  76.4% 
1996     3.4   9.5   11.3  75.1 
1998     3.7   10.3  11.4  73.9 
2000     3.9   10.7  11.6  73.1 
2002     4.0   11.1  11.6  72.5 
2004     4.5   12.5  11.4  70.8 
N in 1994 (x1000) 4,772 17,476  21,514  145,027 
N in 2004 (x1000) 9,711 26,968  24,598  152,805 
% Change 94-04  +103  +54   +14  +5 
Share of Voting-age Citizenry 
1994     1.5%  5.9%  11.5%  80.5% 
1996     2.0   6.4   11.3  79.6 
1998     2.4   6.8   11.8  78.3 
2000     2.5   7.1   12.0  77.7 
2002     2.7   7.6   11.9  77.0 
2004     3.4   8.1   11.8  75.9 
N in 1994 (x1000) 4,631 13,159  22,409  144,731 
N in 2004 (x1000) 6,677 15,955  23,330  149,544 
% Change 94-04  +44  +21   +4   +3 
Share of the Electorate 
1994     1.2%  4.2% 9.4%  84.7% 
1996     1.7   4.8   10.5  82.4 
1998     1.7   4.9   10.9  81.9 
2000     1.9   5.8   11.7  80.0 
2002 2.0  6.1        11.2   80.0  
2004     2.4   6.0   11.2  79.9 
N in 1994 (x1000) 2,003 5,934 12,749  89,468 
N in 2004 (x1000) 2,975 7,551 14,064  100,412 
% Change 94-04  +48  +27  +10  +12 
Source and Note: see Table 2. 
Political and Civic Engagement of Immigrants  73
Notes
i For practical purposes, the term “immigrants” is being used interchangeably
with the “foreign-born” in this project.  In reality, “foreign-born” is a broader
term than “immigrants” and should be preferred.  According to the US Cen-
sus Bureau, a foreign-born person is anyone who is not a U.S. citizen at birth.
The foreign-born population in the United States includes naturalized U.S.
citizens, lawful permanent residents (immigrants), temporary migrants (such
as foreign students), humanitarian migrants (such as refugees), and people il-
legally present in the United States <http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/www/socdemo/immigration.html>.
ii Data for this effort come mainly from the U.S. Census Current Population Sur-
vey Voter Supplement files, 1994-2004, which permit both a multiracial analy-
sis, comparing the participation rates of Asians to other major racial and
ethnic groups among voting-age persons, and a multiethnic analysis among
Asian respondents who are either immigrants themselves or children of im-
migrants.  To cover other types of political and civic participation that do not
require US citizenship, I rely on the 2000-01 Pilot National Asian American
Political Survey which surveyed the political attitudes and opinion of six
major Asian American groups residing in five metropolitan areas.
iii This is based on analysis of the Census 2000 Summary File 3, the 1-in-6 sam-
ple, race-alone data. Direct comparison of racial figures between the 2000 cen-
sus and earlier censuses is difficult because of the addition of a mixed-race
category in Census 2000.
iv See the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website at
<www.uscis.gov> for the latest set of requirements and changes.  
v Most countries, except the United States and certain Latin American coun-
tries, have automatic voter registration (Mackie and Rose 1991).
vi The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 56,000
households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The November data consist of responses to two sets of questions—
the basic labor force questions given every month and the supplemental ques-
tions on voting and registration asked every other November after the general
elections.  The universe of this data series consists of all adult persons in the
civilian noninstitutional populations of the United States living in households
of all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  A major redesign implemented
by the Bureau in 1994 added new questions on nativity and place of birth and
permitted a rare but limited opportunity for this research to analyze the effects
of nativity, country/place of birth, and ancestral origin on the voting regis-
tration and turnout rates of U.S. voting-age persons of Asian (including mixed
racial) descent.  Another major CPS revision in 2004, which began to phase out
the 1990 sample and phase in the 2000 sample, may improve data quality and
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add confidence to the results reported for the 2004 cycle.  However, the adop-
tion of a new question format on race that permits the reporting of mixed ori-
gins has complicated the comparison of results between the 2004 elections
and earlier ones. To maximize comparability, I use a definition of race that in-
cludes persons who may be solely or partly of the racial origin.   
vii The exception is for biological or adopted children born abroad by U.S. citi-
zens and who do not acquire U.S. citizenship at birth.  In 2000, Congress
passed the Child Citizenship Act, which allows any child under the age of 18
who is adopted by a U.S. citizen and immigrates to the United States to ac-
quire immediate citizenship. The law became effective on February 27, 2001.
viii The PNAAPS is the first multi-city, multi-ethnic, and multi-lingual sample
survey of the political attitudes and opinion of Asian Americans.  A total of
1,218 adults of the top six Asian ethnic origins residing in the nation’s five
major population hubs of Asians were surveyed by phone between Nov. 16,
2000 and Jan. 28, 2001.  The survey was sponsored by a research grant from
the National Science Foundation (SES 9973435) and supplemented by a com-
munity grant from KSCI-TV of Los Angeles.  Pei-te Lien is the principal in-
vestigator.
ix The Gender and Multicultual Leadership Survey, 2006-7.  Principal investi-
gators are Christine Sierra, Carol Hardy-Fanta, Pei-te Lien, and Dianne Pin-
derhughes.  Details of the survey methodology and findings are available at
<http:// www.gmcl.org>. 
x The organization is led Karen K. Narasaki, whose statement before the US
House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution leg-
islative hearing on H.R.9 on “A Bill to Reauthorize and Amend the Voting
Rights Act of 1965: Part II” is being cited here.
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Asian American College Students 
and Civic Engagement
Julie J. Park, Monica H. Lin
Oiyan A. Poon, Mitchell J. Chang
University of California, Los Angeles
Introduction
The current political climate reflects the growing significance of
civic engagement among undergraduates.  The heightened energy
and excitement surrounding the 2008 presidential candidates indi-
cate a renewed interest in politics, community involvement, and a
spirit of change.  Especially among the college-age population, the
momentum behind the upcoming elections is building through medi-
ums ranging from political email campaigns to YouTube videos to
student-run political debates.  Indeed, college student participation in
community and political activities has demonstrated a substantial up-
ward trend over the years.  In their national analysis of first-year col-
lege students, Pryor, Hurtado, Sáenz, Santos, and Korn (2007) note
that the percentage of freshmen who engaged in volunteer work prior
to college rose steadily over the past two decades from 43.7% in 1987
to 70.7% in 2006.  Though such statistics provide a broad snapshot of
college students from around the country, where do Asian American
students fit into the picture?
This chapter centers Asian American young adults within a dis-
cussion about civic engagement by highlighting findings from 35
years of data on Asian American college freshmen.  It will also ad-
dress future directions for Asian American undergraduate student
civic engagement, taking immigration and population trends into ac-
count.  Calling attention to Asian American civic engagement within
the college context achieves at least two main goals.  First, it will help
scholars, practitioners, and policy makers move beyond racial stereo-
types of this group and consider their complete college experiences,
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including their involvement outside the classroom.  Doing so will
help facilitate efforts to develop curricular and co-curricular practices
that can better serve the learning and development of this fast-grow-
ing population in higher education.  Second, examining these pat-
terns of civic engagement will shed light on how Asian American
students, as part of the future of our nation, are positioned for greater
participation in a democratic U.S. society.
To put our discussion in context, we will begin by outlining the
significance of having opportunities to become civically engaged
while in college.  We will then explain how an exploration of the civic
engagement patterns of Asian American college students is critical to
combating popular stereotypes about Asian Americans as passive or
uninvolved in non-academic activities.  Our review of civic engage-
ment trends spanning 35 years will address three areas: community
service, political engagement, and the capacity for civic engagement.
Overall, we found high rates of volunteering and community service
among Asian American students, as well as an increase in the per-
centage of students who express the desire to be a leader in their com-
munity.  We also found that consistently over the years, Asian
American students have been more likely than the overall popula-
tion of college students to rate environmental cleanup and the pro-
motion of racial understanding as very important or essential life
objectives.  Lastly, although the percentage of Asian American stu-
dents who discussed politics and worked on political campaigns
dipped during the 1990s, the percentage of students pursuing these
activities since the year 2000 has increased slightly.  We conclude by
discussing how Asian American college students are positioned to
influence their communities through volunteer service and political
involvement.
The Significance of Civic Engagement During College
The importance of helping college students cultivate a commit-
ment to the public good is central to the ongoing dialogue regarding
what it means to be an educated citizen in the U.S. (Checkoway 2001;
Dee 2004; Galston 2001; Ostrander 2004; Rhoads 1998; Sax 2004).
Many colleges and universities seek to foster a sense of civic respon-
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sibility among students by encouraging their involvement in com-
munity or political activities.  While campuses generally do not sup-
port partisan activities, they allow students to do so, encouraging
students to be politically engaged regardless of party or ideological
affiliation.  These activities often include volunteer work, service
learning courses, student government, or political actions such as vot-
ing or demonstrating at the local, state, and national levels.  Through
various types of civic engagement, the expectation holds that stu-
dents will develop altruistic or socially conscious attitudes and be-
haviors that persist even after college. 
Claims about the individual benefits of civic engagement, espe-
cially with respect to service involvement, are supported by empiri-
cal evidence.  Studies link motivation toward participating in
community service with identity development processes (Lavelle and
O’Ryan, 2001; Rhoads 1998; Youniss and Yates 1997).  In these cases,
community service was found to contribute to the process of devel-
oping one’s self-identity as well as increasing one’s level of social re-
sponsibility.  By performing community service work, students felt
they gained an increased knowledge of self through meaningful in-
teraction with others, which then led to further personal and social
identity development (Rhoads 1998; Youniss and Yates 1997).  Fur-
thermore, encouraging civic engagement is important because vol-
unteerism during high school and college has direct and indirect
effects on civic engagement in the post-college years (Astin, Sax, and
Avalos 1999).
Along similar lines, Asian American student participation in co-
curricular activities appears to be especially valuable in facilitating
positive college experiences that include opportunities to build lead-
ership skills or prepare for future careers or graduate school (Liu and
Sedlacek 1999).  Additionally, studies on Asian American involve-
ment in pan-ethnic or ethnic/cultural student organizations illustrate
the significance of collective action and social networks.  Findings
show that such involvement plays a crucial role in heightening eth-
nic awareness and commitment to one’s racial/ethnic community in-
terests (Inkelas 2004), challenging the campus racial climate (Rhoads,
Lee, and Yamada 2002), and improving students’ sense of social abil-
ity and belonging on campus (Wang, Sedlacek, and Westbrook 1992).
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Because “education for citizenship” is much more complex in a di-
verse democracy, students of higher education must be prepared to
“understand their own identities, communicate with people who are
different from themselves, and build bridges across cultural differ-
ences in the transition to a more diverse society” (Checkoway 2001,
127).  Thus, civic engagement is linked not only to student develop-
ment, but to the development of ethnic awareness and identity.
Given that civic and political engagement during college is a foun-
dation for later-life community involvement (Astin et al. 1999), it is
critical to understand how Asian Americans are being prepared to be
involved in their communities in college and beyond.
Asian American Students and Civic Engagement: 
More than Model Minorities
Research on Asian Americans and civic involvement during col-
lege is rare in the educational literature.  This lack of research on
Asian Americans in higher education contributes to a widespread
misunderstanding of their student experiences in college.  Without
sufficient data to contextualize Asian American students, the domi-
nant “model minority” myth will persist in limiting public percep-
tions of who these students are and the types of activities in which
they are engaged.  One negative implication related to the model mi-
nority view is that Asian American students are seen as being con-
cerned only with academic undertakings (see Kao 1995; Sue and
Okazaki 1990; Suzuki 2002).  Such a narrow perspective could easily
lead to assumptions that Asian Americans are less involved in non-
academic endeavors or leadership opportunities without under-
standing how Asian American students are affected by co-curricular
experiences.  Additionally, longstanding racial stereotypes often de-
pict Asian Americans as shy, quiet, passive, and traditional (e.g.,
Leslie, Constantine, and Fiske 2001; Lin, Kwan, Cheung, and Fiske
2005) – unwilling to challenge the status quo.  Such stereotypes fur-
ther mischaracterize Asian Americans as a group with little interest in
becoming activists, community leaders, or politically engaged citi-
zens.  These common portrayals of Asian Americans could be harm-
ful if they deter students from participating in service, political, or
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other civic-oriented activities.  Moreover, elected officials might over-
look Asian Americans as an important segment of the population due
to stereotypes of passivity and a perceived lack of community in-
volvement.
At a time when Asian Americans are currently the fastest grow-
ing college-going population (Pryor et al. 2007), higher education in-
stitutions that serve as primary socialization environments for so
many young adults cannot afford to risk under-serving students and
marginalizing their college experiences.  We can better comprehend
and address Asian Americans’ unique needs only if we obtain a fuller,
more accurate view of this undergraduate student population.  In this
chapter, we aim to provide a comprehensive account of Asian Amer-
ican college students and their civic engagement patterns to inform
higher education policy and practice.  Researchers, educators, and
policy makers concerned about the status of Asian American students
must first acknowledge and understand the varied factors affecting
this diverse group before taking appropriate action to support their
all-around success and improve the overall quality of experiences in
higher education.
Data and Method
The data presented in this chapter are from the Cooperative In-
stitutional Research Program’s (CIRP) Freshman Survey, a nationally
representative study of first-year college students at over 600 colleges
and universities that is administered on an annual basis and housed
at the UCLA Higher Education Research Institute.  It is the country’s
largest and most longstanding comprehensive study of college stu-
dents.  Typically, first-year students complete the CIRP Freshman Sur-
vey at the beginning of freshman year.  Using national norms that are
based on selectivity and college type, student responses are statisti-
cally weighted to reflect the national population of first-time, full-
time college students during the appropriate time period.i
In 2007, the UCLA Higher Education Research Institute released
a report entitled Beyond Myths: The Growth and Diversity of Asian Amer-
ican College Freshmen, 1971-2005 (Chang, Park, Lin, Poon, and Nakan-
ishi 2007).  Being the largest compilation and analysis of data on
80 Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
Asian American college students to date, the report focused on the
361,271 Asian/Asian American first-time, full-time college students
at four-year institutions who took the CIRP Freshman Survey be-
tween 1971 and 2005.  This chapter builds on some of the report’s
findings with respect to Asian American students’ participation in,
and their capacity for, various types of civic engagement, including
community service and political involvement.
To show some of the variation among Asian American college
freshmen, we conducted several analyses that uncover how responses
vary by gender, citizenship, and language heritage.  Language her-
itage refers to whether a student speaks English as his or her first lan-
guage.  While we are unfortunately unable to disaggregate by
ethnicity, we believe that highlighting differences within the larger
group allows us to illustrate the heterogeneity of the Asian American
college student population.  Examining whether distinctions exist be-
tween native English speakers and non-native English speakers, as
well as Asian American students who are U.S. citizens versus those
who are not, is also important in this study of civic engagement.
Asian Americans are challenged by popular perceptions that they are
un-American or “perpetual foreigners” (Ancheta 1998).  Thus, we
were curious to see if Asian American subgroups based on English
language heritage and citizenship status show differences in their lev-
els or frequency of civic engagement.
To draw inferences about the future of Asian American college
student civic engagement, we define “civic engagement” as both vol-
unteerism through community service and political engagement, in-
cluding participation in electoral politics.  Primarily presenting
statistics from CIRP data on Asian American undergraduates, we also
include analyses of trends in young adult voting and community
service to conclude this chapter with recommendations that encour-
age a greater level of civic engagement, particularly in the area of po-
litical involvement, among Asian American young adults.
Civic Engagement Trends for 
Asian American College Students
Community Service and Volunteering
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Overall, we found that an increasing proportion of Asian
American freshmen over time were engaged in community service
activities prior to college.  Like students nationwide, Asian Ameri-
cans are entering college having spent substantially more time vol-
unteering during the high school years.  In 1990, 47.5% of Asian
American freshmen had not volunteered during the past year, com-
pared to 46.2% of the national population.  By 2005, only 32.0% of
Asian American college students had not volunteered in the past year,
compared to 29.4% of the national population.  However, Asian
American students (25.7%) were slightly more likely than the national
population (23.6%) in 2005 to have volunteered three hours or more
during the last year of high school.
We did not see marked differences between native English
speakers and non-native English speakers, or U.S. citizens versus
non-citizens, in their rates of volunteering.  In 2005, 36.1% of Asian
American freshmen who were native English speakers reported vol-
unteering on a frequent basis, whereas 35.9% of non-native English
speakers stated they had volunteered at that same rate.  Asian Amer-
ican students who were U.S. citizens were slightly more likely than
their peers who did not hold citizenship to report volunteering fre-
quently, 36.4% compared to 34.5%.
We found that Asian American women were consistently more
likely than Asian American men to have reported performing volun-
teer work or community service during the past year.  In 2005, 83.9%
of Asian American male students indicated they had performed some
form of volunteer work over the last year, whereas 91.3% of Asian
American female students reported volunteering.  There has been a
consistent gender gap between Asian American men and women in
this area over the decades surveyed.  When Asian American fresh-
men report on the likelihood that they will volunteer or perform com-
munity service during college, another gender gap emerges.  In 2005,
women were 18.4 percentage points more likely to state that there
was a “very good” chance that they would volunteer or become in-
volved in community service in the upcoming years.
Interestingly, Asian American men and women also differ in
whether they aspire to participate in a community action program.  In
1971, when the question was first asked on the CIRP Freshman Sur-
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vey, roughly the same percent of Asian Americans across genders said
that participating in a community action program was a very impor-
tant or essential life objective for them.  However, the general trend
has been that Asian American females have become more likely than
their male counterparts to prioritize community action program in-
volvement, with 34.5% of women versus 25.9% of men rating the item
as a top objective in 2005.
One item on the survey asks students how important it is for
them to participate in a program to clean up the environment (see
Figure 1). Over 40% of Asian American students in 1971 said that this
goal was essential or very important to them, but the percentage of
students indicating this sentiment declined steadily in subsequent
years, with only 20.4% of Asian American students stating that such
programs were a main concern to them in 1986.  However, the pro-
portion of Asian American students prioritizing environmental clean-
up programs once again climbed to 40% by the early 1990s, only to
decline again by the new millennium.  Data from the most recent
years suggest there may be an upward trend in the percentage of all
students agreeing that participation in environmental programs is
very important or essential, possibly reflecting a growing awareness
of issues such as global warming and the need to “go green.”  Fur-
thermore, as Figure 1 shows, Asian American students have consis-
tently been slightly more likely than the national population of
Figure 1. Percentage of Freshmen Reporting that
Participating in a Program to Clean Up the
Environment is "Very Important" or "Essential"
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1992 1996 2000 2004
P
er
ce
nt
Asian
Americans
National
Population
Asian American College Students and Civic Engagement  83
college freshmen to state that participating in programs to clean up
the environment was a top priority for them.
Political Engagement
Civic engagement encompasses activities devoted to commu-
nity betterment, and political participation is a critical element of
broader civic participation.  Asian Americans are exerting stronger
influence in the political process by running for office, coordinating
campaigns, and supporting candidates at the local, state, and national
levels.  We wanted to assess the level of such engagement among
Asian American undergraduates, especially during the early college
years when most students become eligible to vote.  We found general
decreases in discussing politics and keeping up to date with political
affairs.  The greatest declines were during the 1990s, although some
increases have occurred since 2000.  
The CIRP Freshman Survey includes a number of items that
point to the likelihood that students will become involved in politi-
cal activities.  The first item we examined is Asian American students’
desire to have an impact on the political structure.  Chang et al. (2007)
found an increase in the percentage of Asian American students who
stated it was essential or very important for them to influence the po-
litical structure, from 15.8% in 1971 to 21.4% in 2005.
Comparing Asian American women and men in their responses
to this political objective, we see a slight split by gender that has per-
Figure 2. Percentage of Asian American
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sisted since 1971 (see Figure 2).  The widest gap of over five percent-
age points occurred in the mid-1980s, but the difference narrowed by
1990.  In 2005, men were still slightly more likely than women to view
influencing the political structure as a higher priority. 
Also of interest is the emphasis that Asian American students
place on keeping up to date with political affairs.  The proportion of
Asian Americans who reported that following politics was very im-
portant or essential to them increased between 1971 and 1990, from
40.7% to 48.2%.  However, there was a steep decline of over 20 per-
centage points between 1990 and 2000 with regard to the same ob-
jective, from 48.2% to 26.5%.  The national population experienced a
similar decline, from 43.5% in 1990 to 28.1% in 2000.  Since 2000, the
percentage of Asian American students who strongly desire to keep
up with political affairs has increased steadily, up to 34.6% in 2005,
but it remains unclear whether this rising trend will continue.
Several CIRP Freshman Survey items measure actual participa-
tion in various political activities.  Figure 3 shows the percentage of
Asian American students who stated that they discussed politics fre-
quently in the past year, indicating that the proportion of students
who did so dipped during the mid-1990s but has increased incre-
mentally since 2000.
As for their tendencies to participate more actively in politics,
15% of Asian American college students in 1971 stated that they had
worked on a local, state, or national campaign during their senior
Figure 3. Percentage of Asian American
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year of high school.  This number dropped to the single digits for
most of the 1980s and 1990s.  By 2005, 12.6% of Asian American col-
lege students reported having worked on a political campaign in their
last year of high school.
Although the CIRP Freshman Survey has never included an
item asking students about whether they have voted or plan to vote,
the Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and En-
gagement (CIRCLE) has collected data on the Asian American young
adult vote since 1992.  Asian Americans between 18 and 24 years old
were among the least likely to vote in the 2004 presidential election;
only Latinos in this age group were less likely to vote (Lopez, Kirby,
and Sagoff 2005).  Just 35.5% of Asian American voters in the 18- to 24-
year-old category cast a ballot in the 2004 national election, compared
to 47% of the overall 18-24 population.  Ironically, CIRCLE research
also found that Asian Americans ages 18-24 are the most likely group
to say that the government needs to do more to solve problems
(Lopez, Levine, Both, Kiesa, Kirby, and Marcelo 2006).  Whether or
not young Asian American voter turnout will improve in the 2008
presidential election is yet to be seen.  However, in a press release
after Super Tuesday, CIRCLE (2008) stated that the overall young
adult voter turnout increased in every state except for New York.
Capacity for Civic Engagement
In addition to examining various measures of Asian American
students’ community and political engagement, we looked at partic-
ular attitudes, values, and behaviors that underscore their propen-
sity to be effective and involved citizens.  Several items on the CIRP
Freshman Survey reflect the likelihood that Asian American students
will engage in civic and political activities.  First, how confident are
Asian American students in their public speaking and leadership abil-
ities?  As noted earlier, stereotypes portray Asian Americans as docile
and quiet − less likely to make their voices heard.  How have Asian
American students changed over the years in their self-rated abilities
to speak in public and be a leader?  We found that Asian American
students have become more likely to rate themselves positively in
public speaking and leadership ability over the years.  Also, a greater
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percent of students in recent years expressed a desire to influence so-
cial values and become a community leader.
Between 1971 and 2005, the total of Asian American students
rating themselves in the “top 10%” in public speaking compared to
“the average student” grew by over 10 percentage points, from 19.1%
in 1971 to 30.3% in 2005.  Specifically, Asian American males (32.1%)
were slightly more likely to rank themselves as high in public speak-
ing ability compared to Asian American females (28.7%) in 2005.
With respect to self-reported leadership ability, we compared
Asian American men and women to the overall freshman college
population across the decades (see Figure 4).
We found notable differences between Asian Americans and the
national first-year college population, as well as differences between
men and women within each group.  First, Figure 4 shows that in
1971, Asian American women and women from the general first-year
college population were roughly equal in their self-rated leadership
ability.  In contrast, a slightly greater percentage of Asian American
men in 1971 rated themselves as being in the top 10% in leadership
ability compared to men from the overall college freshman popula-
tion.  However, since 1980, men from the total first-year college pop-
ulation have exceeded the other three comparison groups in their
self-rated leadership ability.  Furthermore, during the 1980s a similar
proportion of female students overall and Asian American male stu-
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dents rated themselves in the top 10% in terms of leadership.  But
since 2000, higher percentages of women from the total first-year col-
lege student population have rated themselves in this top leadership
category compared to Asian American men.  In 2005, a slightly higher
percentage of Asian American men than women rated themselves
high in leadership ability, whereas men from the overall first-year
population were 15 percentage points more likely than Asian Amer-
ican women to consider themselves in the top 10% of potential lead-
ers.  In 2005, 64.5% of men overall, 58.7% of women overall, 51.6% of
Asian American men, and 49.4% of Asian American females rated
themselves as having top leadership abilities.
One key gender gap has closed over the years for Asian Ameri-
can freshmen.  As Chang et al. (2007) reported, the percentage of
Asian American freshmen stating that becoming a community leader
is essential or very important to them rose from 13.0% in 1971 to
32.3% in 2005.  In 1971 Asian American men were 10 percentage
points more likely than Asian American women to respond in this
way regarding community leadership (see Figure 5).
However, by 2005, approximately the same proportion of Asian
American men and women expressed a strong desire to become a
community leader, as shown in Figure 5.  In fact, the percentage of
Asian American women was slightly higher than the percentage of
Asian American men in 2005 (32.6% versus 32.0%).  For Asian Amer-
ican women, the change in self-ratings showed an enormous gain of
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over 20 percentage points from 1971 to 2005.
We also assessed responses to the importance of becoming a
community leader according to Asian American students’ language
heritage and citizenship.  In 2005, 33.1% of Asian American students
who were not native English speakers stated it was a very important
or essential objective for them to be a community leader, versus 31.8%
of native English speakers.  In regards to citizenship, 33.4% of non-cit-
izens and 32.1% of U.S. citizens indicated that being a community
leader was very important or essential to them.  The data suggest that
Asian American students who do not speak English as a first lan-
guage or who are not yet citizens are just as interested in becoming
community leaders as their peers. 
When looking at the survey item measuring the importance of
influencing social values, 29.8% of Asian American first-year students
in 1971 reported this was an essential or very important priority for
them.  By 2005, the percentage had risen over 10 percentage points, to
42.3%.  Although we cannot be sure of which social values Asian
American college students are interested in swaying, a breakdown of
their responses to various social and political issues can provide help-
ful insights into specific areas about which they may be concerned.
Table 1 shows the percentage of Asian American freshmen who
agreed somewhat or strongly with certain issues over the years;
dashes indicate that the item was not included on the CIRP Fresh-
man Survey that particular year.  Additionally, the column in Table 1
labeled 2005a provides the national freshman population’s response
to the item in 2005 for the purpose of comparison (Pryor et al. 2007).
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Table 1. Asian American and National Population College Student 
We can see that over time, Asian American student support for
a national healthcare plan and military spending has grown, while
they have become less likely to support laws prohibiting homosexual
relationships.  In 2005, they were slightly more likely than the na-
tional population of college freshmen (see column 2005a of Table 1)
to support national healthcare, abortion rights, same sex marriage,
abolishing the death penalty, and increased gun control.
Finally, the question capturing a student’s commitment to pro-
moting racial understanding may be a critical indicator of the extent
to which Asian American students will participate in political ac-
tivism.  We found that consistently over almost 30 years that Asian
American students were more likely than the overall first-year col-
lege student population at four-year institutions to rate promoting
racial understanding as an important or essential objective in their
lives, as shown in Figure 6.
1971 1980 1990 2000 2005 2005a
A national health care plan is needed to  ---  68.1 78.9  ---  78.1 73.6 
     cover everybody's medical costs          
Abortion should be legal[ized]            ---  62.0 67.5 61.7 62.2 55.2 
Affirmative action in college admissions  ---   ---   ---  49.5 47.7 48.5 
     should be abolished
Federal military spending should be       ---   ---  18.6  ---  25.7 34.2 
     increased
It is important to have laws prohibiting  ---  44.8 32.6 25.1 24.7 27.4 
     homosexual relationships                 
Marijuana should be legalized            39.0 31.6 15.4 30.0 32.9 37.7 
Racial discrimination is no longer a      ---   ---  13.9 18.1 17.3 21.0 
     major problem in America                 
Same sex couples should have the right    ---   ---   ---  63.6 65.8 57.9 
     to legal marital status                  
The death penalty should be abolished    60.0 36.8 27.8 35.4 37.1 33.3 
The federal government should do more  
     to control the sale of handguns             ---   ---  86.9 89.2 84.6 78.7 
Wealthy people should pay a larger share  --- 72.2  --- 55.4 63.2 68.2
     of taxes than they do now
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The difference between the groups’ responses was highest in
1985, when Asian American students were 18.6 percentage points
more likely to place a high priority on promoting racial understand-
ing.  In 2005, Asian American students were 10.8 percentage points
more likely than the national population to state this.  Overall, fewer
students from both the overall first-year and Asian American college
student populations have rated this item as a high priority since the
early 1990s.  However, recent years have seen a slight increase in stu-
dents from both groups who indicated that advancing racial under-
standing was a top life objective.
Notably, we found that Asian American first-year students who
were not native English speakers were actually slightly more likely
than their native English-speaking counterparts to put a high prior-
ity on promoting racial understanding.  Of those students in 2005
who were not native English speakers, 46.5% stated that improving
racial understanding was very important or essential to them,
whereas 42.4% of native English speakers declared the same.  Simi-
larly, 47.5% of Asian American students who were not citizens, com-
pared to 43.4% who were, reported that helping to achieve greater
racial understanding was a fundamental goal for them.
Increasingly, Asian Americans entering four-year colleges and
universities have a desire to influence political structures, serve as
community leaders, improve race relations, and to be volunteers in
their communities.  According to the Center for Information & Re-
search on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), today’s Asian
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American young adults are more likely to be engaged in volun-
teerism than other racial/ethnic groups (Lopez et al. 2006).  CIRP data
shows that since 1971, there has also been an increase in Asian Amer-
ican students who rated themselves in the top 10% among their peers
in leadership and public speaking abilities.  All of these findings pres-
ent promising trends in expected levels of civic engagement for Asian
American students.
Despite the increasing numbers of Asian American students
who wish to influence the political structure, the number of Asian
Americans in the 18- to 24-year-old age range participating in elec-
toral politics through voting remains relatively low, especially com-
pared to the numbers of Asian Americans in that same age category
who are engaged as organizers, activists, and volunteers in local com-
munities.  CIRCLE found that Asian Americans are shown to be the
most engaged young adult population in community volunteerism
and organized fundraisers, but their involvement in electoral politics
did not equal their level of volunteerism (Lopez et al. 2006).  Thus, a
gap exists between the community engagement and political en-
gagement of Asian American college-age students.  The concluding
section addresses several of the ways that Asian American energy for
community involvement can possibly be channeled into greater po-
litical participation.
Future Challenges and Opportunities for Civic Engagement
Sustaining Asian American Student Activism
When it comes to civic engagement, Asian Americans can point
to a strong historical legacy.  In the 1960s and 1970s, Asian American
college students participated in the San Francisco State University
student strike and the movement to establish Ethnic Studies and
Asian American Studies programs (Umemoto 1989).  At the core of
the demands for these academic programs was a call for curricula rel-
evant to the experiences of Asian Americans and their under-served
communities.  Students wanted academic experiences that would
provide them with expertise they could use to solve community prob-
lems.  Although many of the alumni of the Ethnic Studies movement
92 Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
have gone on to establish Asian American community-based organ-
izations such as the Asian Law Caucus in San Francisco, few have
pursued careers in electoral politics.  For Asian Americans, electoral
politics remains “the final frontier” (Fong 2001).
What kind of legacy will current Asian American students leave
for future generations?  Unfortunately, Asian American young adults
are still among the least likely to exercise their right to vote.  Accord-
ing to CIRCLE, young people in the 18- to 24-year old age range were
found to be more likely to participate in their communities and in
electoral politics if they followed current events (Lopez et al. 2006).
They were also more likely to vote or volunteer if they were asked to
do so.  However, unlike earlier generations of students, Asian Amer-
ican first-year college students now are less likely to keep up with
political affairs or to discuss politics, although recently more students
have been pursuing these activities (Chang et al. 2007).  It seems there
is enormous potential among Asian American college students to
make a notable positive difference in shaping the nation’s civic and
political landscape.  Thus, for the benefit of all college-going young
adults, higher education institutions may want to consider increasing
efforts to provide service learning opportunities for undergraduates,
create more campus-community partnerships, and establish other
connections between classroom learning and heightened community
or political awareness that will encourage college student civic en-
gagement.
Awakening the Sleeping Giant
Similar to Latinos in the U.S. two decades ago, Asian Americans
are now being called the “new sleeping giant” because of the unful-
filled potential they hold to demonstrate a significant impact at the
polls (Ong, Ong, Poon, Nakanishi, Scheven, Terriquez, and Lee 2006).
The ability of Asian Americans to exert their political power depends
in part on whether the population’s young women and men will be-
come more politically engaged than they are currently.  Research on
Asian American political engagement and the young adult vote sug-
gests that the Internet can be an important tool to increase the politi-
cal involvement of younger Asian Americans.
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In the time since the Internet has become a part of daily life in
the U.S., English-speaking Asian American young adults have been
found to be the most active Internet users in the nation (Spooner
2001).  According to Tolbert and McNeal (2003), Internet use signifi-
cantly raises the probability of voting.  However, Asian Americans
are not as likely as other Internet users to discuss politics (Wellman,
Haase, Witte, and Hampton 2001).  This finding is consistent with
analyses by Chang et al. (2007) who concluded that today’s Asian
American freshman college students are less likely to participate in
political dialogue than their predecessors.
To reverse this trend, Kurien (2007) argues that the Internet can
be a critical mechanism for civically and politically mobilizing Asian
Americans.  Websites such as Sepia Mutiny (www.sepiamutiny.com),
Angry Asian Man (www.angryasianman.com), and Reappropriate
(www.reappropriate.com) collectively receive hundreds of thousands
of hits, showing the interest among their young readership in politi-
cal and social issues.  These websites represent informal sources of
news about Asian American communities.  Their high levels of read-
ership suggest that the web can be leveraged further to increase po-
litical activity among Asian American young adults.
Some campaigns have been fueled by Asian American student
activists through such websites.  Visitors have sent numerous ac-
counts of anti-Asian American hate and bias incidents on college
campuses across the country to be posted on the Angry Asian Man
website.  In 2005, a 21-year-old Asian American student at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, Eugene Kang, ran for a position on the Ann
Arbor City Council (Jang 2005).  Posts publicizing Kang’s historic run
for office were published on Angry Asian Man, calling area readers to
register and vote for him.  Kang lost his party’s primary election by
just 96 votes. Despite this result, his attempt to become elected into
public office can be seen as a significant accomplishment for any col-
lege student and serves as an example of the untapped promise of
Asian American political involvement.
Another example that reflects the powerful influence of the In-
ternet is the infamous “macaca” incident from the 2006 Virginia Sen-
ate race, when Republican candidate George Allen was caught on
video greeting S.R. Sidarth, a Virginia native of Indian descent as
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“macaca,” telling him, “Welcome to America!” After the clip was
posted online and went viral, history was made in what Rolling Stone
magazine called “The First YouTube Election” (Dickinson 2006).
Allen, previously mentioned as a future presidential contender, lost
the race.  As the incident shows, when Asian American college stu-
dents become involved in politics, their very presence can cause the
public to ask the simple, crucial question: Who is an American?  By
continuing to challenge the perpetual foreigner myth and leverage
the potential of the Internet and social networking, this and future
generations of young Asian Americans are well positioned to make a
unique impact on the course of U.S. politics.
Growing Leadership among Asian American Students
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that Asian Amer-
ican students are prepared to realize their civic and political potential.
A significant number of Asian American first-year college students
wish to shape the political structure and see the government take
more action to address community problems.  Many identify with
having solid leadership and public speaking skills – two competen-
cies that are very important for serving as elected officeholders or as-
suming other community leadership positions.  If these patterns keep
following an upward trajectory, more young Asian Americans will
view themselves as highly qualified for leadership roles both on cam-
puses and beyond, thus giving Asian Americans stronger footing to
step into positions of community influence and political power.  
Another critical skill is the ability to build multi-racial coalitions
and support (Saito 2001a), which Kang needed to achieve given the
relatively low numbers of Asian American residents in Ann Arbor,
Michigan.  However, with the passage of anti-affirmative action
measures in several states over the last decade, many Asian American
students are missing out on opportunities to benefit from racially di-
verse learning environments (Hing 2001).  This raises concern, given
that cross-racial interaction has been linked to higher levels of inter-
est in civic issues for students (Chang, Astin, and Kim 2004).  Racial
diversity in higher education is critical not only to expose Asian
American students to varying viewpoints in the classroom but to mo-
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tivate them towards greater political and community activism.
One way higher education and community organizations can
encourage Asian American students to become more politically in-
volved is to provide more internship experiences directly related to
politics and capitalize on the tendency for Asian American college
students, especially women, to indicate interest in community action
programs, as demonstrated by the trends data we presented.  While
there are internship opportunities targeting Asian American college
students in Washington, DC, a considerable number of them are un-
paid.  Given an under-representation of Asian Americans in political
careers, organizations looking to increase minority young adult in-
volvement in political leadership should seek out Asian American
college students for their participation and offer support for those
with financial needs.  Existing internship and fellowship programs,
such as the Capitol Fellows Program in Sacramento or the University
of California’s Washington Center, should be conscious in their out-
reach efforts to ensure that Asian American young adults are not
being unintentionally excluded from these position openings.  Use of
Internet-based publicity would likely be a viable and low-cost means
of increasing Asian American applications.
Providing college-age Asian Americans with constructive op-
portunities to engage in meaningful dialogue about current events,
and connecting them with volunteer experiences in the community
may be another strategy to increase their political involvement.  Over-
all, there is a renewed call for institutions of higher education to ful-
fill their missions of service and learn to develop well-rounded,
civically engaged leaders (Ehrlich 2000).  For Asian American Stud-
ies programs, one method to increase Asian American civic engage-
ment is to call on majors and minors to fulfill a civic engagement
course requirement involving service learning that draws students
into local communities.  Such requirements should also provide op-
portunities for engagement in electoral politics.  Moreover, service
learning courses within other departments should incorporate Asian
American community sites when possible in order to raise awareness
about the diverse needs of Asian American populations.
As the number of Asian American college students continues to
grow and the desire among these students to be engaged in their com-
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munities as volunteers, activists, and leaders increases, colleges and
universities have a responsibility to provide intentional service learn-
ing or civic engagement curricular and co-curricular opportunities
for all students.  As the trends data indicate, the 1990s were un-
promising years for community and political involvement for both
Asian American students and the overall national college-going pop-
ulation.  There were notable declines in commitments to promoting
racial understanding and environmental clean-up, discussing poli-
tics, and keeping up to date with political affairs.  Since 2000, how-
ever, greater percentages of students have expressed a desire to be
involved in their communities through civic and political education
and action, particularly in the area of community service.  If higher
education institutions can create avenues for Asian Americans and
other college students to link their service experiences with continued
commitments to community involvement and social change, we
might see a growth in concerned Asian American citizens who are
more apt to engage in political activism, including electoral politics.
Although these increases in civic engagement are hopeful, the
future is uncertain for Asian American young adults.  Thus, it is crit-
ical for universities and community-based organizations to actively
promote civic engagement for Asian American students during these
formative college years to set the stage for greater civic and political
participation in future decades.  By providing opportunities like serv-
ice learning courses, internships, and diverse learning environments,
higher education can work to help Asian American college students
improve their societal impact through civic engagement.  Now is the
time for higher education and community leaders to address the gap
between Asian American civic involvement and Asian American po-
litical participation — to fulfill their missions of serving the diversity
of their students and serving their communities.
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Notes
i Weighting is used to readjust the over- and under-representation of certain
types of institutions based on 26 stratification cells.  Cells are based on control
(public or private), type (four-year college or university), and selectivity (av-
erage SAT composite score of the freshman class).  A detailed explanation of cell
stratification and weighting can be found in Appendix A: Research Methodol-
ogy of The American Freshman: Forty-Year Trends (Pryor et al., 2007).
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Introduction
The Internet has rapidly become a familiar communications
medium at the workplace, at home, and on the streets.  To appreciate
the speed of penetration, consider that fact that back in 1997, accord-
ing to U.S. census statistics, less than a fifth of American households
(18.6%) had Internet access at home.  But by 2003, a majority (54.6%)
did, and over a third of those with connections had broadband (U.S.
Department of Commerce 2004). Still more recent surveys have found
that over two-thirds of Americans have access to the Internet at home
(68.1%), and over two-thirds of the connected enjoy broadband (USC
Annenberg School Center for the Digital Future 2007). Without ques-
tion, we are getting increasingly “wired.”
Fortunately, this trend has not passed Asian Americans by.  To
the contrary, Asian Americans appear to have Internet access that is
at least as high or higher than the rate enjoyed by other racial groups,
including non-Hispanic Whites.i Of course, with any “model minor-
ity”-consistent statistics, we should be wary of upward biased meas-
urements.  Specifically, these surveys are conducted in English
(sometimes also Spanish), which means that Asian Americans (a third
who have limited English proficiency) who are not able or willing to
answer long surveys over the telephone in English are undercounted.
This selection bias inflates the numbers because those with limited
English have lower Internet connectivity.   
In addition, we should be mindful of the large variance among
the various ethnic communities that constitute Asian America.  Ten
Asian American ethnic groups have high school completion rates that
are below the national average.  Further, thirteen percent of Asian
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Americans live in poverty, compared to the national average of 12%
(APALC 2006). Because education and income correlate positively
with Internet use, the high averages about Asian American connec-
tivity conceal substantial variance, with specific subpopulations po-
tentially many standard deviations below the mean.  
Still, it remains fair to say that Asian Americans as a racial group
are on average well-connected to the Internet.  What then are the im-
plications for Asian American civic engagement? By “civic engagement,”
I mean the various ways in which individuals engage social, legal,
and political institutions that extend past the boundaries of the fam-
ily or the marketplace.  This capacious definition includes not only
politics in the forms of voting, donating time and money to cam-
paigns, and debating political options but also engagements with civil
society.  Moreover, such engagements do not have to be serious or
lofty; instead, they can revolve around hobbies (e.g., hiking), inter-
ests (e.g., gadgets), aesthetics (e.g., runway fashion), even celebrities
(e.g., fan clubs).    
The Internet clearly has had a large impact on civic engagement,
defined in this broad sense.  But even in core political domains, we
see remarkable findings.  For example, the Pew Internet & American
Life Project found that during the 2004 campaign, 52% of Internet
users went online to get information about the elections; 35% used e-
mail to engage in political discussions; 11% directly engaged in cam-
paign activities, such as donating money and volunteering.   The
survey found that 23% of respondents claimed that using the Internet
for political engagement encouraged them to vote (Rainie et al. 2005).
Data specific to Asian American usage are limited, but what ex-
ists indicate that the Internet is a vitally important source of political
and government information. A special 2001 Pew report found that
nearly half of (English-speaking) Asian Americans used the internet
to “get political news and information” (49%) and to “visit a govern-
ment Web site” (47%)  (Spooner 2001). These proportions are compa-
rable to those for Whites and higher than for African Americans and
Latinos, although as explained above, the Asian American figures
may be biased upward.
Given the growing importance of the Internet, it seems worth-
while to examine, even speculate about, its implications for Asian
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American civic engagement.  This essay answers that call.  The first
part examines how Asian Americans are using online communities
right now, with special focus on ethnic-specific forms of Internet-me-
diated engagements.  In part two, this essay explores a specific as-
pect of political engagement - voting - which may soon be strongly
influenced by the Internet.  Finally, the third part reaches out still far-
ther in time, to imagine how the increasing significance of computer-
mediated communications might alter or disrupt how race operates
both online and off, and what that might mean for Asian America. 
I. Now: Online Communities
The academic literature has highlighted various Asian Ameri-
can online communities.  For instance, a much publicized example is
SAWNET, the South Asian Women Network (http://sawnet.org),
which is a “forum for and about women from Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka” (South Asian Women’s
NETwork). It is a moderated mailing list for adult women only, run
by a group of volunteer moderators, with a companion website reg-
ularly updated with news links and resources on useful topics (e.g.,
“domestic violence”).   
The book AsianAmerica.Net, edited by Professors Rachel Lee and
Sau-ling Cynthia Wong, pulls together additional case studies  (Lee
and Wong 2003). For instance, Kim-An Lieberman describes how
Vietnamese nationalists, both in the United States and elsewhere,
have taken strong political stances online on Websites and news-
groups.  In turn, these cyber engagements have helped shape a mod-
ern Vietnamese identity and even a translation of the Vietnamese
language to ASCII text.  Vinay Lal critiques the Hindu Student Coun-
cil’s Global Hindu Electronic Network (GHEN), which he suggests
propagates Hindutva philosophy and “aggressive Hindu national-
ism.”  Yuan Shu describes the rise of two different Chinese language
networks — Chinese News Digest (created in direct response to the
political strife that would lead to the Tiananmen massacre) and Chi-
nese Media Net (self-styled as a CNN for Chinese) — which have
come to cater to different political viewpoints for Chinese in North
America.  Emily Noelle Ignacio describes how Filipinos in America
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and the Philippines use the Internet to share jokes that both reaffirm
and reproduce Filipino culture and identity.  
These examples display certain patterns.  First, these online com-
munities tend to be ethnic-specific.  Second, and related, they tend to
be transnational, linking immigrant communities with their countries
of origin.  Why might this be so?  
Anyone who reads or writes a blog knows that the Internet de-
creases the cost of producing and distributing information such that
speakers who would not have had the audience necessary to survive
in the print world may nevertheless flourish in cyberspace.  The In-
ternet also decreases the significance of physical distance or geo-
graphic dispersion especially when what is being exchanged is
information.  When groups are talking in a chat room or exchanging
posts in a web forum, the physical distance separating the community
members is essentially irrelevant.  Accordingly, the underlying eco-
nomics of information production and exchange on the Internet per-
mits widely dispersed populations who share some common interest
or connection to form online communities that both substitute for and
enhance offline communities.  
This technological advantage seems perfectly suited for the
needs of various Asian diasporas:  communities tied together by eth-
nicity, culture, immigration experience, and language can bridge
physical distance through online networks.  Put another way, al-
though the Internet can help facilitate a local condominium associa-
tion’s deliberations, the Internet provides comparatively far greater
cost savings in facilitating communications across thousands of peo-
ple separated by thousands of miles spanning oceans.  
Another factor that likely influences community adoption of on-
line technologies is the intensity of interest within that community.
Again, we should not be surprised that ethnicity drives some of that
interest.  Immigrants and their children are often highly motivated
to maintain homeland connections.  Familial, social, and cultural ties
are powerfully felt.  
I do not want to exaggerate these observations.  For example,
there are many Asian American online communities that are pan-
Asian in framing and participation, with focus on domestic politics or
social exchange.   A political example is <modelminority.com>, which
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has the following subtitle: “A Guide to Asian American Empower-
ment.”  A more social example is <AsianAvenue.com>.  In some
sense, what is taking place online tracks the ways in which Asian peo-
ple have formed social, civil, and political communities off-line.  The
typical pattern is to construct an ethnic-specific social or civil institu-
tion by tapping into shared culture, experience, history, and language.
But soon thereafter, and often simultaneously, pan-ethnic social and
civil institutions are built, with less emphasis on culture and home-
land countries and more emphasis on politics and domestic matters.  
In short, Asian Americans are participating in various online
communities.  Not surprisingly, many of the most vibrant, thriving
communities are ethnic-specific and transnational.  But as in the of-
fline world, there are many communities that are pan-Asian and more
domestic and political in orientation.
II. Soon: Online Voting
The Internet has had a general positive effect on Asian American
participation in both civic and political processes.  In this part, I dis-
cuss how in the near future, the Internet might have an especially sig-
nificant impact on online voting.  By “online voting” I mean to adopt
a broad definition.  In its boldest form, it could mean casting a valid
vote remotely “through any computer-mediated device (e.g., desk-
top computer, cellular telephone, personal digital assistant, Internet
appliance) connected through a network, such as the Internet”  (Kang
2001, 1155 n.1). Or, more modestly, it could mean online-assisted vot-
ing, which could entail reading some bar code or radio frequency
identification (RFID) tag on the ballot sheet with one’s mobile phone,
and immediately receiving contextual information including specific
voting recommendations, all inside the traditional ballot booth.
Any discussion of online voting should raise alarms associated
with direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines, which have
failed abysmally.  Manufactured by incompetent and untrustworthy
firms, they have been adopted pell-mell by non-expert government
bureaucrats without sound scientific or engineering advice.  These
machines feature remarkably poor security and suffer from an em-
barrassing lack of transparency, which further erodes trust.  That said,
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these failures are political more than technological.  In other words, I
am confident that over the long term, we will see computer voting
that generates voter-verifiable paper audit trails that ensure voting
integrity and secrecy.ii
For readers skeptical that online voting will ever become com-
monplace, consider the fact that we already allow remote voting in
the form of snail mail via absentee ballots.  For example, “in the 1978
California general election, 314,258 absentee votes were cast (4.41% of
all votes cast); but by the 2004 general election, 4,104,179 absentee
votes were cast (32.61% of all votes cast)“ (Alvarez et al. 2005). For
those who think that hacking threats make online voting a fantasy,
consider how mainstream online banking has become, which allows
massive fund transfers at the click of a key.   In sum, online voting is
not so implausible; certainly, online-assisted voting is just around the
corner if not here already.  
Getting Out the Vote
If lower voting turnout is driven partly by the transaction costs
of voting (physically getting to the ballot box through rush hour traf-
fic or bad weather), then online voting can increase turnout.  Because
Asian Americans, at least English speaking ones, are as well con-
nected to the Internet as any other racial group, there is no reason to
be concerned about a negative disparate racial impact on Asian
Americans.  Whether there is a disparate impact on other racial mi-
nority groups is an important but separate question  (Alvarez and
Nagler 2001).iii
What about the non-English speakers? Current immigration and
demographic projections predict that by 2030, Asian Americans will
make up 7.1% of the United States population.  What’s interesting is
that a majority of them (52.2%) will probably still be foreign-born.
Will these Asians, many of them with limited English skills, be left
on the sidelines?
Perhaps not.  Consider how online (or online-assisted) voting
can tackle the critical problem of limited English proficiency, which is
a serious obstacle to voting.  For instance, one exit poll study of the
2006 midterm elections by the Asian American Legal and Education
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Fund (AALDEF) reported that “nearly half of all [4,700] voters sur-
veyed (46%) needed interpreters to vote, and 38% used translated
written materials” (AALDEF 2007, 2). In a state such as California,
ballots often feature complex initiatives or referenda on a broad range
of issues as complicated as term limits and HMO regulation.  Even
native speakers have difficulty understanding what’s going on.  For
those with limited English, understanding is nearly impossible.  
Unfortunately, translating ballot and election materials into just
a few of the popular Asian languages — Mandarin, Hindi, Tagalog,
Korean, Vietnamese — is cost-prohibitive in the print world. Al-
though federal law (the Language Minority Provision of the Voting
Rights Act) and state election law sometimes require translations,
often the trigger for such requirements (a minimum percentage of
voting-age citizens must be members of a single language minority
group) is not technically satisfied.  Even when it is, the requirements
are sometimes resisted or inadequately implemented (Electionline.org
2006).
Here the Internet could be leveraged, either by the state or by
private actors, to produce and distribute the relevant explanatory ma-
terials in Asian languages. Very crude translations can be made avail-
able at nearly zero marginal cost using existing services such as
Google translate <http://translate.google.com>.  More accurate
translations created by bilingual humans are more expensive to pro-
duce, but once created, they can be distributed at nearly zero mar-
ginal cost.  Examples of such multi-lingual voter education and ballot
translation initiatives exist.   But, just-in-time translations, available
in a multitude of Asian languages — all made possible through the
Internet — could be a substantial boon to Asian voting.
New Intermediaries
But maybe the suggestion that motivated voters will engage in
online translations of difficult ballot materials to make the right pol-
icy choice is naively optimistic.  Frankly, even when our English is
excellent, we will often not know how to vote on a particular question
(think about some complex referendum) or candidate (think about
some school board or judicial retention election).  Often, choosing in-
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telligently between one option and the other requires research that
we simply lack the time or interest to complete.  In such cases, we
will not vote at all, or at least not on that matter — unless we can turn
to trusted intermediaries for recommendations.  By “trusted inter-
mediaries,” I mean individuals, organizations, or entities that can
serve as rough proxies for one’s own values and judgment.  Examples
include: political parties; ethnic press, which for example, has cov-
ered the 2008 presidential election aggressively (Santos 2008); local
politicians; political action committees; nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs)iv; media celebrities; and public intellectuals.   
Again, such recommendations are regularly made through paper
voter guides from the local peace officer association, the Republican
party, and the like.  But as explained, paper mailings are expensive.
By contrast, spreading recommendations through the Internet is
cheap.  Thus, new breeds of political intermediaries are made possi-
ble.  The restraint is no longer the cash necessary to print and dis-
tribute voting guides; instead, the constraint is the degree to which
the voters’ trust and cognitive attention can be won by a particular in-
termediary.
So, in the actual online voting scenario, imagine the following:  
[Consider] the electronic extension of the paper voter guides we
already receive in the mail before Election Day. But the e-version
can be far more than an html or pdf version of the paper mailing.
Instead, it could be a website that frames the ballot website and
“checks” off the recommended votes with the user having to do
nothing but click the “submit” button. In fact, on 12:01 a.m. Elec-
tion Day, trusted political organizations could send to their con-
stituents or target audiences an e-mail with the appropriate URL
for this assisted voting site. Two clicks, and you are done. To be
sure, security protocols may require some changes in this ap-
proach of facilitated e-voting. In addition to the e-mail, there may
have to be small software programs, a.k.a. “applets,” delivered
as well  (Kang 2001, 1168).
In the more modest online-assisted voting scenario, imagine re-
ceiving just-in-time election recommendations in the ballot booth —
all with explanations why, to the extent that we are curious.  No doubt
some will complain that such technology-assisted voting invites not
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individualized deliberation but mindless adherence to some third
party’s recommendation.  (There may also be some legal constraints
against cell phones with cameras being brought into polling booths
in order to deter vote buying.)v But a more realistic assessment asks
whether individualized deliberation is the accurate baseline for com-
parison.  As compared to randomly voting for or against some ini-
tiative, or not voting on that item at all, or even voting straight along
crude party recommendations, online-assisted voting enables a citi-
zen to defer to a trusted intermediary (such as Amnesty International
or the Sierra Club), who is more narrowly tailored to her particular
values or loyalties.   
Online(-assisted) voting enables a new set of intermediaries poor
in money but rich in community trust to engage in political recom-
mendations.  My guess is that there are many such potential inter-
mediaries within the Asian American communities.  So, a political
action committee such as the 80-20 Initiative, (www.80-20initia-
tive.net/). which tries to produce 80% of the Asian American vote to
swing an election, could be more effective through just such tech-
nologies. Grassroots organizations such as AsianAmericansfor
Obama.com (www.asianamericansforobama.com) could do the same
for their preferred candidate.   Celebrities, as well as elected political
officials, could communicate their judgments.  Indeed, even aca-
demics and their think tanks could provide useful recommendations
on various policy initiatives or specific candidates (Kang 2008).vi
III. Later: Cyber-race
In the prior part, we focused on a concrete problem — voting —
and speculated how Asian Americans could do more of it and differ-
ently, via the Internet, in the near future.  Let us now speculate still
further along the time horizon to ask a provocative question: In what
ways might online engagements alter the fundamental ways that race
functions both online and off?  To appreciate this as an intelligible
question, we must first parse a simple model of “racial mechanics.” 
Consider the following diagram, which explains how race in-
fluences a simple bilateral interaction between some perceiver and
target individual.
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As I have described in prior work: 
Through law and culture, society provides us (the per-
ceivers) with a set of racial categories into which we map an
individual human being (the target) according to prevail-
ing rules of racial mapping.  Once a person is assigned to a
racial category, implicit and explicit racial meanings asso-
ciated with that category are triggered.  These activated
racial meanings then influence our interpersonal interac-
tion (Kang 2005, 1499).
The refrain that “race is a social construction” familiar in Criti-
cal Race Studies can be recast in terms of this racial mechanics model.
Each of the ovals — the racial mapping rules, the racial categories, and
the racial meanings associated with those categories — are provided
neither by nature nor deity.  To the contrary, each is a product of
human culture, history, politics, and agency—in these senses, social
constructions.  
To be more concrete, consider the set of racial categories that are
in operation today, and how they have changed over time based on
both the “science” of the day as well as administrative understand-
ings (consider, e.g., shifting census categories).  Back in 1977, the Cen-
sus considered “Asian or Pacific Islander” as one of the four principal
racial categories (with American Indian or Alaskan Native, Black,
White, and Some Other Race).  As of 1997, the Census added a new
racial category by segmenting Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Is-
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lander off from the Asian category (with American Indian or Alaskan
Native, Asian, Black or African American, White, and Some Other
Race) (U.S. Census Bureau nd(b)). For those curious why Latino/as
are not mentioned, “Hispanic” has always been deemed an “ethnic-
ity” variable, not a “racial” one.  Thus Hispanics may be of any race.  
Consider also how mapping rules are socially constructed.  For
example, when it was first passed in 1790, the federal naturalization
statute only permitted “free white persons” to naturalize.  After the
civil war, in 1870, that statute was amended to include persons of
African descent or nativity.  But what about Asians?  In Ozawa v.
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), the Supreme Court clarified that
Japanese were not “white” because that term should be understood
to mean “Caucasian.”   Whatever the Japanese were, they were cer-
tainly not Caucasian.  
The very next year, Bhagat Singh Thind took advantage of
Ozawa’s “white equals Caucasian” formula and argued that the best
science of the day recognized “Hindus” as Caucasian (United States v.
Thind, 261 U.S. 204 [1923]).  Accordingly, Thind should be deemed
White and allowed to naturalize.   When confronted with this logical
but undesirable consequence of their prior holding, the Supreme
Court simply changed its mind.  The Supreme Court backtracked and
said that “white” really should be understood in terms of its plain
meaning, not according to any scientific discourse, which was itself
confusing.  And according to this plain meaning, the legislature that
passed the naturalization statute would have instinctively rejected
Thind as not White.
Finally, it should be obvious that the racial meanings associated
with the Asian American category are highly malleable, changing
sometimes dramatically.  At the end of the 19th century, Asians (con-
sider the Chinese) were viewed as lying illegal immigrants cheating
themselves through the Chinese Exclusion laws to infiltrate the
United States.  By the end of the 20th century, East Asians became the
model minority.  Of course, the “model minority” stereotype can
quickly transmogrify into the “yellow peril” (Kang 1993). But one
cannot deny that stereotypes and attitudes toward Asian Americans
have changed substantially, and in complex ways, in the past century.
Having sketched out a model of racial mechanics, we now focus
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on the Internet.  First, we have already observed that cyberspace al-
lows for greater interactivity with other persons who may not be
within the same geographic community but nevertheless inhabit
some joint community of interest.  Second, the Internet allows iden-
tity to be expressed or performed differently because we typically
avoid the architecture of face-to-face interactions.  In particular, the
Internet often allows for both racial anonymity as well as pseudonymity.
For example, in text-based interactions, we cannot see the human
body, which means that we cannot apply informal visual-based map-
ping rules to place an individual into a racial category according to
looks.  To be sure, text may provide information (e.g., surname or an-
cestry, “slang,” or even zip code), which can be used to map roughly
or tentatively an individual into some racial category, but such infor-
mation need not be shared, in which case, racial anonymity is pre-
served.  As for pseudonymity, in various online arenas including
virtual worlds such as Second Life, an individual can create some
identity, represented by name and avatar, which persists over time,
but need not in any way represent a race generally or represent the
same race that that individual represents off-line.  In other words, on-
line we can engage in a form of “cyber-passing.”
By cross-applying the racial mechanics model with the flexibili-
ties introduced by Internet communications, we can see that the In-
ternet can potentially disrupt racial mechanics in three ways.  First,
anonymity can disrupt “racial mapping” in pursuit of what might be
called an abolition paradigm.  Second, greater interactivity can alter
the cache of “racial meanings” in pursuit of what might be called an
integration paradigm.  This is just a cyber version of the social contact
hypothesis, which suggests that under the right circumstances of re-
peat cooperative engagements, attitudes between groups can im-
prove.  This is the liberal hope latent in racially integrated schools
and neighborhoods.  Finally, pseudonymity can challenge our com-
placent acceptance of the various racial categories given to us by cul-
ture and law (and their connection to biology) in the pursuit of what
might be called a transmutation paradigm.  If we flit through multiple
identities online, perhaps our very conception of racial identity can be
reworked in anti-essentialist ways.  Schematically, the three options
look like this:
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To repeat, Internet anonymity disrupts racial mapping to produce
abolition.  Internet interactivity reforms racial meaning to promote
integration.  Internet pseudonymity unravels our presumptions
about racial categories in the service of transmutation.
In prior work, I have examined these three paths and pointed
out that society does not have to adopt a single design strategy for all
of cyberspace (Kang 2000). Instead, we can intentionally diversify our
policy risk and zone different cyber spaces in accordance with dif-
ferent racial environments.  For instance, I suggest that most market
places be zoned abolition: in such zones, Asian Americans cannot be
given worse offers in product purchases, leases, and the like because
racial mapping is made impossible.  Consider, for instance, how using
a car-buying agent who charges a flat fee above dealer’s invoice can
racially anonymize a buyer, which then prevents the possibility of
racially discriminatory negotiations.
But the focus of this essay is not the marketplace but civil soci-
ety and the political realm.  In these domains, I have argued in favor
of integration as the recommended zoning strategy, with special em-
phasis on establishing those environmental characteristics that social
psychologists have long identified as being crucial to decreasing
racial bias.  The basic idea is that Internet-mediated interactions can
help improve attitudes and decrease stereotypes about Asian Amer-
icans.  
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If this seems far-fetched, consider the following data.  The 2001
Pew Special Report pointed out that 72% of (English-speaking) Asian
Americans used the Internet to seek out hobby information, and that
32% of them engaged in online chat, which entails going into virtual
“rooms” to discuss matters of common interest.  This sort of online in-
teraction need not be superficial  (Spooner 2001). The Center for Dig-
ital Future’s most recent report defined an online community as “a
group that shares thoughts or ideas, or works on common projects,
through electronic communication only”  (CDF 2007, 97).  These on-
line communities are of various natures, ranging from “professional,
social, relationships, spiritual, hobbies, and politics.”   According to
its survey, those who participate in online communities seem to take
them quite seriously.  For example, 67.2% thought the community
was very important or extremely important.   This attitude is reflected
in their time commitments: 56.6% log into their community at least
once a day, during which time they post messages (18.8%); talk to any
available member (8.7%); browse for information (7.0%); or ask for
help (2.7%).  (Id. at 97-98)  
The online community interaction often translates into some real
world engagement as well.  For instance, 20.3% said that they take
offline actions, such as attending a meeting, at least once a year that
is related to their online community.  (Id. at 99)  Interestingly, 43.7%
also claim that they have participated more in “social activism” since
they got involved in online communities.  Relatedly, 29.7% claim that
their involvement in nonprofit organizations have increased since In-
ternet usage (69.6% stayed the same) (102).
All this suggests that Asian Americans can use the Internet to
engage in online communities addressing hobbies, art, culture, poli-
tics and the like, and that these engagements can be deep, persistent,
and cooperative—which satisfy some of the conditions necessary for
social contact to decrease racial prejudice.  So, to take a simple ex-
ample, someone living in Idaho who has never before befriended an
Asian American, partly due to the fact that so few live in that vicin-
ity, may come to “meet” one online through some common interest,
such as cooking or foreign policy.  That actual experience could alter
the racial meanings that the Idahoan had previously about Asian
Americans, which were produced by what might be called vicarious
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interactions — principally, stories or images consumed through mass
media.  
Even more intriguing is the possibility of a slight delay in racial
decloaking.  At the beginning of some online engagement, suppose
that participants of a community know each other only by username,
which prevents racial mapping into the Asian category.  After some
interactions, suppose that the racial cloak is lifted through some bi-
ographical detail that is revealed.  An interaction partner, whose race
was previously not salient (i.e. presumed to be White), turns out to be
Asian (or Black or Latino).  An online user interface that merges a
short-term abolition approach with a long-term integration approach
could facilitate interactions that might have been otherwise biased or
short-circuited by pre-existing biases.
Although this is a mere sketch of a more complicated argument,
the general points can be easily summarized:  the Internet enables in-
triguing strategies of abolition, integration, and transmutation that
Asian Americans can benefit from.  How, then, does this connect back
to civic engagement?  The most important linkage, in my view, is pro-
moting integration.  The Internet will allow individuals that are phys-
ically separated to interact in a community driven by shared interests
and commitments.  As already explained, although some of these
shared interests will be common ethnicity, most will not.   This means
that many Americans who live in areas with negligible Asian Amer-
ican populations might interact with them for the first time online.
And if these engagements are structured in a particular way, then
negative attitudes toward Asian Americans could improve and
stereotypes of Asian Americans could be weakened.  
Conclusion
The Internet provides new ways to promote various forms of
civic engagement.   It can, for example, facilitate the creation of online
communities, which can range from the ethnic-specific and transna-
tional to the more pan-Asian and domestic.  The Internet and related
communications technologies can make possible online voting and
online-assisted voting.  Finally, the Internet can facilitate interracial
interactions that can rework the racial meanings associated with the
114 Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
Asian American racial category.
For Asian Americans, the obstacles to such Internet-assisted civic
engagement is not any digital divide.  To the contrary, on matters of
connectivity, Asian Americans seem to have an edge (at least on av-
erage).  What’s more important is how this connectivity is leveraged.
Much of the increase in civic engagement will happen naturally, as
the Internet becomes an ever richer medium through which we ex-
plore our interests and commitments.  That said, specific user inter-
face interventions – such as those that promote an integration
paradigm – can produce superior environments.   
In my view, those especially interested in Asian American polit-
ical engagement should experiment aggressively with the “trusted
intermediary” idea.  The goal would be to offer a localized recom-
mendation clearance site, which matches Asian American voters with
the views of Asian American trusted intermediaries.  For instance,
for states that elect judges, it would not be difficult to have local Asian
American law faculty who enjoy a “trusted“ status to make recom-
mendations and provide the reasons why.   Those recommendations
could be translated into multiple Asian languages and pushed out
through various electronic media, including the Internet.   If such a
system works well in one election, it will be viewed as a useful re-
source in the next election.  
Engaging online presents tremendous opportunity for Asian
Americans.  With some forethought, that opportunity can be trans-
lated to greater civic and political engagement.
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Notes
i According to the NTIA, as of October 2003, Asian Americans appeared to have
at least as much access to the Internet as Whites.   For example, on basic usage
of the Internet anywhere (e.g., school, home, work), approximately 63.1% of
Asian Americans and 65.1% of Whites used the Internet somewhere, as com-
pared to 45.6% of Blacks and 37.2% of Hispanics.  If we change the measure to
the percentage who live in a broadband household, Asian Americans were clearly
at the top:  34.2%, as compared to Whites (25.7%), Blacks (14.2%), and His-
panic (12.6%).  (NTIA, 2004, Appendix Table 1)
ii See, e.g., <Punchscan.org>.
iii Finding that in the 2000 Arizona Democratic primary, those who voted using
the Internet were more female, more urban, and less minority than those who
voted using paper ballots (R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler, “The
Likely Consequences of Internet Voting for Political Representation”).
iv Ethnic organizations such as the Organization of Chinese Americans., the
Japanese American Citizens League, and the National Korean American Serv-
ice and Education Consortium regularly issue “action alerts” on various pol-
icy issues.   Civil rights organizations such as the Asian Law Caucus, the Asian
Pacific American Legal Center, and the Asian American Justice Center do the
same.  Other organizations, such as the Asian & Pacific Islander American
Health Forum (APIAHF) and the Association of Asian Pacific Community
Health Organizations (AAPCHO), focus on specific subject matter areas, such
as health. 
v See, e.g.  Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-413(e) (“No elector shall use photographic or
other electronic monitoring or recording devices or cellular telephones while
such elector is within the enclosed space in a polling place.”).  
vi See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Why Obama, Korea Times, Feb. 4, 2008 (in Korean); Jerry
Kang, Obama and Ozawa, National Law Journal, March 21, 2008.
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Asian American Panethnicity: 
Challenges and Possibilities
Yen Le Espiritu
University of California, San Diego
Introduction
In a 1999 article published in Gidra, an activist Asian American
news magazine, Naomi Iwasaki (1999, under “Asian American or
Not”) writes, “You know, the hardest thing about pan-Asian solidar-
ity is the ‘pan’ part.  It forces us all to step outside of our comfort
zones, whether they be constructed by ethnicity, class, home city,
identity, whatever.”  Iwasaki’s statement calls attention to the social
constructedness of pan-ethnicity — panethnic identities are self-con-
scious products of political choice and actions, not of inherited phe-
notypes, bloodlines, or cultural traditions.  Panethnic movements and
organizations bring diverse cultural groups together in cooperation
around shared political goals.  In the United States, examples of
panethnic groups include the Native American, the Latino, and the
Asian American.  Despite their distinct histories and separate identi-
ties, these groups have at times united to protect and advance their
collective interests.  Since numbers count in the American political
structure, many racialized groups have determined that their civic
engagement — that is, their efforts to promote social change through
participation in the larger democratic process and/or through grass-
roots community organizing —is more effective when they organize
panethnically (Cornell 1988; Espiritu1992; Saito 1998).  
In my 1992 publication Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging In-
stitutions and Identities, I identify the twin roots of Asian American
panethnicity — in the racialization of Asian national groups by dom-
inant groups and in Asian Americans’ responses to those construc-
tions.  I argue that the racialist constructions of Asians as
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homogeneous and interchangeable spawn important alliances and
affiliations among ethnic and immigrant groups of Asian origin.
Adopting the dominant group’s categorization of them, Asian Amer-
icans have institutionalized pan-Asianism as their political instru-
ment, thereby enlarging their own capacities to challenge and
transform the existing structure of power.  In other words, Asian
Americans did not just adopt the pan-Asian concept but also trans-
formed it to conform to their political, economic, and ideological
needs.
In the four decades since the emergence of the pan-Asian con-
cept in the late 1960s, Asian American communities have changed in
dramatic ways.  No longer constrained by race-based exclusion laws,
Asian immigrants began arriving in much larger numbers than be-
fore.  Many of the post-1965 immigrants have little direct experience
with the Asian American movement and little reason to think of
themselves as Asian American rather than as immigrants, as low-
wage workers, or as members of different national and ethnic groups
(Espiritu et al. 2000, 131).  Moreover, recent immigration has further
diversified Asian Americans along cultural, generational, economic,
and political lines — all of which have compounded the difficulties
of forging pan-Asian identities and institutions.  This chapter reviews
the role of panethnicity in Asian American civic and political en-
gagement, paying particular attention to the ways in which pan-
Asian identities and institutions have been complicated and
transformed by the post-1965 immigration. 
Coming Together: The Emergence of Pan-Asianism
Asians in the United States have always been active in civic en-
gagement — from striking for higher wages and better working con-
ditions to challenging laws that denied them civil rights to supporting
political movements to liberate their homelands (Chan 1991, ch. 5).
However, it was not until the late 1960s, with the advent of the Asian
American movement, that a pan-Asian consciousness and con-
stituency were first formed.  The development of a pan-Asian con-
sciousness and constituency reflected broader societal developments
and demographic changes as well as the group’s political agenda.  Be-
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fore World War II, pan-Asian unity was not feasible because the pre-
dominantly foreign born Asian population did not share a common
language.  During the postwar years, owing to immigration restric-
tions and the growing dominance of the second and even third gen-
erations, U.S.-born Asians outnumbered immigrants.  By 1960
approximately two-thirds of the Asian populations in California had
been born in the United States (Ong 1989, 5-8).  With English as the
common language, persons from different Asian backgrounds were
able to communicate with one another (Ling 1984, 73) and in so doing
to create a common identity associated with the United States.  Also,
the breakdown of economic and residential barriers during the post-
war period provided the first opportunity for an unprecedented num-
ber of Asian Americans to come into intimate, sustained contact with
the larger society — and with one another.  Formerly homogeneous,
the Asian ethnic enclaves started to house mixed-Asian communi-
ties, as well as non-Asian groups.  Multigroup suburban centers also
emerged.  Paul Wong (1972, 34) reported that since the early 1960s
Asian Americans of diverse national origins had moved into the sub-
urbs outside the major Asian communities such as Berkeley and San
Mateo, California.  Although a small proportion of the local popula-
tion, these Asian Americans tended to congregate in pockets; conse-
quently, in some residential blocks a majority of the residents were
Asian Americans.
Although broader social struggles and internal demographic
changes provided the impetus for the Asian American movement, it
was the Asian Americans’ politics — explicitly radical, confronta-
tional, and pan-Asian — that shaped the movement’s content.  In-
spired by anticolonial revolutions in Asia and by black and Chicano
revolutionary nationalism, college students of Asian ancestry sought
to transcend inter-Asian ethnic divisions and to ally themselves with
other “Third World” minorities (Blauner 1972, ch. 2; Omatsu 1994).
Through pan-Asian organizations, publications, and Asian American
studies programs, Asian American activists forged a pan-Asian con-
sciousness by highlighting their shared resistance to Western imperi-
alism and to U.S. racism.  The pan-Asian concept enabled diverse
Asian American groups to understand their “unequal circumstances
and histories as being related” (Lowe 1991, 30).  By the mid-1970s,
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“Asian American” had become a familiar term (Lott 1976, 30).  Al-
though first coined by college activists, the pan-Asian concept began
to be used extensively by professional and community spokesper-
sons to lobby for the welfare, health and business interests of Amer-
icans of Asian descent.  Pan-Asian media such as Amerasia Journal,
Asian Week newspaper and AsiAm magazine have also been estab-
lished.  Moreover, single ethnic organizations such as the Japanese
American Citizens League and the Organization of Chinese Ameri-
cans began to take up issues that affect all Asians.  Commenting on
the “literally scores of pan-Asian organizations” in the mid-1970s,
William Liu (1976, 6) asserted that “the idea of pan-Asian coopera-
tion [was] viable and ripe for development.”
The advent of state-sponsored affirmative action programs pro-
vided another material reason for Asian American subgroups to con-
solidate their efforts.  Because the welfare state bureaucracy often
treats all Asian Americans as a single administrative unit in distrib-
uting economic and political resources, it imposes a pan-Asian struc-
ture on persons and communities dependent on government support.
As dealings with government bureaucracies increased, political and
civic participation along a pan-Asian line became necessary, not only
because numbers confer power but also because the pan-Asian cate-
gory is the institutionally relevant category in the political and legal
system.  Administratively treated as a homogeneous group, Asian
Americans found it necessary — and even advantageous — to re-
spond as a group.  The pan-Asian strategy has led to some victories.
For example, Asian American legislators, community leaders, and or-
ganizations united to fight the Census Bureau’s proposal to collapse
all Asian racial codes into one summary category for the 1980 and
1990 censuses.  Partly in response to the strength of their political lob-
bying, the Census Bureau finally conceded to the coalition’s demand
for a detailed enumeration of Asian subgroups.  At first glance, Asian
American demands to be counted separately in the 1980 and 1990
censuses suggest the absence of pan-Asian solidarity.  However, this
struggle for separate counts was waged by pan-Asian advocacy
groups.i Without the competitive advantage of these pan-Asian ef-
forts, the struggle with the Census Bureau probably would not have
been so successful.  Thus, rather than demonstrating the lack of pan-
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Asian solidarity, the census struggles illustrate the organizational di-
alectic of Asian American ethnicity: a demand for separate counts
was waged by a pan-Asian coalition.  It is noteworthy that Asian
Americans who lobbied for individual group data also pushed for an
accurate total API count.  In other words, the census protest was
mostly against the absence of subgroup categories, not against the pres-
ence of the pan-Asian category (Espiritu 1992).
While political benefits certainly promote pan-Asian organiza-
tion, it is anti-Asian violence that has consistently drawn the largest
pan-Asian support.  For many Asian Americans, anti-Asian violence
concerns the entire group, cross-cutting class, cultural, and genera-
tional divisions.  The 1982 killing of Vincent Chin, a Chinese Ameri-
can who was beaten to death by two white men who allegedly
mistook him for Japanese, united Asian Americans across genera-
tional, ethnic, class, and political lines.  For some Asian Americans,
the Chin case marked their first participation in a pan-Asian effort.
Their belief that all Asian Americans are potential victims propelled
them to join together in self-defense and to monitor, report, and
protest anti-Asian violence.  In particular, Asian Americans pushed
for the collection and reporting of statistics on anti-Asian crimes at
the local, state, and federal levels.  This pan-Asian activism has forced
government officials, the media, and the public to be more attentive
and responsive to anti-Asian crimes (Espiritu 1992).  
Changing Demographic and Economic Characteristics
The post-1965 immigration surge has transformed Asian Amer-
ica — and thus the feasibility of pan-Asian civic engagement — in
dramatic ways.  The share of immigration in the United States from
Asia as a proportion of total admission grew from 5 percent in the
1950s to 11 percent in the 1960s and to 33 percent in the 1970s, and it
has remained at 35 percent since 1980 (Zhou and Gatewood 2000, 9).
In sheer numbers, the Asian American population grew from a total
of 1.4 million in 1970 to 7.3 million in 1990, to 10.2 million in 2000.  By
2030, it is projected that the API population will be nearly 25 million
and will comprise just over seven percent of the total population (Ong
and Scott, Chapter 1).  According to Zhou and Gatewood (2000, 14),
124 Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
immigration accounted for more than two-thirds of the spectacular
population growth.  For the new national origins groups (Indians,
Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and the Hmong), pop-
ulation growth can be attributed almost entirely to immigration
(Zhou and Gatewood 2000, 14). The dramatic growth in the absolute
numbers of Asian Americans has been accompanied by increasing
ethnic, generational, and socioeconomic diversity within Asian Amer-
ica.  As Michael Omi (1993, 205) succinctly states, “The irony is that
the term [“Asian American”] came into vogue at precisely the his-
torical moment when new Asian groups were entering the U.S. who
would render the term problematic.”
Ethnic Diversification
Before the post-1965 immigration surge, the Asian American
population was composed mainly of three ethnic groups: Japanese,
Chinese, and Filipino.  In 1970 Japanese Americans constituted the
single largest group (41 percent of the Asian American population),
followed by Chinese Americans (30 percent) and Filipino American
(24 percent).  Members of other national origin groups (mostly Kore-
ans) represented less than 5 percent of the Asian American population
total (Zhou and Gatewood 2000, 13).  Coming of age in the 1960s,
U.S.-born Japanese and Chinese Americans formed the core force of
the Asian American movement on the West Coast college campuses
and in the Northeast (Espiritu 1992).  In contrast, in 2000, the U.S.
Census recorded twenty-four national origin groups, and no single
group accounted for more than one-quarter of the Asian American
population.  While Japan has sent very few immigrants to the United
States, the Philippines, China and Taiwan, Korea, India, and Vietnam
have always been on the list of the top sending countries since 1980
(USINS 1997).  Reflecting these immigration patterns, in 2000 the
Japanese American share of the Asian American population fell to
only 8 percent, and the five largest Asian American groups were Chi-
nese and Taiwanese (24 percent), Filipino (18 percent), Asian Indian
(17 percent), Korean (11 percent), and Vietnamese (11 percent) (Barnes
and Bennett 2002).  The new Asian American demographics have
complicated the pan-Asian alignment created in the 1960s and 1970s
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among the then largest Asian American groups: Japanese, Chinese,
and, to a lesser extent, Filipino Americans.
Generational Diversification
Between the 1940s and 1960s, when immigration from Asia was
restricted, U.S.-born Asian Americans dominated the Asian Ameri-
can population.  By the 1970s the foreign-born reemerged as a large
majority.  In 2000, 7.2 million Asian Pacific Americans — approxi-
mately 70 percent of the total Asian American population — were for-
eign born (U.S. Department of Commerce 2002).  The foreign-born
component dominated all Asian American groups except for Japan-
ese Americans; over 60 percent of Filipinos and nearly 80 percent of
Vietnamese and other Asians were foreign born (Zhou and Gatewood
2000, 14).  Because of legal exclusion in the past, it is only among the
two oldest immigrant groups — the Japanese and Chinese Americans
— that a sizable third or fourth generation exists.  Among Asian
American children under eighteen years of age, more than 90 percent
are either foreign-born or children of foreign-born parents (Zhou and
Gatewood 2000, 23).  Ong and Scott, in Chapter 1 have projected that
the foreign born segment will still be a majority in the year 2030.
Class Diversification
Post-1965 immigration has also increased the economic diver-
sity of Asian Americans.  In contrast to the largely unskilled immi-
grant population of the pre-World War II period, the new arrivals
include not only low-wage service-sector workers but also significant
numbers of white-collar professionals.  Ong and Patraporn (2006) re-
port that ethnic differences play a significant role in the unequal dis-
tribution of wealth among Asian Americans.  Using indirect measures
of wealth (mean income, interest, and dividends, rental income and
home value), they found that in 2000, Japanese, Chinese and Asian In-
dians consistently held more wealth at the top end while non-Viet-
namese Southeast Asians settled at the bottom end.  The most
significant gap is between Japanese and non-Vietnamese Southeast
Asians where the latter’s mean household income is about half that
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for Japanese at $47,153 and $88,122 respectively, and their amount of
wealth was less than a quarter of that held by Japanese.  While Fil-
ipinos and Vietnamese fare better in terms of mean income, their in-
terest, dividends and rental income is substantially lower than the
average for all Asian Americans.  Koreans are slightly below the av-
erage of all Asians for all three measures of wealth.  
Asian American Identities, 
Political Attitudes and Policy Concerns 
The results from the 2000 Pilot National Asian American Politi-
cal Survey (PNAAPS)—the nation’s first multicity, multiethnic, and
multilingual survey of the political attitudes and behavior of Asian
Americans on a national scale — support a possible future for a grow-
ing pan-Asian consciousness.ii Although PNAAPS data indicate that
most Asian Americans prefer ethnic- rather than panethnic-based
identities, they nevertheless show evidence of panethnic solidarity,
especially in policy concerns affecting the Asian American commu-
nity.  Among all respondents, 34 percent identify as ethnic American
and 30 percent by ethnic origin alone.  Only 15 percent identify as
“Asian American.”  However, among those who do not identify
themselves as Asian American, when probed if they have ever
thought of themselves as Asian American, about half of the respon-
dents report such panethnic identification.  Thus, cumulatively, close
to six out of ten respondents identify with the panethnic “Asian
American” label in some contexts.  And about half of the respondents
believe that what happened generally to other Asian American
groups would impact what happened in their life (Lien, Conway, and
Wong 2004, 17).  
The potential for Asian American unity is also evident in their
similar voting behavior and political attitudes.  The PNAAPS data
show that 70 percent who report an opinion on affirmative action are
in favor of it; 73 percent favor bilingual services and public informa-
tion; and respondents, by more than a two-to-one margin, approve
rather than disapprove of political contributions by legal immigrants
(Lien et al. 2004, 18).  Not surprisingly, the majority also favor the
election of Asian American candidates and public policies addressing
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the concerns and needs of the Asian American and immigrant com-
munities (Lien et al. 2004, 18).
Like previous studies, the PNAAPS data show that those who
experience discrimination are more likely to develop panethnic con-
sciousness.  Approximately half of the study’s respondents identify a
racial or ethnic issue (i.e., race relations, language barriers, discrimi-
nation, stereotyping, lack of ethnic political power, and interethnic
relations) as one of the “most important problems” facing the Asian
American communities (Lien et al. 2004, 224).  However, panethnic
identity construction is not necessarily uniform across groups.  As an
example, the PNAAPS data suggest that the experience of racial dis-
crimination may mobilize panethnic identification among the U.S.-
born but not among those born in Asia.  Rather than becoming
politicized and mobilized, immigrants who experience racial dis-
crimination appear to “feel alienated or petrified in the host society”
(Lien et al. 2004, 67-68). These findings underline the importance of
recognizing that the processes of racial formation and civic engage-
ment may be very different for the U.S.-born compared to immi-
grants. 
Organizing as Asian Americans
During the post-1965 period, the Asian American community’s
growing numbers, high growth rate, and local concentration promise
to enhance the political influence of their pan-Asian civic engage-
ment. On the other hand, the expanding diversity of Asian America
presents multiple challenges to building a meaningful pan-Asian po-
litical coalition.  A review of the research on Asian American civic en-
gagement suggests that pan-Asian organizing is a secondary but
politically critical phenomenon that is constantly shaped and reshaped
by social, cultural, legal, and political forces in the environment.  It is
also important to note that ethnic-specific identities and panethnic
identities are not mutually exclusive; both exist simultaneously and
both serve as a resource for the development of Asian American po-
litical participation and empowerment (Lien et al. 2004, 209-210).  
Cumulatively, existing data suggest that pan-Asianism is closely
linked to civic engagement: Asian Americans, regardless of how they
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define themselves ethnically, organize panethnically when they de-
termine that pan-Asian alliance is important for the protection and
advancement of their civic and political agenda.  In her analysis of 55
national pan-Asian organizations from 1970 to 1998, Dina Okamoto
(2006) found that the number of pan-Asian organizations has in-
creased since 1970 and throughout the 1980s, with the peak occur-
ring in 1980.  A smaller number of national pan-Asian organizations
formed in the 1990s, which may be due to the increasing diversity of
the Asian populations or to the increasing size and influence of the ex-
isting organizations.  More than one-quarter of the pan-Asian organ-
izations established between 1970 and 1998 were political
organizations that shared the common goals of promoting civil, eco-
nomic and political rights for Asian Americans as well as for Asians
in their respective countries of origin.  Some examples include The
Asian American Voters Coalition that promotes the equal treatment
of Asian Americans in the U.S. political system and The Committee
Against Anti-Asian Violence that fights racism and violence against
Asian Americans.  Another one-quarter of the pan-Asian organiza-
tions were professional organizations that promote networking, in-
formation sharing, and equal employment opportunities for all Asian
Americans.  Okamoto (2006) reports that these organizations shared
more than their professional interests.  For example, the mission of
the Asian American Journalists Association is not simply to increase
employment of API journalists, but also to monitor stereotypes in the
media and to advocate for fair and accurate news coverage of API is-
sues.  In a recent study of 2004 registered Asian American organiza-
tions, Chi-kan Richard Hung (2005) found that pan-Asian
organizations are in the minority (14 percent), but that they tend to
have more assets and revenue than ethnic-specific ones.  Echoing
Okamoto’s findings, Hung reports that social service and public in-
terest organizations are more likely to be pan-Asian than religious
and cultural ones.  Moreover, even though pan-Asian organizations
are not growing as quickly as ethnic-specific ones, their steady
growth, especially in the arena of political advocacy, is noteworthy.
Lai (2007-08, 7) reports that Asian American community-based or-
ganizations are among the “fastest growing public service sectors in
California during the last three decades.”  In 1998, over 250 pan-Asian
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organizations existed in Los Angeles and Orange counties.  In 2007,
there were over 150 organizations that focused on political advocacy
alone.  Overall, these findings suggest that Asian Americans form
pan-Asian organizations to respond to external political and funding
opportunities and to fight unequal opportunities and discriminatory
treatment. 
Other studies confirm that racial discrimination galvanizes pan-
Asian mobilization: as Asian Americans find themselves without op-
portunities and fair treatment, they establish supportive alliances
from which to strategize about collective issues (Okamoto 2006).  As
an example, Leland Saito (1998) reports that Japanese and Chinese
Americans came together in Monterey Park, California to protest
xenophobic attempts to remove Asian languages on business signs.
Linda Vo’s (2004) study of the Asian Business Association in San
Diego provides another example: Asian Americans joined the associ-
ation because of shared professional interests and shared experiences
of economic exclusion and employment discrimination.  Along the
same line, Okamoto (2006) found that underlying structural condi-
tions, such as occupational segregation and spatial concentration,
heighten panethnic consciousness, leading Asian Americans to found
pan-Asian institutions. These pan-Asian organizations are important
because they provide a setting for persons of diverse Asian back-
grounds to establish social ties and to discuss their common prob-
lems and experiences.  As Asian Americans come together to
coordinate, plan, and participate in the activities of these organiza-
tions, they become tied together in a cohesive interpersonal network
(Espiritu 1992).
Asian American activists have also organized to combat anti-
Asian violence, defined not as random attacks against Asians but as
a product of structural oppression and everyday encounters
(Kurashige 2000, 15).  The activities of the Asian Americans United,
a panethnic community-based organization in Philadelphia, provide
an example (Kurashige 2000).  When large numbers of Southeast
Asian immigrants began experiencing problems in Philadelphia with
racist violence, educational inequality, and poor housing, a small
group of educated East and South Asian American activists re-
sponded.  Modeling themselves after the militant Yellow Seeds or-
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ganization in the 1970s, group members insisted on anti-imperialist
politics, a critique of racism as institutional and structural, and a focus
on activist organizing and politics.  They organized a successful rent
strike and were part of a victorious legal campaign to institute bilin-
gual education in the local schools.  Most important, they sought to
build relationships with working-class Southeast Asian communities
by creating a youth leadership-training program organized around a
pan-Asian identity and radical politics.  When a violent attack on
Southeast Asian youths in that city by a group of white youths led to
a fight that left one of the white attackers dead, city police and pros-
ecutors portrayed the attackers as victims and laid the responsibility
for the violence at the hands of the Southeast Asians.  Although un-
able to secure full justice in the court cases that ensued, Asian Amer-
icans United seized on the incident as a means of educating its
constituency about institutionalized racism.  The group succeeded in
mobilizing parts of the Asian American community around these ef-
forts, and its success enabled it to move from panethnic to intereth-
nic affiliation through an alliance with a Puerto Rican youth group
also plagued by hate crimes, police brutality, and prosecutorial racism
(Espiritu et al. 2000, 132).  This example suggests that class need not
be a source of cleavage among Asian Americans, and that the con-
cerns of working-class Asian Americans can unite people at the grass-
roots level with class-conscious members of the intellectual and
professional strata (Kurashige 2000).
The pervasiveness of racism also catalyzes pan-Asian organiz-
ing among Asian American college students.  Colleges constitute an
important site for the emergence of pan-Asianism because they are
among the public institutions that lump all Asians into a single group
and also because young Asian Americans — whose ethnic and racial
identities are shaped largely in dialogue with and in opposition to
U.S. racist ideologies and practices — are much more receptive to
Asian American panethnicity than their immigrant parents.  In a
study of an Asian American student organization, APASO, at a large
research university in the Midwest, Rhoads et al. (2002) reports that
ongoing discrimination against Asian Americans reinforces the on-
going need for Asian American students to organize around their
pan-Asian identity.  This sense of shared experience motivated
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APASO to challenge campus structures that may limit the experiences
and opportunities of Asian Americans.  For example, during the 1999-
2000 academic year, APASO pushed for the creation of a multicul-
tural student center and fought to retain seats on a student
government association reserved for multicultural student groups.
Rhoads et al. (2002) argue that in the process of organizing around
their shared experiences with racism, Asian American college stu-
dents advance collective understandings of their location in the
broader society and the political issues that they face collectively as
Asian Americans.  And it is through organizing and socializing to-
gether that their social identity as Asian Americans is reinforced and
strengthened (Rhoads et al. 2002, 13).  The authors conclude that
panethnic organizations play a critical role in reducing campus
racism and discrimination because they promote the creation of mul-
ticultural academic communities (Rhoads et al. 2002, 14).
Asian Americans have also been active in the policymaking
arena. As an immigrant-majority population, Asian Americans have
united to contest anti-immigration policies in the late twentieth cen-
tury.  In 1989, a coalition of Asian American legal organizations —
the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Asian
Law Alliance, the Asian Law Caucus, the Asian Pacific American
Legal Center of Southern California, Na Loio No Na Kanaka —
Lawyers for the People of Hawaii, and Nihomachi Legal Outreach —
opposed a Senate bill’s proposed cap on family-based immigration
and the deletion of the second and fifth preference categoriesiii (S 358).
The coalition argued that these measures would scale back opportu-
nities for Asian immigrants to reunite with families at a time when the
impact of anti-Asian exclusion laws, which were finally lifted in 1965,
was still being felt (Wong 2006a, 102-103).  During the 1996 presi-
dential election, the issue of immigration was once again at the cen-
ter of attention for Asian Americans (Leong 2002, 230).  In the
congressional fight over the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act, Asian American (and Latino) groups led the
pro-immigrant family coalition, which formed to preserve yearly al-
locations of family-unification visas.  They also lobbied to protect and
enhance the rights of foreign workers (Wong 2006a, 163).  
Regarding welfare reform, Asian Americans’ responses splin-
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tered along ethnic and class lines.  Many affluent Asian Americans
regarded the harsh 1995 Welfare Reform Act, which bars disadvan-
taged immigrants from many government assistance programs, as a
“refugee” or “elderly” immigrant issue that did not concern them
(Leong 2002, 231).  However, many Asian Americans became inter-
ested in the 1995 Act once they realized that it included language that
would have made legal immigrants ineligible for student loans and
grants.  In other words, it was the proposed cut to educational bene-
fits rather than to welfare benefits that galvanized Asian Americans
into action because many did not view educational assistance as wel-
fare (Leong 2002, 234-238).  The welfare reform case thus encapsu-
lates both the possibilities and limits of pan-Asian advocacy efforts:
on the one hand, Asian Americans will organize panethnically to pro-
tect their interests; on the other hand, what they perceive to be their
interests can and do exclude the needs of the most marginalized
Asian American groups.
Challenges to Pan-Asianism
The growing population of bi- and multiracial Asian Americans
poses an immediate challenge to pan-Asianism.  However, some ex-
isting evidence suggests that the growth of the population of mul-
tiracial Asians need not spell the end of pan-Asianism.  According to
the 2000 U.S. census, approximately 850,000 people reported that they
were Asian and white, and 360,000 reported that they were two or
more Asian groups (Barnes and Bennett 2002, table 4).  While there ex-
ists no comprehensive data on the racial identification of multiracial
Asians, the close contact with Asian American advocacy groups
maintained by the Hapa Issues Forum (HIF) — a national multiracial
Asian American organization — suggests that multiracial Asian and
pan-Asian identities need not be mutually exclusive.  From its in-
ception, HIF has pursued a double political mission: pushing for
recognition of multiracial Asians as well as for the civil rights agen-
das of existing Asian American groups.  These two goals are most ev-
ident in the group’s response to the controversy over the classification
of multiracials in the 2000 census.  Denouncing the government’s past
attempts to wedge mixed-race Americans into one rigid racial cate-
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gory, most mainstream multiracial groups favored adding a “mul-
tiracial” category to the 2000 census.  However, most civil rights
groups, including many pan-Asian groups, argued that such a cate-
gory would dilute the numbers of people who identify with a partic-
ular race and cause their respective communities to lose hard-won
gains in civil rights, education, and electoral arenas.  Refusing this
“splitting” of their multiple personal and political identities, HIF’s
board of directors rejected the “stand-alone multiracial” category and
endorsed the “check more than one” format, contending that the lat-
ter option would allow them to identify as multiracial and “still be
counted with their Asian American brothers and sisters” (King 2000,
203).  In other words, the “check more than one” format would allow
the data to be collected in a way that recognized the existence of mul-
tiracial Asians and still make it possible to use the data in “the five
racial category format to track discrimination against Asian Ameri-
cans” (King 2000, 202).  Although data are limited on the relationship
between the identity of multiracial Asian Americans and their civic
engagement, the HIF’s decision to endorse the “check more than one”
format keeps open the possibility that multiracials will fashion their
politics along multiple lines of affiliation, including panethnically.
As discussed above, another challenge to pan-Asianism is that
it can mask salient divisions, subsume nondominant groups, and cre-
ate marginalities — all of which threaten the legitimacy and effec-
tiveness of pan-Asian organizing.  Existing evidence indicates that
pan-Asian organizations often reproduce national and ethnic hierar-
chies as class and organizational hierarchies.  For example, some
Asian American groups, such as Filipinos and Southeast Asians and
South Asians, have accused the more established Chinese and Japan-
ese Americans of monopolizing the funding and jobs meant for all
Asian Americans; the dissidents complained that newer and more
impoverished groups were simply used as window display (Espiritu
1992).  In an ethnographic study of an Asian panethnic community
agency in northern California, Eileen Otis (2001) reports that national
hierarchies were reproduced in the distribution of staff positions in
the agency, with individuals from more economically developed
countries — often countries that were more closely tied to the United
States — obtaining the coveted staff positions.  With the exception of
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one staff member who came to the United States from Vietnam as a
child, all of the staff members were from Asian “Tigers” or “devel-
oped” East Asian countries.  Otis (2001, 362) concludes that “it was no
accident that those from countries with the strongest neocolonial ties
to the U.S. obtained these positions, since individuals from countries
like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand tend to have more opportu-
nities to develop English language skills.”  Comparing the experi-
ences of affluent Chinese immigrants and poor Cambodian refugees,
Aihwa Ong (1996. 751) concludes that the category “Asian Ameri-
can” “must confront the contradictions and instabilities within the
imposed solidarity, brought about by the group’s internal class, eth-
nic, and racial stratifications.”  In Asian American studies, many
scholars have critically pointed to the field’s privileging of East
Asians over South and Southeast Asians — a clear indictment of the
suppression and diverse histories, epistemologies, and voices within
the pan-Asian framework.  For example, in an edited volume on
South Asians in Asian America aptly titled A Part, Yet Apart, Rajiv
Shankar (1998, x) laments that South Asians “find themselves so un-
noticed as an entity that they feel as if they are merely a crypto-group,
often included but easily marginalized within the house of Asian
America.”
Discussion
The emergence of the pan-Asian entity in the late 1960s may be
one of the most significant political developments in Asian American
civic engagement.  The existing evidence suggests that Asian Amer-
ican panethnic organizing is closely linked to civic engagement:
whenever there is a need to combine their resources, Asian Ameri-
cans act as a cohesive unit, presenting a united front against the dom-
inant society.  This united front does not mean that Asian Americans
dismiss internal differences and divisions, but only that they look be-
yond them.  
The post-1965 immigration has fueled population growth and
led to greater visibility for Asian Americans, but their changing de-
mographics has also complicated their civic engagement.  In partic-
ular, Asian immigration to the U.S. is bifurcated along class line:
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many Asian immigrants are uneducated, unskilled and poor, while
others are highly educated, skilled, and affluent.  Moreover, Asian
immigrants do not share a common history, sensibility, or political
outlook with U.S.-born Asians.  As reviewed in this paper, such in-
ternal diversities have made it more difficult for Asian Americans to
speak with a unified political voice.  Thus Asian American paneth-
nicity has been an efficacious but contested category, encompassing
not only cultural differences but also social, political, and economic
inequalities.
As we end the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Asian
American community is at a crossroads: how to build pan-Asian sol-
idarity amid increasing internal diversities and amid an increasingly
polarized U.S. society?  In 2030, it is projected that the Asian Ameri-
can population will continue to be diverse along generational and
ethnic lines.  Given past patterns of Asian American organizing, I ex-
pect that ethnic-specific organizations will continue to outnumber
pan-Asian ones.  On the other hand, even though pan-Asian organi-
zations will be in the minority, I anticipate that they will continue to
maintain their influence among Asian Americans and within the
larger society.  This is because pan-Asian organizations tend to have
more assets, revenues, and politically experienced leaders than eth-
nic-specific organizations.  Moreover, because pan-Asianism is pri-
marily a political identity, it does not appear to conflict with
ethnic-specific identities.  In other words, while those with a pan-
Asian American identity are more likely to be engaged outside their
ethnic group, those with an ethnic-specific identity do not appear to
limit their engagement to within-group arenas.  Finally, once estab-
lished, pan-Asian organizations further promote civic engagement
because they become the institutional symbol of Asian American
unity and the political voice of Asian American interests.  As the de
facto representatives of Asian American concerns, these organizations
influence a much wider Asian American audience than their mem-
bership rosters suggest.  Pan-Asian institutions are also important be-
cause their very existence can spawn similar organizations.  Once
institutionalized, the pan-Asian structure reinforces the cohesiveness
of already existing networks and expands these networks (Espiritu
1992).
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Perhaps most importantly, past research indicates that racial dis-
crimination is a key catalyst for pan-Asian mobilization.  Today,
Asians in the United States continue to face a host of challenges that
affect all Asians: hate violence, racial profiling, anti-Asian media
treatment, the ‘model minority’ myth, the ‘perpetual foreigner’
stereotype, exclusionary immigration and naturalization policies, cit-
izens-only restrictions, and denials of language rights — all of which
require them to organize panethnically (Ancheta, Ma, and Nakanishi
2004, v).  In the next two decades, as the United States competes in-
ternationally with China and India’s growing economic influence, it
is likely that domestic anti-Asianism will correspondingly rise, mak-
ing pan-Asian efforts — both from pan-Asian advocacy groups and
from the combined efforts of single-ethnic advocacy groups — a po-
litical necessity.  But much work remains to be done.  The challenge
for Asian American leaders will be to identify and articulate shared
interests and ideology within the socially and economically diverse
Asian American community that can serve as the basis for pan-Asian
identification and mobilization.  Some key mobilizing issues include
immigration, language access, racial profiling (especially for South
Asian Americans in the post 9/11 era), and anti-Asian violence.  Per-
haps more importantly, pan-Asianism will not materialize unless and
until Asian Americans double their effort to solicit new membership
and groom fresh leadership, especially from within the ranks of the
less affluent underrepresented Southeast Asian communities. 
Notes
i The groups included: the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asian
Pacific Americans, the Asian Pacific American Census Advisory Committee,
and the Pacific/Asian Coalition, with the combined efforts of single-ethnic ad-
vocacy groups such as the Japanese American Citizens League, the Chinese for
Affirmative Action, and the Organization of Chinese Americans.
ii The PNAAPS utilizes two linked fate questions that are also found in surveys
on African-American political participation: 1) “Do you think what happens
generally to other groups of Asians in this country will affect what happens in
your life?” and 2) If yes “Will it affect it a lot, some or not very much?”
iii unmarried children of citizens and residents, and adult siblings of citizens and
residents
The Usual Suspects: Asian Americans as Conditional Citizens  137
The Usual Suspects: 
Asian Americans as Conditional Citizens
Claire Jean Kim
University of California, Irvine
Introduction
Perpetual foreigners who lean toward treason—this has been
the most consequential construction of Asian Americans for the past
century and a half.  Asian Americans are sometimes model minori-
ties, geishas, martial artists, hardworking merchants and more, but
they are always aliens with suspect loyalties.  One could argue that
Asian Americans are tolerated during ordinary times and, during cer-
tain crises, forcefully expelled from the body politic, whether liter-
ally or symbolically.  The imputation of perpetual foreignness plays
a key role in triangulating Asian Americans relative to whites and
blacks, or positioning Asian Americans as not only between whites
and blacks in terms of intelligence but also apart from both of them
in terms of civic belonging (Kim 1999).  The rendering of Asian Amer-
icans and Asian immigrants as irredeemable aliens is a story whose
major historical signposts are all too familiar: the anti-Chinese move-
ment, the racial bar on naturalization, discriminatory legislation such
as the Alien Land Law of 1913, exclusionary legislation such as the
Immigration Act of 1924, the internment of Japanese Americans dur-
ing World War II, the campaign finance scandal of 1996, and the pros-
ecution of Wen Ho Lee.  This dramatic and continuing story is a
pointed rejoinder to recent scholarship suggesting that Asian Amer-
icans are now being accepted as white by the majority.
What does all of this mean for Asian American “civic engage-
ment”?  One can define “civic engagement” very broadly to refer to
any participation in the public sphere, but I want to focus in this ar-
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ticle on the collective advancement of group interests through con-
ventional political channels such as voting, running for office, advo-
cacy, lobbying, and seeking to influence policy through donations.
Here a number of questions arise.  How much can Asian Americans
achieve through these channels given the prevailing construction of
them as irredeemable aliens?  Does their putative foreignness mean
that they cannot be taken seriously as political subjects?  Is Leti Volpp
(2001) right that the “Asian American citizen” may be an oxymoron?
Race-neutral laws and widely-held rights suggest that political mem-
bership is universal and constant yet the quality of a group’s mem-
bership seems to depend crucially upon that group’s standing in the
national imagination, and the standing of Asian Americans is at best
unresolved.
This article approaches these questions through an analysis of
how Asian American scholars, activists, and officials have responded
to a recent milestone in the narrative of Asian American exclusion—
namely, the campaign finance scandal that emerged out of the U.S.
presidential election of 1996.  Most concur that this was an extremely
significant event.  Ling-chi Wang of UC Berkeley testified in front of
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights that he could not think of “one
issue in the 150-year annals of Asian American history that has been
more of a setback to civil rights for this community.”  Thomas Kim,
author of The Racial Logic of Politics, characterized the campaign fi-
nance scandal as “without question the single most important na-
tional event influencing the political fortunes of Asian Americans in
the post-World War II era” (2007, 52).  Now that a decade has passed
since the scandal broke, it seems fitting to ask what meaning(s) Asian
American scholars, activists, and officials have attached to it.  Almost
all agree that the event drew upon and powerfully invigorated the
enduring notion of Asian Americans as foreigners inclined toward
treason, but they differ on whether we should view the scandal as a
temporary setback in the teleological narrative of Asian American po-
litical incorporation or as a sober reminder of the ideological
processes that will always relegate Asian Americans to the margins of
the nation’s political life. 
This chapter has three sections.  In the first, I show that Asian
Americans’ analyses of the 1996 campaign finance scandal tend to di-
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verge, with some observers treating the event as a superable barrier
to Asian American empowerment and others as suggestive of the per-
manent exclusion of Asian Americans from political membership.  In
the second, I suggest that these divergent readings of the scandal
spring from a deeper division as to whether the story of Asian Amer-
ican politics generally is an “American Dream” narrative or an “Im-
possible Dream” narrative.  In the third, I propose the concept of
“conditional citizenship” as a way of thinking about Asian Ameri-
cans’ political status and consider what all of this means for Asian
American “civic engagement.”
Readings of the Campaign Finance Scandal of 1996
Asian American political efforts bore significant fruit during the
1996 election.  Gary Locke of Washington state was elected the first
Asian American governor outside of Hawaii; Asian American candi-
dates did well in various state and local elections; and a historic na-
tional voter registration drive led by a coalition of Asian American
advocacy organizations resulted in 75,000 new Asian American reg-
istered voters.  Excitement that Asian Americans were coming into
their own politically was tempered, however, by the breaking cam-
paign finance scandal.  What came to light was that several Asian
American fundraisers for Clinton’s re-election effort—including John
Huang, Charlie Yah-lin Trie, and Maria Hsia—had violated federal
campaign finance laws by soliciting and accepting donations from
foreign nationals who were transnational Asian capitalists based in
Indonesia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere.  Bob Woodward’s
“exclusive” in the Washington Post in early 1996 broke the story, which
was then energetically taken up by conservative journalists, think
tanks, and the presidential campaigns of Bob Dole and Ross Perot.
Over the next year, partisan political fervor transformed the fundrais-
ing improprieties of a handful of Asian Americans into a phantas-
magorical vision of collusion among a Clinton campaign hungry for
money, Asian American fundraisers inclined toward treason, and a
Chinese government bent on subverting American democracy.  Head-
lines trumpeted an “Asian Connection,” the role of “guan xi” in
American politics, and the emergence of “Chinagate,” while promi-
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nent Republican officials made anti-Asian jokes and mocked Asian
accents in public fora.  
Leading journalists and politicians racialized the scandal by gen-
eralizing from the wrongdoers to all people of Asian descent, and by
consistently eliding distinctions between Asians and Asian Ameri-
cans, and between Asian Americans of different national origin an-
cestries.  Bound by a putatively homogeneous culture, the entire
Asian “race” was depicted as implacably alien, prone to doing things
in an undemocratic way, and thus presumptively suspect in its polit-
ical actions.  All guns turned on the Asian American community, es-
pecially its noncitizen members.  The Clinton administration chose
to deflect charges of selling state secrets by “getting tough” with its
own donors—the Asian American ones, to be specific.  After the elec-
tion, the DNC launched an internal investigation of donors selected
according to several criteria, including those who were solicited by
Huang and other Asian American fundraisers and those whose con-
tributions were above $5,000 and were “made in connection with any
DNC fund-raising event targeting the Asian Pacific American com-
munity.”  The investigation ended up broadly targeting donors with
Asian surnames.  Donors were not only grilled as to their credit his-
tory, social security numbers, citizenship status, and sources of in-
come, but were also told that they would be identified to the press as
uncooperative if they refused to divulge this information.  
The DNC went further, temporarily banning all legal permanent
residents from making campaign donations, attending White House
events, or having their pictures taken with the Clintons or Gores—
even though it was foreign nationals, not legal permanent residents,
who had been implicated in the campaign finance scandal.  Demo-
cratic and Republican House and Senate members introduced a total
of nine different bills aimed at limiting campaign contributions from
legal permanent residents.  Asian American elected officials like Gov-
ernor Gary Locke and California Treasurer Matt Fong found their
fundraising practices scrutinized by the media.  The Federal Elections
Commission launched an investigation, the Department of Justice
started a task force, and two Congressional committees chaired by
Senator Fred Thompson (R-TN) and Representative Dan Burton (R-
IN), respectively, held formal, well-publicized hearings on the cam-
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paign finance scandal.  Both sets of hearings opened with a roar (as-
serting grand allegations about a Chinese plot to influence U.S. pol-
icy or steal nuclear weapons technology and the role of Asian
American spies) and closed with a whimper (having failed to pro-
duce any hard evidence to support these allegations).  Only the emer-
gence of the Monica Lewinsky story in 1997 quieted the frenzy.
Most Asian Americanists analyzed the 1996 campaign finance
scandal as an egregious episode of stereotyping and discrimination
that hampered Asian American political development.  These authors
share a sense of moral outrage and a central unspoken assumption:
that racial discrimination, however severe its impact and widespread
its occurrence, is not necessarily endemic to the American political
and legal system.  In fact, the system can be mobilized to combat and
perhaps even eradicate discrimination.i Hence the tone of these
works is often hortatory—urging officials to use the tools at their dis-
posal to respond vigorously to the discriminatory aspects of the scan-
dal, urging Asian Americans to persevere in their pursuit of political
power, or urging Asian Americans to adopt new political strategies
toward this goal.  Many of the authors discussed here were actively
involved in organizing Asian American community responses to the
scandal as it was unfolding. 
In September 1997, Asian American advocacy groups and indi-
viduals generated a Petition to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in re-
sponse to the campaign finance scandal.  In his introduction to this
document, attorney Edward Chen argues that the scandal revealed a
“pervasive, institutional and disturbing pattern of discrimina-
tion”(377) which violated the First Amendment and equal protection
rights of Asian Americans and undermined federal civil rights and
voting rights laws.  The petition itself criticizes Congress, both parties,
the media, and individual elected officials for racial stereotyping,
criminalizing the entire Asian “race” as disloyal aliens, applying a
double standard by ignoring the campaign finance violations com-
mitted by non-Asian Americans, catering to the xenophic impulses
of the public, and unjustifiably stigmatizing legal permanent resi-
dents as a suspect class.  In this passage, petitioners urge the nation
to live up its highest ideals of equality and democratic inclusiveness:
The issues raised in this Petition are significant not only to Asian
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Pacific Americans but to ALL Americans...The degradation of
any discrete and insular minority group—here the ‘foreigniza-
tion’ of Asian Pacific Americans in particular—reflects an intol-
erance of diversity and besmirches the ideals of our
Constitution...[W]e must all become engaged in a struggle to de-
fine America in the 21st Century—a struggle about whether di-
versity will be accepted as a core value of this multicolored
country or will be rejected as hollow, meaningless rhetoric (359-
60).
While supporting a full investigation into the alleged miscon-
duct of various individuals, the petitioners demand that the handling
of the affair be “fair, informed, accurate and free of racial and anti-im-
migrant bias” and that “the standards applied to Asian Pacific Amer-
icans—in Congressional hearings, in the media and by all political
parties—be fair and equal as befitting their status as loyal citizens
and legal permanent residents of this country” (358).  The petition
captures the civil rights approach to racial injustice: calling the na-
tion to its higher self by marshalling the nation’s laws, constitutional
ideals, and antidiscrimination norms against discriminatory actions.
In his two contributions to the National Asian Pacific American
Political Almanac of 1998-1999, Don Nakanishi also reads the campaign
finance scandal of 1996 as an episode of racism that threatens the po-
litical gains achieved by Asian Americans.  Noting that the event “re-
vives the long-standing issue of whether America will ever truly
accept Asian Pacific Americans as Americans rather than foreign-
ers”(Nakanishi 1998-1999a, 35), Nakanishi implies that Asian Amer-
icans will eventually be accepted and achieve empowerment if they
keep their eyes on the prize.  The historic aspects of Asian American
participation in the 1996 election were “signs of political growth and
maturation” (Nakanishi 1998-1999b, 9), Nakanishi avers, and Asian
Americans should “continue the political momentum begun before
the current controversy erupted”(Nakanishi 1998-1999a, 35) by build-
ing a strong political infrastructure and becoming more informed vot-
ers.  Rather than being deterred by racism, Asian Americans should
be spurred to greater political engagement because of it.  Senator
Daniel Akaka’s (D-Hawaii) piece in the same volume reflects a simi-
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lar sense that Asian Americans are poised on the brink of historic po-
litical achievement.  Worried that the campaign finance scandal “will
kill this initial flowering of a historically quiescent and apolitical com-
munity”(28) by confirming Asian Americans’ fears that the system is
rigged against them, Akaka exhorts Asian Americans to emulate the
Asian immigrants and Asian Americans who in the past “overcame
steep social, economic, and institutional barriers”(28) to gain mem-
bership in American society.
Like Nakanishi and Akaka, Frank Wu and May Nicholson
(1997) call upon Asian Americans to persist in their quest for politi-
cal power despite the shadow cast by the campaign finance scandal.
They point out that the media and politicians consistently implied
that figures like John Huang represented all Asian Americans, elided
distinctions among Asians and Asian Americans, and evoked cultural
essentialist arguments to discuss the Asian “race”—yet they  remain
optimistic that the event can serve as “a rite of passage” for Asian
Americans who can “contribute positively to our democratic experi-
ment”(25).  This reading of the scandal as a discriminatory episode,
a barrier that Asian Americans can overcome on their path toward
empowerment, can also be seen in a piece by Frank Wu and Francey
Lim Youngberg (2001).  Here the authors concede that the campaign
finance scandal “raise[s] troubling implications about the acceptance
of Asian immigrants as U.S. citizens and their ability to participate as
equal stakeholders in shaping public policy”(312), yet also suggest
that the event highlights a certain “lack of political maturity among
Asian Americans”(337).  Asian Americans should view it as “a chal-
lenge and an opportunity”(337), they argue, redoubling their efforts
to gain political power.  
Some authors exhort Asian Americans to continue their quest
for political empowerment, but in a manner that is significantly mod-
ified by the lessons of the campaign finance scandal.  No more poli-
tics as usual, they insist, Asian Americans need to change course.
According to Ling-chi Wang (1998), Asian Americans must recognize
that they are being used by various groups, including fundraisers like
John Huang, transnational capitalists, and politicians of all parties.
Although Huang described himself as promoting Asian American
collective interests, he was, according to Wang, representing a small
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elite group of wealthy business entrepreneurs and professionals with
ties to transnational Asian capital.  Transnational capitalists, for their
part, attempt to continue the historical pattern of home countries’
“extraterritorial domination”(13) of Asian American communities,
using these sites as points of entry for economic and political pene-
tration.  Noting the deforming impact of these processes upon the
class structure and political development of Asian American com-
munities, Wang concludes that transnational capital’s interests are
pointedly incompatible with those of most Asian Americans.  Indeed
politicians of all parties, he suggests, racialized the scandal in order
to divert public attention from the real national crisis: the corrupting
influence of money on American elections and democracy.  
In another piece (2002), Wang also criticizes inside-the-
Beltway Asian American advocates and politicians for “trying to
hitch a free ride from a foreign gravy train” (112) and for reflexively
crying racism in defense of Huang and others.  What Asian Ameri-
cans need to do, he insists, is to break free from those trying to hijack
their cause.  This involves joining others in calling out the corruption
of the campaign finance system and pursuing meaningful campaign
finance reform, as well as returning to community organizing at the
grassroots level.  The “silver lining” of the 1996 campaign finance
scandal, Wang suggests, is that it shows the “resilience of Asian
Americans and their collective determination to conquer the last fron-
tier in their long quest for racial equality and social justice: full and
equal participation in a democracy...regardless of one’s race, gender,
color, or class” (116).  
Paul Watanabe (2001), too, sees the campaign finance scandal as
an object lesson in what Asian Americans should and should not be
doing politically.  Against those who suggest that Asian Americans
simply need to persevere, Watanabe insists that the scandal “clarified
many of the limitations of mainstream involvement”(371), thus point-
ing out the need for new strategies.  If donating money to national
campaigns in the hope of appointments and political influence is a
failing strategy, in part because the economic and political interests of
big donors are not those of the majority of Asian Americans, he asks:
“[W]hat must be done if Asian Americans ever wish to participate as
they should in ruling America?”(380).  Like Ling-chi Wang, Watanabe
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favors a return to the grassroots.  Citing groups involved in voter reg-
istration and naturalization drives, such as Asian American Legal De-
fense Fund in New York City, he argues that community activism
builds an “enhanced indigenous base [which] contains resources—
individual, organizational, financial, experiential—that are crucial in
support of expeditions into the larger political milieu...[and which]
offers sustenance through the battles that may be waged”(376).
Though Wang and Watanabe recognize the need for a political ad-
justment, they, like the authors discussed above, suggest that Asian
Americans can, through struggle and perseverance, call the nation to
its higher self and achieve true membership in this society.
A second, smaller set of writings on the 1996 campaign finance
scandal is more critical and less hortatory in orientation.  These au-
thors read the event not as a discriminatory barrier to be overcome
but as evidence that the civic exclusion of Asian Americans reflects a
profound and perhaps implacable problem in American society.  Ac-
cording to these authors, the 1996 campaign finance scandal was the
product of entrenched ideological and political structures, not just
the prejudiced behavior of certain journalists and politicians.  The
emphasis in these works is more on advancing a fundamental cri-
tique of the culture and the political system and heightening our un-
derstanding of how these function systematically to vitiate Asian
American citizenship than it is on advising Asian Americans to re-
double or retool their efforts within current configurations.
Neil Gotanda’s (2001) piece is a prominent example.  In
Gotanda’s view, the campaign finance scandal of 1996 and the Wen
Ho Lee espionage case of 1999 (more on this below) are paradigmatic
examples of a pattern that he calls “Asiatic racialization.”  Asiatic
racialization involves “a group of related yet distinct ideas—Asiatic
inassimilability, the conflation of Asian Americans with Asian citi-
zens, and the perception of Asians as a threat to the American na-
tion”(80).  These ideas can be traced all the way back to Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the California Supreme
Court case People v. George Hall (1854), and the Chinese exclusion
cases.  Gotanda sharply criticizes those who characterize the 1996
scandal and the Wen Ho Lee case as episodes of “stereotyping.” “In-
stead of individual prejudice or error,” he writes, “the images of for-
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eignness are deeply embedded, historically established racial under-
standings...[that have been] remarkably stable, remaining largely un-
changed for over a hundred years”(92).  In other words, the problem
is not discrimination, seen as a set of discrete individual acts, but
racialized constructions deeply woven over time into the cultural in-
frastructure of the nation.  The result is “citizenship nullification” or
“the act of stopping the exercise of a person’s citizenship rights
through the use of the implicit link between an Asiatic racial category
and foreignness”(80).  
Leti Volpp (2001), too, reads the 1996 campaign finance scandal
and the Wen Ho Lee case as markers of a cultural and ideological dy-
namic by which Asian Americans are denied full citizenship.  Look-
ing back to the 1870 Congressional debate over naturalization law
and the 1877 Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immi-
gration, Volpp argues that Chinese immigrants were seen as aliens
“whose deep-seated, ineradicable cultural, political, and religious dif-
ferences”(79) made incorporation into the polity unthinkable.  What
is striking is the extent to which this same racialized construction con-
tinues to be applied to Asian Americans today.  Indeed, Volpp argues,
Asian Americans are not just seen as foreigners but as anti-citizens,
those against whom Americanness is defined.  These racialized per-
ceptions function to vitiate Asian Americans’ formal rights of citi-
zenship.  Volpp writes:  “The perception that the political activity of
Asian Americans is somehow at odds with ‘American’ political in-
terests serves to deny Asian Americans the effective political subject-
hood essential to full citizenship”(81-82).
Michael Chang, author of a book-length work on the campaign
finance scandal, Racial Politics in an Era of Transnational Citizenship:
The 1996 ‘Asian Donorgate’ Controversy in Perspective (2004), argues that
the campaign finance imbroglio of 1996 was actually the beginning of
a discursive-political phenomenon that culminated several years later
with the Wen Ho Lee espionage scandal.  After the New York Times
and the Washington Post ran front page stories in early 1998 alleging
that Clinton had allowed the leaking of w-88 nuclear warhead tech-
nology to China, Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA) set up and
chaired a House committee investigation on the issue.  It was the Cox
committee final report’s claim that a spy had facilitated the alleged
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transfer of nuclear warhead technology to Communist China that led
directly to the arrest and prosecution of Los Alamos Nuclear Labo-
ratory nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee. The evidence suggests that the
government’s focus on Lee was a result of racial profiling, and that
the major factor weighing against him was his Chinese (ironically,
Taiwanese) ancestry.ii
The government failed to find evidence to substantiate the alle-
gations against Lee and the case became a public embarrassment.
Lee, who had been promptly fired from his job, charged with fifty-six
criminal counts, and placed in solitary confinement for nine months,
was released in September 2000.  To secure his release, he pled guilty
to one charge of mishandling classified documents.  It turns out that
these documents were only categorized as “classified” after Lee had
downloaded them; that it was common practice for scientists to
download sensitive information onto their computers so that they
could work at home (former CIA head John Deutch admitted to doing
this and was never prosecuted); and that the information Lee down-
loaded was never connected to the leak of w-88 nuclear warhead
technology.  Judge James Parker of the Federal District Court in Al-
buquerque formally apologized to Lee and publicly excoriated the
government for its handling of the case. 
What bound the campaign finance scandal and the Wen Ho Lee
case together, according to Chang, were what he calls “Asian donor-
gate” discourses, including the “preexisting racialized nationalist dis-
course best described as perpetual ‘foreignness’”(5).  These discourses
were forged in the crucible of “American Orientalism,” or “the dom-
inant mainstream construction of East-West relations in terms of cul-
tural, economic, and military conflict and difference” (78).  By
generating culturally essentialist views of the Chinese—e.g., the be-
lief that there is a homogeneous and static Chinese “culture” that is
antithetical to Western culture and that determines the actions of peo-
ple of Chinese descent all over the globe—American Orientalism,
Chang argues, directly produces events which ostracize Asian Amer-
icans, both symbolically and physically.  It nurtures the common per-
ception of China as a threat to the well-being of the West, democracy,
the environment, and human rights, as well as the common percep-
tion of Asian Americans as the enemies within.  Unforgettably, the
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Cox report stated that every person of Chinese descent residing in
the U.S.—whether visiting scholar, student, legal permanent resident,
or citizen—was a potential spy or “sleeper agent” waiting to be acti-
vated by the Chinese government.  In an era of transnational global-
ization, Chang argues, Asian Americans will continue to be politically
marginalized via Orientalist discourses as long as the state’s power to
define alienage, or who is culturally a “citizen” and who is an “alien,”
goes unchallenged. 
In the other book-length treatment of the 1996 campaign finance
scandal published to date, The Racial Logic of Politics: Asian Americans
and Party Competition (2007), Thomas Kim argues that institutional as
well as cultural factors overdetermine the ongoing political exclusion
of Asian Americans.  The conventional wisdom holds that the two-
party political system will promote the incorporation of minority
groups insofar as each party needs to court the support of these
groups to build a winning coalition.  According to Kim, reality belies
this expectation.  In fact, the institutional dynamics of two-party pol-
itics have worked to powerfully marginalize Asian Americans, with
the 1996 campaign finance scandal being a case in point.  Why, Kim
asks, did the Democrats in 1996 turn on Asian Americans rather than
challenging Republican attacks as racially discriminatory and untrue?
The answer lies in the fact that “Asian bodies [are] racialized as im-
mutably beholden to foreign entities” (28).  Kim explains: “[P]arty
elites, recognizing the political danger posed to their party brand
name by the discursive presence of ‘racialized outsiders’ within the
party coalition, must explicitly and aggressively expel Asian Ameri-
cans if their party hopes to build and maintain a majority party coali-
tion”(4).  Rather than promoting Asian American incorporation, the
dynamics of coalition-building in a two-party system, working in
conjunction with cultural constructions of Asian Americans, actually
hamper it, as each party distances itself from despised Asian bodies
in order to please other supporters.  Kim writes: “[T]he problem rests
not in the political strategies Asian Americans might choose within
the two-party system but in the structure of the system itself”(5).
Kim suggests that Asian Americans should continue to seek political
empowerment but his own analysis of the events of 1996 implies that
there is little reason for optimism on this front.  Compared with the
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first set of authors, this second set is considerably more skeptical
about the possibility of Asian American membership in the polity.
Two Narratives of Asian American Politics
These divergent readings of the 1996 campaign finance scandal
spring from a broad division in how Asian American scholars, ac-
tivists, and politicians narrativize Asian American politics as a whole.
The first reading of the scandal (as an episode of discrimination to be
overcome) emerges from what I call an “American Dream” narrative,
which is constructed and reproduced by mainstream elected officials,
professional civil rights advocates, and many scholars.  The second
reading of the scandal (as evidence that Asian Americans may be per-
manently ostracized from the polity) is driven by what I call an “Im-
possible Dream” narrative, which is constructed and reproduced by
certain scholars in critical race theory and ethnic studies.  Like all di-
chotomies, this one obscures various nuances in position and maps
imperfectly onto reality.  Still, delineating this central fault line in po-
litical opinion is helpful in the assessment of the present and future
possibilities of Asian American “civic engagement.”
According to the “American Dream” narrative of Asian Ameri-
can politics, Asian Americans have struggled for more than a century
against discrimination and are moving inexorably if unevenly toward
the promised land of full political incorporation.  The journey has
been long and painful, marked by oppression and suffering, but the
outcome is all but certain.  As Martin Luther King, Jr. memorably put
it in Selma, “The moral arc of the universe is long but it bends toward
justice.”  This narrative depends upon the metaphor of movement
over time, of a physical journey from a point of origin (exclusion) to
a destination point (inclusion), suggesting that Asian Americans are
coming out of the wilderness into the heart of the polis.  It is teleo-
logical, developmental, hortatory, and optimistic.  Informed by the
notion that America is a land of opportunity and freedom where
everyone—“regardless of one’s race, gender, color, or class” (Wang
2002, 116)—can succeed, this “American Dream” narrative of Asian
American politics embraces the civil rights movement’s philosophy
and the antidiscrimination framework it produced.iii It expresses
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American triumphalism.  
Unsurprisingly, scholars and advocates who focus on voting are
among the most active craftspeople of the “American Dream” narra-
tive of Asian American politics.  In keeping with the teleological
thrust of this story, these observers discuss statistical data about Asian
American population numbers, immigration rates, naturalization
rates, registration rates, and voting as a matter of collective destiny.
As its title suggests, the 2006 press release by the Asian American
Studies Center, “The New ‘Sleeping Giant’ in California Politics,” ex-
emplifies this narrative (Ong et al. 2006). This document begins by
noting that census data from 2005-2006 indicate that Asian Ameri-
cans have increased their “potential power” at the polls by raising
their overall numbers as well as their rate of citizenship.  From 2000
to 2005, Asian Americans in California went from 3.8 million to 4.7
million, representing 38% of the state’s net gain of 2.2 million; in ad-
dition, 71% of Asian American adults are now citizens by birth or nat-
uralization, a significant increase over 2000.  The report continues:
“However, there are still barriers to fully translating the population
numbers into voting power”—in particular, that Asian Americans are
less likely to register and vote than non-Hispanic whites and African
Americans.  The sense here is that changing demographics among
Asian Americans have created an immanent political potential wait-
ing to be realized.  When they overcome the barriers in their way, the
narrative goes, the sleeping giant will awaken and Asian Americans
will fulfill their political destiny.  They will elect more Asian Ameri-
can officials and become an effective voting bloc able to both influ-
ence public policy and formulate policy agendas.  
Similarly, the National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac,
published every few years or so, presents an optimistic, hortatory
view of Asian American politics.  The Almanac typically includes ar-
ticles, statistics, scholarly reports, and a political directory of elected
and appointed Asian American officials.  Although it includes many
articles that criticize electoral politics from the left, the Almanac con-
veys a clear “American Dream” orientation by analyzing the growing
Asian American population’s voting potential and jubilantly count-
ing the increasing number of Asian American officials.  The 2001-2002
volume is dedicated to Elaine Chao and Norman Mineta, who were
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appointed Secretaries of Labor and Transportation, respectively, by
George W. Bush.  James Lai, one of the volume’s co-editors, asserts
that these two appointments “make a strong statement to our nation
that Asian Pacific Americans are not perpetual foreigners” and “make
it clear that Asian Pacific Americans are here to stay, achieving new
levels of political incorporation”(12).  
The “American Dream” narrative of Asian American politics
underlies the rhetoric of many Asian American elected officials as
well.  In “The Need for Asian American Leadership: A Call to Action”
(2000), Governor Gary Locke of Washington weaves a classic teleo-
logical story about Asian Americans overcoming barriers, facing re-
maining challenges, and moving toward the promised land of
inclusion and the fulfillment of their political destiny.  First Locke dis-
cusses historical instances of discrimination such as the Chinese ex-
clusion movement, the bar on naturalization, and Japanese American
internment.  Then he credits the civil rights movement with creating
“tremendous progress,” adding, “I am honored to be an emblem of
that progress”(2).  He then identifies the “great challenges”(3) still
facing Asian Americans, naming poverty, inequality, racially moti-
vated violence, and episodes of ostracism such as the 1996 campaign
finance scandal and the prosecution of Wen Ho Lee.  Exhorting Asian
Americans to register, vote, and run for office, Locke writes: 
We bring into the new century a legacy of the blood, sweat, and
tears of our parents and our grandparents who helped make this
country all that it is today.  We owe it to our ancestors to take ac-
tion that will guarantee that the children of the twenty-first cen-
tury do not have to live through the cycles of discrimination that
have marred our own coming of age (4). 
Through committed political action, Locke suggests, Asian
Americans can move forward in their journey toward a post-dis-
crimination age.  
In a 1996 speech entitled, “A One Hundred Year Journey: From
Houseboy to the Governor’s Mansion,” delivered during his run for
Governor of Washington, Locke casts his personal and political au-
tobiographies in terms of the “American Dream.”iv Locke explains
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that his grandfather emigrated from China in the late 1800s, worked
as a houseboy, cannery worker, and logger, and then fought in the
Normandy Bay invasion in World War II as a soldier in the U.S. Army.
He continues: “[M]y background, and my family’s experiences have
emphasized the meaning of values like hard work, education, the
family, the meaning of personal responsibility, and that government
can only provide an opportunity, but cannot guarantee us success”
(3).  Urging Asian Americans to get involved politically in order to
protect their hard-won gains and assume their “rightful place at the
table”(6), Locke describes his run for Governor as the culmination of
a 100-year journey of sacrifice, hard work, and determination on the
part of his own family and Asian Americans throughout history.
In a special issue of the UCLA Asian Pacific American Law Journal
(2002) devoted to Asian American politics, articles by other Asian
American elected and appointed officials echo Locke’s themes.  The
titles of Tony Lam’s “Breaking Down the Walls: My Journey From a
Refugee Camp to the Westminster City Council” and Satveer Chaud-
hary’s “How a Chaudhary Beat a Carlson” are vivid and self-ex-
planatory.  Chaudhary writes: “[A]ct on your dreams.  If an Asian
Indian senator can make his mark in Minnesota, every Asian Amer-
ican can achieve his or her dream.  If one barrier falls, ten fall with it.
This is not just my story,  it is the story of America” (168).  Ming Chin,
who was appointed to the California Supreme Court in 1996, writes
in the same volume: “I am living the American dream.  Only in Amer-
ica could the son of a Chinese immigrant farmer rise to sit on the
state’s highest court” (150). 
The “Impossible Dream” narrative of Asian American politics
starts with the observation that the “American Dream” narrative is
fundamentally mistaken.  The “American Dream” narrative, as we
have seen, sees racial discrimination as aberrational rather than inte-
gral to the American experience.  Discrimination may be frequent and
widespread, but it can ultimately be overcome.  For the scholars who
craft the “Impossible Dream” narrative, this view of racism, embod-
ied in antidiscrimination norms and statutes, is wishful thinking and
harmfully misleading.  In their view, racism is a permanent and im-
placable feature of American life, and people of color will be better
able to struggle against it if they face this difficult truth.  Asian Amer-
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icans will never gain full incorporation through politics as usual—
electoral politics and traditional civil rights advocacy—because these
activities do not challenge racism at its roots.  While critical race schol-
ars think racism is ineradicable in an ultimate sense, they do not sug-
gest throwing in the towel but rather generating new and creative
strategies for resisting and challenging racism, ranging from decon-
structing racialized identities to rethinking the boundaries of the na-
tion-state and definitions of citizenship.  Where the “American
Dream” narrative is teleological, emphasizing a physical journey
through time and space and over barriers toward the promised land,
the “Impossible Dream” narrative emphasizes endless cycles of racial
“progress” and retrenchment that add up to stasis.  Its powerful anti-
triumphalist message challenges American national mythology at its
core.  It is this “Impossible Dream” narrative that underlies the analy-
ses, discussed above, which read the 1996 campaign finance scandal
as suggestive of the permanent exclusion of Asian Americans from
meaningful U.S. citizenship.
Derrick Bell (1992), one of the founders of critical race theory,
articulated many of the core arguments that comprise the “Impossi-
ble Dream” narrative.  According to Bell’s theory of “racial realism,”
racism will never be eradicated in America and the antidiscrimination
framework that purports to address racism is a collective fantasy that
prevents us from recognizing this truth.  Racial realism posits that
white people always act out of what they perceive to be their collec-
tive racial interest, unconstrained by promises, norms or laws.
Whites abstain from racial discrimination if abstinence is cost free or
profitable (the “interest convergence thesis”), but they sacrifice black
people whenever there is something to be gained from doing so.  For
example, powerful whites have for centuries instigated “racial bond-
ing” against blacks as a way of distracting poor whites from class in-
equality.  Recognizing the dual truths that racism is permanent and
that civil rights will not eliminate it enables one to be realistic, ac-
cording to Bell, not fatalistic.  We must still struggle against racism in
a committed way as an assertion of our humanity, but we must do it
with our eyes open.
Neil Gotanda is one of a handful of Asian American legal schol-
ars who have brought critical race theory to bear upon the Asian
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American experience.5 Gotanda’s (2001, 1985) central argument has
been that Asian Americans have a distinctive experience of being
racialized as “foreign” as well as non-white, with the implication that
critical race theory must differentiate among varied group experi-
ences rather than presuming that the black experience reflects those
of other groups of color.  Let us return to Gotanda’s 2001 article dis-
cussed above, entitled, “Citizenship Nullification: The Impossibility
of Asian American Politics.”  As mentioned, Gotanda sees the 1996
campaign finance scandal and the Wen Ho Lee espionage case as ev-
idence that enduring “images of foreignness” continue to “nullify”
Asian American citizenship.  Like Bell, Gotanda believes that racism
is a permanent, implacable feature of American life and that civil
rights laws can never uproot it, with the result that groups of color
can never achieve true membership in the polity.  Gotanda’s conclu-
sion at the end of the article is stark: “[G]enuine Asian American cit-
izenship is an impossibility”(80), even for those who possess the legal
status of citizens, as long as race continues to play a significant role
in American life.  In other words, the political exclusion of Asian
Americans is a permanent condition.
It is useful to return as well to Leti Volpp’s article discussed
above, entitled, “‘Obnoxious To Their Very Nature’: Asian Americans
and Constitutional Citizenship” (2001).  As mentioned, Volpp, too,
reads the 1996 campaign finance scandal and the Wen Ho Lee espi-
onage case as markers of cultural constructions which function to vi-
tiate Asian Americans’ formal citizenship rights.  Drawing upon
Linda Bosniak’s work, Volpp identifies four discourses about citi-
zenship: citizenship as legal status, citizenship as rights, citizenship
as political activity, and citizenship as national identity.  In the first
two, citizens are objects, “passive recipient(s) of rights”(72).  In the
latter two, citizens are active subjects with their own subjectivity.
Volpp’s argument is that while whites are comfortable with granting
Asian Americans citizenship in the first two senses, they are not com-
fortable with Asian Americans being active political subjects or being
seen as representing or constituting national identity.  Indeed, Asian
Americans are racialized so unremittingly as alien and different that
“‘citizen’ and ‘Asian’ could be said to function as antonyms in the
United States context”(82).  According to Volpp, this story about un-
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fulfilled citizenship should not surprise us.  She writes: 
Race has always fundamentally contradicted the promise of lib-
eral democracy.  The racially exclusive origins of liberalism and
civic republicanism were starkly at odds with their purported
goals.  While membership in the citizenry has been widened,
simply adding rights with an accompanying logic of color-
blindness will not translate into substantive enjoyment of citi-
zenship.  Ideas about race will continue to disrupt the ability of
Asian Americans to function and be identified as citizens...One’s
Asianness seems to be the difference one must suppress in order
to be a full citizen (83). 
It is not just that Asian Americans are disadvantaged by the
rules of the game; they are actually prevented from succeeding.  Since
politics as usual is obviously insufficient for dealing with the impla-
cability of racism, Volpp speaks of “new forms of struggle” that rec-
ognize the futility of seeking national membership within current
configurations and that seek the transformative “creation of political
solidarities across racial and national boundaries”(85).  In other
words, Asian Americans’ aspirations of belonging can only be ful-
filled if the game is restructured in a significant way.
It is worth noting that this division between the “American
Dream” and “Impossible Dream” narratives emerges as well in de-
bates over one of the central events in post-civil rights Asian Ameri-
can politics—namely, Japanese American reparations.  As Natsu Saito
(2001) argues, the established internment narrative suggests that
Japanese American internment was a terrible tragedy, but that the na-
tion recognized and corrected its error.  Saito identifies two flaws with
this narrative: it sees racism as an aberration, and it suggests that the
wrong of the internment has been righted.  Casting the internment
instead as “really a logical extension of all that had come before”(8)
in Asian American history, she demonstrates that history is in fact re-
peating itself at the start of the twenty first century as the U.S. gov-
ernment traces Arab and Muslim Americans as “terrorists” who are
“foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening” (12).  Saito reviews
recent cultural productions, individual stories, FBI programs, court
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cases and anti-terrorism policies and concludes: “The government is
still subverting our civil rights and undermining the safeguards of
judicial review by tapping into race-based fears and playing the ‘na-
tional security’ trump card”(26).  Echoing Chris Iijima, she points out
that Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 to reward the “su-
perpatriotism” and acquiescence of Japanese Americans and to pro-
mote the idea that minorities can make it in the U.S. if they try hard
enough.  Saito urges Japanese Americans to speak out against the es-
tablished internment narrative and fight the treatment of Arab and
Muslim Americans, suggesting that it is still in their power to re-in-
terpret the meaning of the internment.  How long can the “American
Dream” narrative of the internment persist in the face of post-9/11
realities?
Asian Americans and Politics in a New Century
What are the implications of the campaign finance scandal and
of putative foreignness more broadly for Asian American “civic en-
gagement”?  It depends upon whom you ask.  Judging by their pub-
lic rhetoric, most prominent players in Asian American
politics—including elected and appointed officials, professional ad-
vocates, and many scholars—espouse the “American Dream” narra-
tive of Asian American politics and believe that the campaign finance
scandal and related events are simply setbacks that should spur the
community to even greater efforts at political empowerment.  The en-
tire premise of their system-oriented work (policymaking, lobbying,
mobilizing the vote) is that conventional political action can mitigate
discrimination and produce group benefits.  Their own reaction to
the campaign finance scandal—filing a petition alleging discrimina-
tory treatment, sponsoring public fora on the issue, writing opinion
pieces, etc.—exemplifies intensified “civic engagement” as a response
to adversity.  On the other hand, those scholars and activists who es-
pouse the “Impossible Dream” narrative of Asian American politics
believe that “civic engagement” defined as the collective pursuit of
group interests through conventional political channels is a dead
end.vi Convinced that electoral politics and civil rights advocacy are
rigged games that inevitably reproduce white privilege, they see
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these activities as distracting Asian Americans from exploring alter-
native political possibilities.  What is needed, in their view, is not civic
engagement but civic transformation.vii
Which is more accurate, the “American Dream” narrative or
“Impossible Dream” narrative of Asian American politics?  In my
view, there is some truth to each.  To capture this complexity, I pro-
pose that that we think of Asian Americans from 1952 onwards as ex-
periencing “conditional citizenship.”8 Conditional citizenship is
formal citizenship whose meaning is contingent upon variable forces
in a given place and time.  It is citizenship that is qualified by nega-
tive cultural valuations of groups such that demographic changes,
geopolitical dynamics, and other kinds of processes can trigger its ab-
rogation, symbolically and perhaps literally.  Unlike the uncondi-
tional citizenship typically enjoyed by whites, conditional citizenship
is always on the verge of being compromised. This notion is not as
sanguine as the “American Dream” narrative: there is no teleological,
triumphal journey from the outside to the center of the polis; Asian
Americans may never fully arrive, politically speaking.  But it is not
as pessimistic as the “Impossible Dream” narrative either: conditional
citizenship is still legal citizenship and provides greater protection
and opportunity for Asian Americans than did the earlier state of
being “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”  This concept recognizes that
Asian American citizenship is meaningful and yet that it is vulnera-
ble.  Conditional citizenship is a fluid concept that invites histori-
cization, unlike Gotanda’s more fixed concept of “citizenship
nullification,” for instance.  Thus in any historically specific situation,
it is useful to identify which forces might align to qualify and/or
shore up the political and national membership of Asian Americans.
Will the continued dominance of the foreign-born among Asian
Americans for the next several decades weaken the political stand-
ing of Asian Americans?  Perhaps.  But history suggests that even if
immigration were to cease completely, third and fourth generation
Asian Americans would continue to be seen as immutably foreign
and politically suspect.
Looking into the future, what are the implications of conditional
citizenship for Asian Americans and politics in the twenty-first cen-
tury?  How will variable demographic, social, and cultural forces
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shape the meaning of Asian American citizenship and how might
Asian Americans respond?  Both domestic and international forces
will figure prominently; I will discuss only a few.  Consider emergent
racial dynamics within the U.S.  The growing numbers of Latinos will
alter racial configurations, particularly in areas like California that
also have large Asian American populations.  On the one hand, as
Latinos emphasize issues of concern to immigrants, such as bilingual
education and immigration policy, there will be new opportunities to
extend the alliances that Asian Americans and Latinos have already
constructed over redistricting and other issues.  On the other hand, as
non-Latinos perceive emergent Latino political power as a looming
threat, a rise in nativistic expressions is almost certain to occur.  Even
if these expressions focus explicitly on Latinos and not Asian Amer-
icans, they will influence immigration and other policies that pro-
foundly impact both groups.  Although the rhetoric surrounding the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
focused on Latino immigrants, the law had an adverse effect on many
Asian Americans as well.  
One factor that may strengthen Asian American citizenship is
the Western “War on Terror” and its impact on the status of Arab and
Muslim Americans.  As Saito (2001) makes clear, the U.S. government
and the media have, through the “War on Terror,” racialized these
groups as intrinsically threatening and disloyal.  One consistent
theme in American history has been that spotlighting a particular
group as a threat to the nation tends to cast other marginalized
groups in a more favorable light, if only temporarily.  During World
War II, previously vilified Chinese Americans suddenly found them-
selves held up as a positive alternative to “Japs.”  In the aftermath of
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, many Black Americans reported that whites treated them
more generously.  Foreignness is a relative concept: there’s nothing
like a supposed “Islamo-fascist” to make a Black person look truly
American.  If the racializing of Arab and Muslim Americans contin-
ues or intensifies, if Americans really come to believe they are en-
gaged in a “clash of civilizations” with Islam, this could have the
effect of making Asian Americans appear more American and as less
of a threat.  Even if Asian Americans led the charge against the vilifi-
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cation of Arab and Muslim Americans, as Saito encourages them to
do, they would still likely benefit from the comparative valuation,
whether they wished to or not.
On the other hand, there are international developments that
portend serious trouble for Asian Americans who, as conditional cit-
izens, are struggling to assert their membership.  The rise of China
as a global economic and military powerhouse and competitor with
the U.S. has implications for all Asian Americans.  Japan’s surge as an
economic power in the 1980s led to significant tension between the
U.S. and Japan.  These tensions, combined with a domestic economic
downturn, generated a surge of white racially motivated violence
against Asian Americans.  Vincent Chin was one casualty of this sit-
uation.  The attitude that leading politicians and literati manifest to-
ward China today is hauntingly familiar and mildly alarming.  We
hear that China is immune to moral reasoning (because it supports
the Sudanese government committing genocide in Darfur and con-
tinues its domination of Tibet); it is ruining the planet (because its
rapid industrialization has created serious environmental problems);
it is spreading plagues (the SARS epidemic appears to have origi-
nated in China); it is undercutting American industry (by taking ad-
vantage of the “most favored nation” status and flooding the U.S.
market with cheap goods); and it is trying to hurt Americans (by
sending poisoned toothpaste, pet food, and toys to the U.S.).  Jokes
about poisonous goods from China have become a staple in late night
comedy routines.  In the American imagination, China has become
the Dr. No of the globe, a mastermind plotting to destroy its enemies
and conquer the world via myriad nefarious means.  
It may be that the most powerful moves Asian Americans can
make in response to conditional citizenship relate to political subject
formation, or the definition of the ‘we’ in question.  Consider the fact
that conditional citizenship may well apply to other racialized groups
(and arguably to other kinds of groups as well), not just to Asian
Americans.  For example, although the racialization of Asian Ameri-
cans has differed in important ways from that of Black Americans,
unconditional citizenship has eluded both groups.  Black people were
enslaved, denied citizenship under Dred Scott v. Sandford (1854), and
then granted political membership by the Reconstruction Amend-
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ments, only to see these rights abrogated by the establishment of Jim
Crow in the South.  Black Americans are not cast as aliens beholden
to foreign powers, but they are cast as aliens within their own land.
In his story “The Space Traders,” Derrick Bell (1992) suggests that
whites will one day betray Black people spectacularly, in a manner
evocative of slavery.  Offered wealth, environmental rejuvenation,
and bountiful energy sources by space aliens in exchange for the na-
tion’s Black population, white and other Americans would, according
to Bell, mull it over briefly and then say yes.  Constitutional and civil
rights protections would be tossed aside and Black Americans would
be rounded up, stripped, and chained before being forced onto the
space ship.  That the same story could be told about Asian Ameri-
cans, Latinos, Native Americans, Arab and Muslim Americans, and
others suggest that despite the specificity of their respective experi-
ences, these groups may share the common plight of conditional cit-
izenship.  There may be untapped political potential here.  If
Americans of Asian, African, and Mexican descent were to approach
the recent treatment of Arab and Muslim Americans as an assault
upon ‘us’ rather than as a matter of little concern or an occasion for
‘us’ to stand up for ‘them,’ interesting new political configurations
might emerge.
As Espiritu (1992) has shown, Asian American panethnicity or
racial consciousness was constructed in the 1960s by people of vari-
ous Asian origins as a response to being racialized as a single goup
(see also Espiritu in this volume).  Forged in the crucible of white
racism and nativism, Asian American panethnicity has come to be
seen as a normative good, an achievement that literally birthed a com-
munity, the key to effective political action.  The conventional narra-
tive of panethnicity is exciting and heroic: Asian Americans
constructed something from nothing and now struggle to keep
panethnicity alive despite the centrifugal pressures of ethnic and di-
asporic identities, all in the name of group empowerment.  However,
panethnicity may reinforce foreignizing tendencies by suggesting
that Asian Americans constitute a unitary group with distinct politi-
cal interests from other Americans.  Proponents of panethnicity are
very clear that Asian Americanness is constructed, but the nuances of
reactive identity formation are lost on the general public, who simply
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perceive a culturally or racially distinct group asserting its unitary
identity and interests.  Along these lines, Asian Americans might
want to avoid describing themselves in the very culturally and
racially essentialist terms used by those seeking to restrict their citi-
zenship.  For instance, many Asian American elected officials and
community leaders such as Michael Woo, Matthew Fong, and Chang-
lin Tien have claimed that Asian Americans are uniquely poised as
Pacific Rim players to serve as “bridge builders” between the U.S.
and Asia.  Evelyn Hu-Dehart (1999) rightly asks about the political
risks of this kind of talk.  Similarly, Arif Dirlik (1999) points out that
the turn toward diasporic thinking in the academy tends to reify
“Chineseness,” which both dehistoricizes identity formation and ren-
ders Chinese people aliens in their immediate contexts.  While the
short term gains purchased by racial essentialism are obvious up
front, the long term costs are often overlooked and deserve more con-
sideration. 
Underlying the processes of subject formation is the question of
substance: what does it mean, politically speaking, to be Asian Amer-
ican?  What are Asian American political interests?  Should Asian
Americans continue to struggle to define a unitary set of group in-
terests or instead let their individual interests or values define their
group memberships and identities?  Should Asian Americanness be
the exclusive or even primary way of organizing political responses
to the world?  Since Asian Americans experience the world not only
as Asian Americans but also as women, Los Angelenos, Americans,
Vietnamese immigrants, teachers, workers, transnational capitalists,
gays and lesbians, members of the Third World, etc., to what extent
should they embrace multiple, simultaneous definitions of ‘we’ and
join various political configurations only some of which are defined
by panethnicity?ix “Civic” comes from the Latin civis, which means
community.  This raises the question: whom is Asian American “civic
engagement” supposed to serve?  Who is the community in ques-
tion?  Asian America?  America?  A global citizenry?  Are energy is-
sues, global food shortages, deforestation, species extinction, nuclear
proliferation and other such issues best addressed through race-based
politics?  There is no distinctly Asian American position on global
warming, but Americans of Asian descent can, along with others, em-
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brace a ‘we’ built upon the profound understanding first, that the
domination of nature and animals is linked philosophically, analyti-
cally, and practically to the domination of women, people of color,
and others, and second, that the planet’s survival depends upon
transforming all of these relationships.x Asian American “civic en-
gagement” may turn out to refer to Asian Americans going beyond
current frameworks and working to develop and nurture broader
communities that are not racially defined.  Denied full membership
in the U.S. polity, Americans of Asian descent may yet claim it in a
larger arena.
Notes
i We can of course distinguish between public position-taking and private ru-
minations.  Some who espouse the “American Dream” narrative in public may
have private doubts about whether racism will ever be conquered.  My concern
here is with the public positions and their implications.
ii Robert Vrooman, former chief of security at Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory,
has publicly stated that Lee was singled out because he was of Chinese de-
scent.  The short list of suspects contained names of other scientists with very
similar profiles, but none other than Lee was of Chinese descent.  See Volpp
2001, 81.
iii To be clear, the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s itself drew heav-
ily upon the American creed (the ideals of equality, freedom, and justice) and
described itself as seeking to make the American Dream a reality for Black
Americans. 
iv Governor Locke delivered this keynote speech at the national conference of
the Organization of Chinese Americans on June 29, 1996.  It was later pub-
lished in the 1998-1999 edition of the National Asian Pacific American Political Al-
manac. 
v Others include Robert Chang, Mari Matsuda, and Keith Aoki. 
vi One example of an activist organization with this stance is Committee Against
Anti-Asian Violence (CAAAV), based in New York City.  See Kim 2004. 
vii There is no existing survey data that ascertains to what degree Asian Ameri-
can individuals subscribe to one or the other narrative.  We cannot infer from
the act of voting that an individual espouses the “American Dream” narrative
because one can vote for the same reason that a nonbeliever might go to con-
fession—“just in case”.  Do immigrants lean toward the “American Dream”
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perspective?  Perhaps, since this would be consistent with the aspirational at-
titudes that lead them to migrate.  Yet precisely because of their aspirations, im-
migrants may be the most likely to become disillusioned with politics, as many
in the Korean immigrant community did after the Los Angeles uprising of
1992.
viii 1952 was the year when the bar on naturalization was lifted for Asian immi-
grants to the U.S.
ix Many Asian Americans already do this.  I am posing a normative question,
not a descriptive one.
x See ecofeminist works such as Plumwood (2002) and Kheel (2008). 
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Connecting the Dots: 
Understanding the Importance of 
Census Participation to Civic Engagement
Terry M. Ao
Introduction
Civic engagement is often seen as the key to empowerment for
a community.  While there is no one authoritative definition, civic en-
gagement is generally seen as an activity or activities taken to make
a difference and promote the quality of life in a community, through
both political and non-political processes.  In essence, civic engage-
ment encompasses a broad ideal of individually contributing to a
greater good that benefits both the individual and the community at
large.  In the Asian American community, what is often overlooked is
how critical census participation is to effective civic engagement.
This stems, in part, from a lack of knowledge about the census gen-
erally — that is, what it is, why it is important, what is at stake with
respect to census participation, and, consequently, the inability to con-
nect the importance of census participation to effective civic engage-
ment.  Once that connection is understood, we must focus on
understanding the barriers to our communities’ full participation and
what can be done to eradicate these barriers.  At the end of day, cen-
sus participation should be seen as the backbone of civic engagement
and, thus, should be included as an integral component of any com-
prehensive civic engagement campaign. 
What is the Census?
The United States Constitution requires the federal government
to count the number of people in the United States every ten years.
This count is called the decennial census and the next scheduled
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count will be 2010.  The Census Bureau, which is a part of the United
States Department of Commerce and is responsible for planning and
conducting the decennial census, is tasked with counting everyone
who resides in the United States as of Census Day, April 1, 2010, in-
cluding children and immigrants, regardless of their legal status.  
In past censuses, the Census Bureau sent out a short-form survey
to 100% of the households and a long-form survey to a random sam-
ple of households (1 in 6).  The short form asked the basic population
questions, such as age, gender, race and Hispanic origin.  The long
form asked socioeconomic questions, such as educational attainment,
language ability, income levels and so forth.  While data from both the
short and long forms are used for funding appropriations, Voting
Rights Act requirements and other governmental and non-govern-
mental reasons, the short form data is collected for the purpose of
reapportionment and redistricting.  
After the 2000 census, the Census Bureau replaced the long form
of the decennial census with the American Community Survey (ACS),
which asks similar questions to the long form and is intended to pro-
vide information on what a community looks like on a more up-to-
date basis rather than relying on data collected every ten years. The
ACS questionnaire asks questions such as name, sex, age, ethnic ori-
gin, race, language ability, educational attainment and household in-
come. The ACS provides communities with critical economic, social,
demographic, and housing information for all states, cities, counties,
metropolitan areas and population groups of 65,000 people or more.
Because it is designed to provide more up-to-date data, the ACS is
sent out to a sample of households every month of every year and
the Census Bureau provides ACS data on an annual basis.  With the
switch from long form to ACS, future censuses, starting with the 2010
Census, will only consist of the short form.
The Census Bureau also conducts various other surveys
throughout the years, including the Current Population Survey (CPS)
and the Economic Census, that help provide the data needed to un-
derstand the many communities that make up this country.  The CPS
is a monthly survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and is the primary source of information on
the labor force characteristics of the U.S. population. Estimates ob-
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tained from the CPS include employment, unemployment, earnings,
hours of work, and are available by a variety of demographic char-
acteristics including age, sex, race, marital status, and educational at-
tainment as well as by occupation, industry, and class of worker.
Supplemental questions to produce estimates on a variety of topics
including school enrollment, income, previous work experience,
health, employee benefits, work schedules, and voting are also often
added to the regular CPS questionnaire.  The Economic Census pro-
vides official measures of output for industries and geographic areas,
and serves as the cornerstone of the nation’s economic statistics, pro-
viding key source data for the Gross Domestic Product and other in-
dicators of economic performance. 
Why is the Census important?
The importance of census data cannot be overstated; census data
is critical for our society to function as it is used for many purposes
by many entities.  For example, information about age,
Hispanic/Latino ethnicity, and race is used by the Department of Jus-
tice to combat discrimination; by the Department of Health and
Human Services to support research on service delivery for children,
minorities, and the elderly; and by the Department of Education to
conduct studies, evaluations, and assessments of children of different
racial and ethnic backgrounds.  This information is also used to reap-
portion political representation and in the redistricting process.  In-
formation about age, race, Hispanic origin, and language ability is
used to determine election language assistance requirements under
the Voting Rights Act.  Income and housing responses are used by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to assess the
need for housing assistance for elderly, handicapped, and low-income
homeowners.  Citizenship information is used by community-based
organizations to assess the needs of their constituents.  Employment
information is used by communities to develop training programs,
and by business and local governments to determine the need for
new employment opportunities accordingly.  Income information
helps determine the needs of families and others and makes it possi-
ble to compare the economic levels of different areas, and how eco-
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nomic levels for a community change over time.  Voting data from
the CPS in federal election years have been used to figure out where
to canvass for get-out-the vote efforts or to determine which com-
munities need more education and outreach efforts targeting them.  
Many federal and state programs use census data to distribute
funds for community development. In fact, according to The Brook-
ings Institution, census data is used by federal agencies to determine
the allocation of over $300 billion in federal funding.   Education in-
formation is used to determine the number of public schools, educa-
tion programs, and daycare services required in a community.  Data
on disability provides the means to allocate government funding for
healthcare services and new hospitals in many communities.  Mili-
tary service information is used by the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs to measure the needs of veterans and to evaluate veterans’
programs dealing with education, employment, and health care.  
Finally, it is particularly important that Asian Americans partic-
ipate in the census because it is the richest source of data on Asian
American communities, particularly for sub-ethnic communities
(such as Chinese, Asian Indian and Hmong).  In many data sets or
surveys developed by private, academic and other governmental en-
tities, Asian Americans often find themselves woefully underrepre-
sented.  Many data sets or surveys simply lump Asian Americans into
the “Other” categories, thereby making it impossible to determine
what the landscape looks like for Asian Americans on that particular
topic, whether that topic be related to health care, educational drop-
out rates, or some other important social or political issue.  Other
times, Asian Americans are able to find aggregated data for the entire
Asian American community but that data may not be particularly
useful.  Because the Asian American community is diverse, com-
prised of several dozen distinct ethnic groups, a multitude of cultures
and languages, and widely varied experiences in the U.S., aggregated
data may simply mask problems and concerns for particular sub-eth-
nic groups.  For example, Asian Americans as a whole are often seen
as wealthy and well educated, but disaggregated data for subgroups
reveals a wide array of incomes, poverty rates, and levels of educa-
tional attainment — from those doing very well to those struggling on
multiple fronts.  The Census Bureau is one of the few entities that col-
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lects and reports data at the disaggregated level of Asian American
sub-ethnic groups.  Therefore, it is even more critical for Asian Amer-
icans to participate in census surveys to ensure that the data captured
by the Census Bureau is as thorough and accurate as possible.
What is at stake when we talk about Census participation?  
If census data is used for so many purposes, from reapportion-
ment and redistricting to allocation of federal, state and local funding,
to recognizing trends and problems in communities, then the data
must be accurate.  An accurate count of Asian Americans will allow
communities to track the well-being of children, families, and the eld-
erly; determine where to locate new highways, schools, and hospi-
tals; show a large corporation that a town has the workforce the
company needs; evaluate programs such as welfare and workforce
diversification; and monitor and publicize the results of programs.
Unfortunately, there have been issues with accuracy of census counts,
particularly for communities of color.  Since 1940, the Census Bureau
has attempted to measure its ability to accurately count the people in
America whether it was through Demographic Analysis or the use of
a separate coverage measurement survey.  Duplicate responses lead
to overcounts, while omissions, or missed persons, lead to under-
count.  Subtracting overcounts from undercounts results in a net un-
dercount or overcount for each census.  
For each decennial census from 1940 to 1980, the national net un-
dercount went down, as did the net undercount for specific popula-
tion subgroups.  However, since 1940, there has always existed a
differential undercount – that is, non-Hispanic whites had lower un-
dercount rates than people of color, or, stated another way, people of
color were missed by the census more often than non-Hispanic
whites.  The differential undercount was also reduced each decennial
census since 1940.
The 1990 census was a watershed moment for the Census Bu-
reau.  It was the first census that was less accurate than the one pre-
vious.  The differential undercounts were the highest the Census
Bureau had ever recorded.  We also learned from 1990 that it was not
only African Americans who suffered significant differential under-
170 Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
counts but also Latino Americans and Asian Americans.i Moreover,
American Indians on reservations had the highest undercount of any
groups in the 1990 census, with an undercount rate of over 12 per-
cent (Hogan and Robinson 1993). The undercount of children was
generally disproportionate.  Children made up a quarter of the over-
all population in 1990, but accounted for slightly more than half of
all persons missed by the Census Bureau.  The undercount of chil-
dren of color was even more disproportionate (Edmonston 2000).
In 2000, the Census Bureau worked to improve the accuracy of
the count.  Unfortunately, it was unclear how well the Census Bureau
was able to count people because the Census Bureau did not have
confidence in the detailed findings from their final coverage meas-
urement, the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (Revision II).  The
National Academy of Sciences’ National Research Council did con-
clude with a fair amount of confidence that the net undercount and
differential undercount by race/ethnicity were reduced from 1990.
However, the panel also concluded that there continued to exist a dif-
ferential undercount of racial minorities in the 2000 census (Com-
mittee on National Statistics 2004, 241). 
In the Asian American community, accuracy in census counts re-
mains a persistent issue.  In the 2000 Census, Asian Americans were
alleged to be slightly overcounted by the Census Bureau’s findings,
possibly because there was a relatively high rate of duplication for
Asian Americans in college living away from home, which likely off-
set any undercount of other subgroups.  
Still, other Asian American subgroups believe that they were
vastly undercounted.  This was particularly true for Southeast Asian
communities.  For example, many community leaders in Long Beach,
California believed that the Cambodian population was under-
counted in the 2000 census.  As evidence, they cite the fact that local
school enrollment data were considerably different than the data pro-
vided by the 2000 census.  During the 1999-2000 school year, school
enrollment data showed a population of Cambodian students that
was nearly as large as the entire Cambodian population counted by
the Census Bureau.  Yet, the 2000 census data showed that the Cam-
bodian school-age population accounted for less than half of all Cam-
bodians in California.  It is clear that the Census Bureau missed a
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significant number of Cambodian children in the 2000 census, and,
from this finding, we can extrapolate it is highly likely that the cen-
sus missed a significant number of Cambodian adults in California,
as well.
Impact on Civic Engagement
Because non-participation in census surveys can lead to poten-
tial undercounts, severe consequences to civic engagement will in-
evitably follow.  Inaccurate census counts can create future problems
for redistricting, addressing language barriers to voting, and enforc-
ing voting rights.  Additionally, undercounts would make other as-
pects of civic engagement work more difficult to undertake.
Undercounting communities will have a devastating impact on
redistricting.  Redistricting, the process by which census data is used
to redraw the lines and boundaries of electoral districts within a state,
affects districts at all levels of government – from local school boards,
wards and city councils to state legislatures and the United States
House of Representatives.  The way that district lines are drawn also
influences whether or not elected officials are responsive to the needs
of their communities, such as securing funding for bilingual educa-
tion classes or ensuring that Limited English Proficient individuals
in the community have access to health care.  
Asian American communities have not traditionally been ac-
tively involved in the redistricting process, except in certain areas
where there is a sizeable population.  This lack of participation has,
in turn, resulted in underrepresentation in elected leadership posi-
tions.  For example, despite being 12% of the population in Los An-
geles as of the 1990 Census, there were no Asian Americans on the
County Board of Supervisors during the 1990s because the Asian
American communities were split apart into different districts
(Vasquez 2001). Keeping Asian American voters with shared inter-
ests together in a district means that they have a significant voice in
deciding who is elected to office, and whether their needs are being
raised and represented.  In 2001, the Coalition of Asian Pacific Amer-
icans for Fair Redistricting (CAPAFR) was formed to organize the
Asian American and Pacific Islander communities statewide in Cali-
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fornia for the first time in history to actively engage in the statewide
Assembly redistricting process and create a statewide Assembly pro-
posal.  CAPAFR’s advocacy resulted in the 2001 Assembly lines uni-
fying seven key communities of interest, two of which resulted in the
election of Asian American Assembly members (Assemblyman Mike
Eng of the 49th Assembly District and Assemblyman Van Tran of the
68th Assembly District), including the first Vietnamese state legisla-
tor in the nation (Coalition of Asian Americans for Fair Redistricting
2001). The ability to make this progress begins with having quality
census data.  If Asian Americans are missed in the decennial count
then they will not be represented in the redistricting process.  If too
many Asian Americans are missed, whole communities run greater
risks of being split into different districts during the redistricting
process, and thereby losing their political clout.
If Asian Americans are missed from the monthly American
Community Survey (ACS), communities run the risk of not receiving
the election language assistance they need — and are entitled to
under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  During the 2006
reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, in recognition of the
move from the long form to the ACS, Section 203 determinations were
to be made every five years based on ACS data (Hamer, Parks and
King 2006). Section 203 requires covered jurisdictions to provided lan-
guage assistance during the electoral process, thereby removing the
language barrier to voting for their covered language minorities.  A
jurisdiction is covered under Section 203 where the number of limited
English proficient United States citizens of voting age in a single lan-
guage group within the jurisdiction who are Asian American, Latino,
American Indian or Alaska Native is more than 10,000, more than
five percent of all voting-age citizens, or exceeds five percent of all
reservation residents on an Indian reservation, and has an illiteracy
rate higher than the national illiteracy rate.ii Once covered, the juris-
diction is obligated to provide “any registration or voting notices,
forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information re-
lating to the electoral process, including ballots” in the covered lan-
guage as well as in English.iii Section 203 has been successful in
increasing the civic engagement of Asian American citizens, with
higher voter registration and turnout levels from each previous en-
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actment or reauthorization period.  Increases in voter registration and
turnout can be directly linked to Section 203 compliance.  For exam-
ple, after entering into a Memorandum of Agreement with the De-
partment of Justice, Harris County, Texas (Houston) saw the doubling
of Vietnamese voter turnout which resulted in the first Vietnamese
candidate in history to be elected to the Texas legislature, defeating
the incumbent chair of the Appropriations Committee.   The in-
creased civic engagement of these groups has also led to increased
political representation by candidates of choice.  In recent years, al-
most 350 Asian Americans have been elected to office.iv If Asian
American communities miss out on Section 203 coverage because of
missed persons, then their ability to be civically engaged suffers.
Finally, without accurate voting data, the ability of civic en-
gagement organizations to do their job effectively will be compro-
mised.  Information on reported voting and registration by various
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics is collected for the
nation in November of congressional and presidential election years
through the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS). Combined
with data from other census surveys, these data are important in de-
termining what groups are in need of education and outreach efforts
and are useful in detecting trends in voting patterns of particular
communities.  For those organizations that have a demographic
analysis capacity, or for those that do not but who contract with those
that do, census data can be used to develop a Get-Out-The-Vote strat-
egy, including determining where canvassing and phone banking
should occur.  These data are critical to civic engagement by helping
to shape and guide what any given civic engagement campaign
should look like.
What barriers exist to Census participation 
for the Asian American community?
It is clear that we need to have every Asian American counted
and it is equally clear that some are not.  There are barriers to census
participation that likely explain why some Asian Americans are being
missed.  The Asian American population in the United States is larger
than it has ever been in our nation’s history.  From 1990 to 2004, the
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Asian American population doubled in size, growing from seven mil-
lion to 14 million.  Of this rapidly growing segment of the popula-
tion, about two-thirds are foreign-born, and more than a third of the
Asian American population, nearly four million people, is considered
limited English proficient (LEP).   This combination of factors indi-
cates that a significant sector of the population is at a substantial dis-
advantage — both linguistically and culturally — when it comes to
participation in the census.  
The Census Bureau’s Asian American focus groups showed that
many Asian Americans lacked awareness about the census and had
not heard of the Census Bureau.v Indeed, many Asian Americans find
the idea of the census not only confusing, but invasive and poten-
tially threatening.  Asian Americans — especially those who have re-
cently emigrated from countries with oppressive governments —
believe that the census is linked to the Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  The Census
Bureau’s Asian American focus groups also noted the lack of under-
standing about the purpose of the census and how the data is used.
They also did not recognize any direct benefit to participating in the
census to themselves and/or to the Asian American community.
Lastly, respondents noted that English-language proficiency issues
and the lack of availability of in-language materials functioned as bar-
riers to census participation by Asian Americans.  
While the ideal for a census is to achieve a complete count of all
persons in the country, perfection in this context is impossible.  The
pragmatic reality is that the Census Bureau constantly strives to
achieve the most accurate count possible and one that is better than
previous counts.  The 2010 Census will provide the Census Bureau
with even more challenges in achieving an accurate count.  The de-
mographics of 2010 have changed drastically from 2000.  Some com-
munities, such as the Latino American and Asian American
communities have experienced high growth rates.  Additionally, re-
cent natural disasters have displaced many people from their homes
and have created a more complex — consequently, less traditional —
sense of household for many people.   The Census Bureau must be
able to understand these communities and situations and the unique
barriers to an accurate count that may exist for them.  
Broadening the Understanding of Civic Engagement for Asian Americans  175
The Census Bureau also has to account for the fact that people
are reluctant to voluntarily provide personal information to the gov-
ernment in an age of identity theft and in the wake of immigration
raids and other dragnets that post-9/11 policies have created.  Com-
bined with growing privacy concerns that have arisen from recent
disclosures that the Census Bureau inappropriately shared informa-
tion with government agencies, an increasing number of people, par-
ticularly minorities, are fearful of providing even the most basic
information asked on the census.  The Census Bureau must somehow
overcome the many obstacles created by these factors in order to get
an accurate count.
What can be done to break down barriers 
to Census participation?
It is important that we actively educate people about the im-
portance of census surveys because the Census Bureau’s Asian Amer-
ican focus groups indicated that very few had ever participated in
any U.S. Census, even though most of the Asian American partici-
pants had been living in the United States during the 2000 Census.  In
fact, the majority of Asian American respondents reported never hav-
ing received the census in the mail, nor were they visited by a census
enumerator.  For those who received the form but did not respond,
some threw it away because they could not read English, others said
they just were not interested, and a few said that at the time they were
not yet citizens and thought that only U.S. citizens could participate.
A number of participants mistakenly confused the census question-
naire with their annual evaluation form for their welfare assistance
programs or with other telephone or mail surveys conducted by pri-
vate businesses or government agencies.  Thus there is a lot of con-
fusion regarding what the census surveys are, what they do, and how
one should correctly fill them out.  
Based on the Census Bureau’s Asian American focus groups,
doing good and improving one’s community was seen as an impor-
tant benefit of the census.  The Asian American respondents ex-
pressed their particular interest in a number of the benefits, including
school funding, funding of other programs (such as police, firemen,
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and national security), building new roads, determining the number
of Congressional seats, planning for businesses, and providing pub-
lic bilingual services.   In fact, once participants were shown the cen-
sus fact sheets and had an opportunity to discuss how the data is used
and benefits the community, the majority expressed interest in par-
ticipating in the 2010 Census.  
There are many opportunities to engage Asian Americans in par-
ticipating in census surveys.  Some of the specific efforts suggested by
the Census Bureau’s Asian American focus groups to motivate more
Asian Americans to participate in the census include: working closely
with Asian churches and temples; setting up seminars or workshops
at Asian American community centers or organizations; getting the
message to parents through students at school and creating and send-
ing a task force with bilingual census takers.  They also suggested
running in-language ad campaigns that emphasize the following
messages: participating in the census does not require legal status
and filling out your census form provides benefits to communities, in-
cluding hiring more police, receiving more funding for schools, and
building more roads to reduce traffic.  Further, greater census partic-
ipation can also allow communities to gain more political power.
They also noted that the most effective outreach strategies to reach
Asian ethnic communities utilize native-language media (e.g., tele-
vision, newspapers, radio, billboards near or within the community)
and flyers posted at Asian churches, temples, community centers, so-
cial service organizations and at major Asian grocery stores.  
Conclusion
Understanding the importance of census participation to effec-
tive civic engagement is critical to optimizing civic engagement work.
The primary key to overcoming these obstacles is to raise overall
awareness of the census and why it is important for every person to
participate in census counts, regardless of their citizenship or legal
status.  Unfortunately, even for community based organizations who
are aware of the benefits of census data, working on census education
and advocacy often takes a back seat to other pressing issues, such
as citizenship and naturalization, immigration or get-out-the-vote
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work.  Having community groups understand that accurate census
data is the backbone to all of their civic engagement efforts will help
to create greater awareness of the importance of census data.  If Asian
American communities can work collectively to increase the accuracy
of their communities’ census counts, the effect on civic engagement
efforts will be widespread and profound, the impacts of which could
range from increased funding for programs, services, schools and in-
frastructure, to having more voting power, to electing more Asian
American elected officials at local, state and national levels. 
Notes
i The 1990 census provided the first measurements on the undercounts for
Latino Americans, Asian Americans, American Indians and Alaska Natives.
In the previous decennial censuses, the only coverage measurements made
were for “black” and “non-black.”
ii 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(b)(2).  The Director of the Census Bureau makes these de-
terminations, which are effective upon publication in the Federal Register.  The
Director’s determinations are not subject to review in any court.  42 U.S.C. §
1973aa-1a(b)(4). 
iii 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(c).  Of course, when the covered language is oral or un-
written, then the covered jurisdiction is only required to furnish oral instruc-
tions, assistance, or other information relating to registration and voting.  Id. 
iv H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 9-10 (2006) at 19.
v The report on these focus groups, Ethnic and Racial Sub-Population Focus
Group Research, Qualitative Research Conducted on Behalf of the U.S. Census
Bureau, can be found at http://www.census.gov/procur/www/2010com-
munications/final%20report%20-%20asian%20&%20arab-american.pdf.  The
report provides detailed findings from focus groups on the following popu-
lations:  Korean, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Filipino, Laotian, Chinese, Arab,
Multi-Racial, and Caucasian.
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INTRODUCTION
In societies with free association among individuals, civil society
developments constitute the foundation and fabric of its people.  Civil
society generally refers to actions individuals voluntarily take in var-
ious forms, at different levels of collectiveness, and under diverse in-
stitutional settings — all with the goal of bringing positive changes to
a relevant community.  These actions are distinctively different from
government or market activities, but they are becoming increasingly
inter-related and inter-dependent.  Public policies may facilitate civil
society developments.  One example is providing the regulatory
framework with sufficient incentives to encourage the formation of
publicly accountable nonprofit organizations to carry out good work.
In the U.S., different types of nonprofit organizations are formed
everywhere to advance a multiplicity of causes, so much so that the
terms civil society and nonprofit organizations are frequently used
interchangeably.  
In Asian American communities, civil society is very much part
of communal life since the early history of immigration.  In earlier
times of exclusion and isolation, Asian American nonprofit organi-
zations might perform significant de facto self governance roles for an
ethnic community.  In recent decades of a more open society and ac-
commodating public policy, different types of Asian American or-
ganizations can be instrumental in promoting greater political and
economic integration with society at large.  Yet, very little is known
about Asian American nonprofit organizations (NPOs) as a group.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of these or-
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ganizations in major U.S. metropolitan areas — guided by a simple
research question: What is the pattern of development of Asian Amer-
ican nonprofit organizations?  The pattern of development includes
the size of this segment of nonprofits, their history, the distribution
among different functional types as well as among diverse ethnic
groups, and some general financial situation of these organizations.
It is a well-established fact that nonprofit organizations play an
increasingly important role in contemporary U.S. society (Salamon
1999).  Various theories have been advanced to explain the rationale
for the existence of the nonprofit sector.  One theory argues that the
rise of nonprofit organizations is a result of government failure —
analogous to the justification for a government to exist due to market
failure (Weisbrod 1988).  As the private market fails to produce some
goods and services because of the incompatibility between market
incentives and the nature of public goods and services, so are some
other goods and services that a government, even a democratically
selected one, may fail to produce equitably.  In a society with hetero-
geneous public interests and public decision by majority rule, only
collective goods (including public goods) that meet majority interests
may get provided.  In the absence of any alignment with majority in-
terests, public goods that are local to either a geographic area or to a
community of any particular characteristic may need to find alterna-
tive provision mechanisms. Individuals that share the same local pub-
lic interests may engage in self-organizing to form voluntary and
nonprofit agencies to provide local collective goods.   Resources for
these nonprofits may come from within the same community, out-
side the community, or even the larger government sector, particu-
larly when these local public interests overlap with the larger context
of government policy initiatives.
The community interests of different racial and ethnic groups
can be considered an example of such local collective goods.  In this
case, the collective goods are local to different ethnic groups.  As a
community, Asian Americans are comprised of significant immigrant
population of diverse ethnicity.  There are at least two general immi-
grant concerns for these Asian Americans — economic survival in the
adopted country and maintaining a distinctive cultural identity and
heritage.   Helping immigrants to survive economically includes or-
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ganizing nonprofits to teach English as Second Language (or English
for Speakers of Other Languages), providing employment services
or services to those who need help in taking care of themselves —
like low-income households, the youth, and the elderly.  Maintaining
cultural identity may take the form of setting up ethnic language
schools to teach U.S.-born Asian American children, forming non-
profits to promote ethnic art, music, dance, and other aspects of the
immigrant home culture.  As Asian American communities grow,
they may learn to adopt more mainstream organizing strategies.  One
consequence is the development of Asian American nonprofits that
promote Asian American interests in the context of the larger society
— including advocacy groups, professional associations, funding in-
termediaries, and private foundations.  
Thus, Asian American nonprofit organizations can generally be
categorized into four functional types.  These categories are:
1. Religious organizations.  These are primarily churches and tem-
ples.
2. Cultural organizations.  These organizations promote and pre-
serve an ethnic group’s cultural identity, including home-coun-
try language schools, traditional arts, dance, or music groups, and
other general cultural organizations — for instance, associations
based on the last name of an ethnic Chinese subgroup.
3. Service organizations.  These agencies provide primarily one or
more types of social services like English classes, health services,
youth programs, or senior housing projects.  These services have
the overall objective of helping immigrants participate more pro-
ductively in the economy.  
4. Public interest organizations – these are advocacy groups, pro-
fessional organizations, civic organizations, and private founda-
tions and various public interest funds.  The central theme among
them is to enhance the voice of their respective Asian American
constituency through organizing, financing, holding forums,
sponsoring activities, or other appropriate means.
Among these four functional types of Asian American nonprofit
organizations, there is also heterogeneity of community interests.  Be-
cause of the nature of religious and cultural activities — especially in
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the use of native languages and the meaning of identity, it is likely
that a religious or cultural organization serves a specific Asian ethnic
group.  A social service or public interest organization operates in the
larger societal context in terms of its funding sources or sphere of in-
fluence, and thus may not be bounded as much by similar language
and cultural particularities.  A Vietnamese American may not attend
a Chinese church but participate in an English class conducted at an
Asian American social service agency.  The following empirical sec-
tions may shed some light on whether the distribution of Asian
American nonprofits reflects this pattern of heterogeneity.
The remainder of this chapter is organized into three parts.  The
first part describes the data, which come primarily from IRS tax
forms.  This is a rich source of information with some major limita-
tions.  The second part presents a profile of the Asian American non-
profit organizations in the sample.  The major findings are that Asian
American nonprofit organizations are numerous but few compared to
all nonprofits, they are young and diverse — both ethnically and
functionally — and they are concentrated in a small number of met-
ropolitan areas.  The third part examines the factors associated with
the functional types (religious, cultural, service and public interest)
and with organizational size as measured by total assets and annual
revenue.  The results indicate that Asian American religious organi-
zations tend to have a longer history, are more likely to be found in
suburban middle class communities, as well as in metropolitan areas
with a more diverse ethnic population, and a relatively less active
general population in community organizing.  The opposite is true
for secular Asian American organizations as a group. The pattern is
less consistent among the three types of secular Asian American or-
ganizations.  Regarding organization size, more established Asian
American nonprofits, pan-Asian American organizations, and those
located in communities with larger Asian American populations tend
to have more financial resources. 
DATA
In spite of the emerging importance of ethnic nonprofits, re-
search on these organizations has only begun recently.  Michael
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Cortes (1998) explored various data sources for research on Hispanic
nonprofits in the U.S.  He made use of the application for tax-exempt
status and nonprofit tax returns (Form 990); both were filed with the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service.   The data used in Cortes (1998) is
available at the IRS upon request.  Recent advances in information
technology, especially via the internet, have rendered similar infor-
mation accessible on a few websites.  This study makes use of these
free and electronically accessible data sources1 (e.g. website of Na-
tional Center for Charitable Statistics and www.guidestar.org) to pro-
vide an overview of Asian American nonprofit organizations in the
U.S.  Since Form 990, the tax return filed by nonprofits receiving an-
nual revenue of $25,000 or more, is filed on a voluntary basis, com-
pliance and data quality may not be carefully audited.  However,
Froelich, Knoepfle, and Pollak (2000) and Bielefeld (2000) demon-
strated the research utility of these completed tax returns.  After com-
paring the information in Form 990 with audited financial statements
of selected nonprofits, Froelich, Knoepfle and Pollak (2000) concluded
that the financial information, especially balance sheet and income
statement information, contained in Form 990 was generally reliable. 
This chapter examines Asian American nonprofit organizations
in U.S. major metropolitan areas.  Asian American nonprofit organi-
zations here refer to nonprofits with the mission of serving directly
and primarily Asian Americans, and that are run by Asian Ameri-
cans, either as executive directors or as board members of the organ-
ization, or both.  Thus, neither nonprofit organizations that serve
Asian Americans but have no significant Asian American represen-
tation as board members or as the executive director, nor non-Asian
American serving organizations with Asian American executive di-
rectors are included in this study.  Metropolitan areas are used be-
cause minority and immigrant populations are likely to be
concentrated in these areas.  More specifically, Consolidated Metro-
politan Statistical Area (CMSA) is used as the definition for metro-
politan areas.  This is the most inclusive metropolitan area concept
used by the Census Bureau.  This study collects information from the
10 largest CMSAs as measured by total population.2
CMSA demographic data is obtained from the 1990 and 2000
census. The Guidestar database of nonprofits allows interactive
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searches for these organizations within the same approximate cover-
age of CMSAs.  This study assumes that a fifty-mile3 area surround-
ing the zip codes of a central city is big enough to cover most of the
Asian American nonprofit organizations in the corresponding met-
ropolitan area.  Another challenge is to identify Asian American non-
profits in the electronic archives.  In this study, these organizations
are identified by their names bearing such classification or sub-
groups as Asian, Cambodian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese,
Indian4, Filipino, and similar terms.
Asian American nonprofit organization data for this study is col-
lected from the website www.guidestar.org, because it also includes
location information of nonprofits that do not file Form 990, espe-
cially religious organizations.  This website also provides the key in-
formation of when a nonprofit organization is granted tax-exempt
status or when it was formed.   Even though the Asian American non-
profits included in this study are not exhaustive of all such organi-
zations — smaller ones are particularly excluded — the search on this
website provides the most comprehensive count of them from one
single source.  According to a local directory of human services for
Asian Americans (Asian American Federation of New York 2003),
there are 85 to 90 Asian American human service agencies in the New
York metropolitan area.  Almost the same number (83) of Asian Amer-
ican service organizations are identified in this study.  A comparison
of the Boston data with a local directory of Asian American organi-
zations in Massachusetts (Asian American Resource Workshop 2001)
shows that the local directory has 219 Asian American community
organizations whereas the www.guidestar.com archive search re-
sulted in 112 Asian American nonprofit organizations.  A breakdown
of the four functional types of organizations shows that the Boston
Asian American organizations in this study amount to 47 to 55 per-
cent of the same type of organizations in the local directory.  If local
directories are complete, this is an improvement over the general un-
dercount of small nonprofit organizations as reported in O’Neill
(2002).  As much as two-thirds of 501(c)3 nonprofits had annual rev-
enue less than $25,000 in 1997 (Arnsberger 2000) and thus were not in-
cluded in the IRS Form 990 database for that year.  Thus, the sample
in this study is a reasonable representation of medium to large Asian
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American nonprofit organizations in the respective metropolitan
areas. 
PROFILE OF ASIAN AMERICAN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
ASIAN AMERICAN POPULATION AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2 summarize the relevant U.S. census
data and findings from examining the data on Asian American non-
profit organizations available at the website www.guidestar.org.
They provide an overview of the ethnic and functional diversity of
Asian American nonprofit organizations in major U.S. metropolitan
areas.  This section begins with a general discussion of the distribu-
tion and history of these organizations in relation to the distribution
of the Asian American population.
The Asian American population grew rapidly in the 1990s.  Fig-
ure 1 shows the size of the Asian American population and the num-
ber of Asian American nonprofit organizations in the ten largest
metropolitan areas.  In 2000, Los Angeles (1.7 million), New York (1.4
million), and San Francisco (1.3 million) have the largest Asian Amer-
ican population, each accounting for 7 to 18 percent of the total pop-
ulation.  The other metropolitan areas are far behind with less than
400,000 Asian Americans, or 2 to 6 percent of the total population.  It
is not surprising that 70 percent of the Asian American nonprofits in
the sample are located in these three metropolitan areas.  Los Ange-
les has the most numerous Asian American nonprofits (about 820),
in comparison with New York (about 470), San Francisco (about 360),
and the other 7 metropolitan areas which has less than 100 to 200
each.   This concentration is even more pronounced for older Asian
American nonprofits.  Both Figure 1 and the high correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.93 strongly confirm the finding that metropolitan areas with
larger Asian American populations have more Asian American non-
profits.
The top full panel of data in Table 1 shows the youth of most of
the existing Asian American nonprofits.  In each of the ten metropol-
itan areas, between 45 to 60 percent of Asian American nonprofits
were formed in the 1990s.  Another 20 to 30 percent have their ori-
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gins in the 1980s, and 10 to 25 percent in the 1970s.  The average age
of Asian American nonprofits in this study is less than twenty years.
The median age is 12 years.  Some of the Asian American nonprofits
formed in the last fifty years may have ceased to exist, but this infor-
mation is not available in the data for this study.  
Asian American nonprofits amount to less than 1 percent of the
total number of nonprofits in 7 of the 10 largest metropolitan areas.
Even in the three largest Asian American communities, Asian Amer-
ican nonprofits are only 1 percent (New York), 2 percent (San Fran-
cisco), or 3 percent (Los Angeles) of the total number of nonprofits in
the respective area (Figure 1).  Although the proportion of nonprof-
its organized and run by Asian Americans is much lower than that of
the metropolitan population of Asian descent, there are proportion-
ally more Asian American nonprofits than Hispanic-Latino nonprof-
its in each of the same metropolitan areas (Hung 2007).  The
languages used among Asian Americans are more diverse than the
primarily Spanish and Portuguese commonly used among the His-
panic-Latino population.  Despite the stereotype of Asian American
being the model minority, many in the population need social serv-
ices as well (Cheng and Yang 2000).  The services also need to be pro-
vided in a culturally competent way (Zhan 2003).  These Asian
American organizations may be more prepared to deliver culturally
competent services.  The much larger Hispanic-Latino population
may also be served by mainstream nonprofits with bilingual staff, or
by Hispanic-Latino run nonprofits that are larger than the typical
Asian American organizations.  These differences partly explain the
more numerous Asian American nonprofits relative to Hispanic-
Latino organizations.  
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Figure 1. Asian American Population and Nonprofit Organizations in the Ten Largest
Metropolitan Areas 2000
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Table 1.  Distribution of Asian American Nonprofits by CMSA 
Top 10 CMSA 
L.A. N.Y. S.F. D.C. CHI. BOS. PHIL. HOU. DAL. DET. Total % Total N ( c )
Total 824 469 365 213 117 108 91 92 74 51 2404
% among the 10 CMSAs (a) 34.3 19.5 15.2 8.9 4.9 4.5 3.8 3.8 3.1 2.1 100.0
Historical period organization was 
formed
% formed within a CMSA in 1950 and 
before 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.7 0.0 1.1 2.2 0.0 0.0 1.3 30
% formed in a CMSA in 1951-1960 0.9 1.1 1.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.8 19
% formed in a CMSA in 1961-1970 6.5 3.4 7.7 6.6 4.3 2.8 3.3 4.4 1.4 5.9 5.5 130
% formed in a CMSA in 1971-1980 12.7 12.0 18.8 17.5 24.1 14.0 16.7 9.9 11.0 17.6 14.6 349
% formed in a CMSA in 1981-1990 26.3 20.6 24.3 21.8 20.7 22.4 26.7 24.2 31.5 19.6 24.0 572
% formed in a CMSA in 1991-2000 52.4 61.5 46.1 52.1 49.1 60.7 52.2 59.3 56.2 54.9 53.8 1283
Ethnicity (b) 
% Pan Asian American within CMSA  8.1 16.3 20.5 19.5 16.4 17.8 18.7 11.0 12.2 7.8 14.1 338
% Chinese within CMSA  20.3 28.9 35.5 30.7 25.9 45.8 22.0 38.5 27.0 39.2 28.0 673
% Japanese within CMSA  8.8 4.9 11.5 4.2 9.5 2.8 6.6 5.5 5.4 7.8 7.5 180
% Korean within CMSA  47.5 41.3 18.9 26.0 37.9 15.9 37.4 13.2 29.7 27.5 35.5 853
% South Asian within CMSA  2.3 2.8 3.3 9.3 4.3 0.9 3.3 12.1 6.8 9.8 3.9 94
% Southeast Asian within CMSA  13.0 5.8 10.4 10.2 6.0 16.8 12.1 19.8 18.9 7.8 11.1 266
Functional types (b)  
% Religious NPO within a CMSA  52.1 42.4 38.8 42.9 47.3 38.0 29.8 20.6 27.1 26.4 40.5 972
% Cultural NPO within a CMSA  16.1 24.2 20.7 20.9 27.0 26.0 20.5 27.6 33.6 25.3 21.4 515
% Service NPO within a CMSA  12.1 17.8 25.0 18.7 14.9 20.0 16.1 21.0 20.6 25.3 16.6 399
% Public Interest within a CMSA  19.7 15.6 15.5 17.6 10.8 16.0 33.6 30.8 18.7 23.1 21.5 516
(Chi-Square Tests: p < 0.01) 
(a) Chi-Square Tests: p < 0.05 
(b) Chi-Square Tests: p < 0.01 
(c) The total N for all historical periods is smaller than that for all ethnicity or all functional types because the year of formation for about 20 organizations cannot be 
determined 
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PAN-ASIAN AMERICAN AND ETHNIC NONPROFITS
If heterogeneity of community interests is the basis for organiz-
ing nonprofit organizations to substitute for government failure, the
extent of ethnic diversity among Asian American nonprofit organi-
zations would further highlight the significance of these agencies in
fulfilling unmet needs that escape government or mainstream non-
profit organizations’ attention.  The second full panel of data in Table
1 shows the distribution of different ethnic Asian American nonprof-
its in the ten largest metropolitan areas in 2000.  The top full panel of
data in Table 2 shows the period of formation for these ethnic Asian
American nonprofits.
Pan-Asian American nonprofit organizations are organized to
promote the interests of all Asian Americans, rather than focusing on
a specific ethnic group.  Pan-Asian American, Southeast Asian, and
South Asian nonprofits are the youngest among Asian American non-
profits; about 60 percent of them were organized in the 1990s.  Al-
most the same percentage of each of the three groups was formed in
the 1970s (9-12%) and 1980s (23-24%).  Southeast Asians and South
Asians are relatively new immigrant groups compared with the East
Asian groups of Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans.  The recent emer-
gence of pan-Asian American organizations can be attributed to the
time it takes for the rise of the U.S.-born and English-speaking gen-
eration of Asian Americans, who are likely to be the most active or-
ganizers of pan-Asian American nonprofits.  While most ethnic
nonprofits focus on the needs of the first generation immigrants and
their families, some second generation middle-class Asian Americans
see the merits in joining ethnic organizations as well.   To offset the
perception or stereotype of being “foreign” in a primarily white en-
vironment in Dallas, second generation Korean Americans and In-
dian Americans separately organized their own ethnic associations
to preserve a balance between their heritage and economic class.
They celebrate both ethnic and American holidays, and conduct serv-
ice projects with first generation ethnic associations as well as with
mainstream community organizations (Dhingra 2003).
Researchers continue to debate whether pan-Asian American ac-
tivism is an outgrowth of the civil rights movement in the 1960s or in-
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fluenced by the more radical approach of the contemporary black lib-
eration movement (Omatsu 1994). In any case, establishing nonprofit
agencies was an important institutionalization process at the begin-
ning stage of the pan-Asian American movement (Geron 2003).  Most
of the pan-Asian American nonprofits played primarily advocacy
roles from addressing anti-Asian American sentiments to promoting
Asian American political representation at multiple levels of govern-
ment (Lien 2001).
In each of the ten metropolitan areas, pan-Asian American non-
profits constitute about 8 to 20 percent of existing Asian American or-
ganizations.  That is, on average, 8 to 9 out of every 10 Asian
American nonprofits are organized to promote the spiritual, cultural,
economic, and political interests of specific ethnic Asian groups rather
than to further pan-Asian American interests.  There are actually
fewer truly pan-Asian American nonprofits than the number reported
here, since the Asian American identification in some of the non-
profits’ names might be used to reflect the intentionally inclusive na-
ture of the organizations, while the actual clientele is still primarily
one ethnic group.  The pan-Asian American movement may actually
benefit from the diversity of Asian ethnic community activism, espe-
cially in the form of nonprofit organizations, by bringing them into an
alliance with a unifying goal.  It may be more difficult for pan-Asian
American activists to directly engage the diverse ethnic Asian com-
munities because of language and cultural differences.  The seem-
ingly few pan-Asian American nonprofits may not signal inadequate
pan-Asian American activism if significant numbers of individual
ethnically based organizations are affiliated with pan-Asian Ameri-
can nonprofits.  The effectiveness of pan-Asian American movements
at the organizational level or the extent of such inter-organizational
linkages needs further research.   However, there is some evidence
that partnerships with pan-Asian American organizations may not
always be on an equal footing, and ethnic organizations may find it
necessary to form additional coalitions based on other kinds of shared
identity like gender or class (Advani 1997).
Among the current ethnic Asian American nonprofits, propor-
tionally more Japanese American nonprofits were among the oldest
organizations in the largest metropolitan areas.  The distribution of
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their origin over the three decades since 1970 has been steady, at
about 20 to 25 percent.  But they are not as numerous as the other eth-
nic groups, primarily because of the absence of substantial Japanese
immigration in recent years.   Only 27 percent of Japanese American
nonprofits were organized in the 1990s, compared with 50 to 60 per-
cent for all the other ethnic Asian nonprofits.  The Japanese American
nonprofits nevertheless continued to advocate for the community.
For instance, the Japanese American Citizens League, beginning in
the 1970s, played an active role in seeking redress for the internment
of Japanese Americans during World War II (Kitano and Maki 2003).
Some of its leaders were also instrumental in founding other Asian
American professional organizations like the Asian Pacific American
Librarians Association (Yamashita 2000).
Southeast Asian nonprofits outnumbered Japanese American
nonprofits in most of the top ten metropolitan areas. Because of the
turmoil in their homelands and the circumstances of refugee reset-
tlement, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian immigrants face par-
ticular socioeconomic and psychological challenges in adapting to
life in the U.S. (Rumbaut 2000).  Southeast Asian nonprofits played es-
pecially important roles in this lifelong process of adjustment (Pho,
Gerson, and Cowan 2007).  Because of the historical colonial rela-
tionship between the U.S. and the Philippines, Filipino organizations
have a longer history than other Southeast Asian nonprofits.  How-
ever, because of differences in economic class and homeland regions,
Filipino organizations in the U.S. are far from being homogeneous
(Espiritu 1996).  
A surprising pattern is that Korean American nonprofits out-
numbered their Chinese American counterparts in the ten metropol-
itan areas as a whole (35.5 % vs. 28%) as well as in half of them,
including New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Dal-
las.  This is due to the large number of Korean churches set up in the
1990s in these metropolitan areas.   In contrast, there are proportion-
ally more Chinese American than Korean American nonprofits in DC-
Baltimore, San Francisco, Boston, Detroit, and Houston, the same
metropolitan areas where religious organizations do not dominate
numerically.   The rapid growth of Korean churches, mostly Protes-
tant, was a transnational phenomenon beginning with the similar
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growth in South Korea in the last few decades.  In a study of Korean
churches in New York City, Min (2000) argued that the large number
of small to medium sized Korean ethnic churches were also conven-
ient places where Korean immigrants maintained their cultural tra-
ditions, sought services through the pastoral ministry, and acquired
social status for the selected few church leaders.  These utilitarian
functions are likely to prevail in other ethnic religious organizations
as well, as in the case of some Hindu organizations that are part of the
transnational development of Hindu nationalism in reproducing
Hindu culture in the U.S. (Rajagopal 2000; Mathew and Prashad
2000). 
South Asian nonprofits lag behind other Asian ethnic groups in
their distribution across the metropolitan areas.  According to Khan-
delwal (2002), South Asian organizations in New York City were
mostly fragmented along a home country’s regional, religious, or cast
boundaries.  Early Indian American nonprofits in the 1960s and 1970s
were formed by middle class professionals or well-off businessmen,
in order to solidify social connections and to hold cultural events.  Be-
ginning only in the late 1980s and 1990s were there pan-South Asian
organizations to address the advocacy and social services needs of
the more diverse immigrants — especially women and youth.
Among Indian American nonprofit organizations, significant diver-
sity or even rivalry may exist.  In the Los Angeles area, a Hindu In-
dian and a Muslim Indian organization were separately engaged in
influencing homeland politics and defining Asian Indian identity in
southern California (Kurien 2001).  Likewise, Chinese American or-
ganizations in Chinatowns may also be caught in the middle of the
political maneuvering between China and Taiwan, after the U.S. gov-
ernment established diplomatic relationship with the People’s Re-
public of China in 1973.
The fact that Asian American nonprofits can be classified based
on ethnic identity reflects the heterogeneity of interests among Asian
Americans.  Using an ethnic group’s identity or country of origin in
the title of the organization further shows that preserving ethnic and
cultural uniqueness may be intentional among some of the ethnic
Asian American groups.  Yet, pan-Asian American organizations pro-
vide a channel for these diverse ethnic nonprofits to strive for a united
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front in matters of common concern.     This balance between hetero-
geneous group identities and unified community interests may also
be illustrated in the distribution of the four functional types of Asian
American organizations.
FOUR FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF ASIAN AMERICAN NONPROFITS
Asian American ethnic community organizations existed prior
to the 1950s.   Various ethnic organizations were instrumental in rep-
resenting immigrants’ social, economic, and political interests in the
earlier political climate of exclusion and discrimination of ethnic mi-
norities (Yu 1992; Lien 2001).   In the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury these organizations were probably one-stop places for immigrant
activities — from finding a job, dealing with mainstream institutions
outside the ethnic community, settling disputes, to seeking social and
cultural enrichment.  The growth of the federal and state govern-
ments in social services and the increasingly inclusive political cli-
mate in the second half of the twentieth century might have broken
the monopoly of these few traditional ethnic organizations in com-
munity affairs.  At the same time, the economy from division of labor
might have encouraged the rise of different types of Asian American
community organizations, with each type focusing primarily on one
area of specialization.   The development of nonprofit organizations
in New York’s Chinatown is an example of such changes inside and
outside of an ethnic community (Kuo 1977).  In addition, the differ-
Table 2. Distribution of Asian American Nonprofits by Historical Period of Formation 
Percent of Organizations Formed in: 
Ethnicity (a)  1950 or before  1951-1960  1961-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-2000 
All
periods Column % 
Pan Asian American  0.0 1.2 1.2 12.2 23.0 62.4 100.0 14.1
Chinese 2.2 1.0 4.3 17.1 23.5 51.7 100.0 28.0
Japanese 2.2 2.2 29.8 18.5 20.2 27.0 100.0 7.5
Korean 0.7 0.2 3.9 14.3 25.7 55.1 100.0 35.5
South Asian 0.0 2.2 2.2 8.7 23.9 63.0 100.0 3.9
Southeast Asian 1.9 0.0 3.4 12.1 23.5 59.1 100.0 11.1
Functional Types (a) 
Religious NPO 2.0 0.9 6.2 17.0 25.6 48.3 100.0 40.6
Cultural NPO 0.4 0.6 3.3 31.6 24.9 56.8 100.0 21.5
Service NPO 0.5 0.3 1.5 15.0 24.6 58.1 100.0 16.5
Public interest NPO 1.4 1.2 9.2 10.6 19.8 57.8 100.0 21.4
Percentage of Existing 
Organizations Formed in this 
Period 1.3 0.8 5.5 14.6 24.0 53.8 100.0 100.0
Actual Number of Existing 
Organizations Formed in this 
Period 30 19 130 349 572 1283 2383 2383
(a) Chi-Square tests, p < 0.01 
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ential impact of the modern welfare state on ethnic organizations is
confirmed by a national study of Indochinese refugee associations
(Hein 1997).  Direct public assistance to individual refugees tends to
reduce the role of ethnic organizations.  Privatization of public assis-
tance, however, uses ethnic organizations as the middleman to de-
liver services to these refugees and thus enhances the prominence of
these organizations.  
By examining the type of programs outlined in the completed
Form 990, we can determine the functional category to which an
Asian American nonprofit organization belongs.   However, because
not all nonprofits report detailed program information, we can also
examine the agency’s name and its mission statement to ascertain the
agency’s functional category.  The data for this study shows that, in
general, existing Asian American religious organizations have a
longer history than the other three types of Asian American non-
profits in these metropolitan areas.  Twenty--eight (58 %) of the 48
Asian American nonprofits formed prior to 1960 are religious organ-
izations.  More than 55 percent of the cultural, service, or public in-
terest nonprofits were formed in the 1990s, whereas 48 percent of the
religious organizations were formed in the same period.  Likewise, 74
percent of the religious organizations were formed in the last two
decades, whereas close to 80 percent or more of the cultural, service,
or public interest nonprofits were formed in the same period (Table
2).  For each of the four functional types of Asian American nonprofit
organizations, successively more of them were formed over the last
four decades.  However, the proportion of these organizations formed
for religious purposes has declined steadily from more than 60 per-
cent to less than 40 percent during the last few decades, as more and
more non-religious Asian American organizations are organized.
This order of development may be attributed to the differences in the
costs to organize and maintain different types of nonprofits.  These
costs may include not only the higher material and financial resources
required to organize service agencies but also the increasingly so-
phisticated political skills necessary, especially in relation to the ex-
ternal community, to run effective public interest organizations.  
The bottom panel in Table 1 shows the distribution of the four
functional types of Asian American nonprofits in the 10 metropoli-
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tan areas in 2000.  In six of them — New York, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Philadelphia, Detroit, and Dallas, the distribution of nonprofits
among the four functional categories are very similar.  Religious non-
profits constitute the single largest group (38 to 52%). Asian Ameri-
can nonprofits that promote culturally and ethnically distinctive
identities are the second largest group (16 to 27%), followed by serv-
ice-oriented nonprofits (12 to 25%) and public interest organizations
(11 to 20%).  The implication for participation in the political arena is
significant for the Asian American communities in these six metro-
politan areas.  Sirola, Ong, and Fu (1998) argued that Asian American
community-based organizations can play significant roles, although
are not always able to do so, in lobbying for favorable local economic
development policies — especially when the relative size and the eco-
nomic hardship facing the Asian American population do not imme-
diately catch the attention of policy makers.  If advocacy groups,
professional organizations, civic organizations, and private founda-
tions, all part of public interest Asian American nonprofits, are the
most prepared to mobilize the respective ethnic community, are there
enough of them to effectively represent the voice of Asian American
communities?  These public interest organizations, or Asians Ameri-
cans who are part of these organizations, may need to join forces with
other Asian American nonprofits, especially service agencies, in order
to make their voices heard.  The numerous Asian American religious
organizations, different from their African American counterparts,
are unlikely to be very vocal and active in the political arena.  Talk-
ing politics at the Sunday pulpit is a rarity in Asian American
churches, even though some claim that Hindu organizations may
mingle their religious and cultural focus with Hindu nationalism
(Mathew and Prashad 2000).
For the remaining four metropolitan areas — DC-Baltimore, San
Francisco, Boston, and Houston — the distribution of Asian Ameri-
can nonprofits among the four functional categories is more even.
While religious organizations constitute close to or more than 40 per-
cent of all Asian American nonprofits in the other six metropolitan
areas, none of the functional types exceed 35 percent in this second
group of metropolitan areas.  Religious organizations still constitute
a significant portion (20 to 30%) of all Asian American nonprofits, al-
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though they are not as overwhelming as in the other seven metro-
politan areas.  There are relatively more cultural organizations
(33.6%) than any other type of Asian American nonprofits in the
Boston area.  In the Houston area, there are roughly the same num-
ber of religious, cultural, service, and public interest organizations.
Asian American public interest organizations are proportionally more
numerous in San Francisco (33.6%) and DC-Baltimore (30.8%) than
in the other top ten metropolitan areas.   This last observation may be
attributed to the influence of the general progressive atmosphere in
San Francisco (Deleon 1992) and the agglomeration effect of the con-
centration of federal government agencies and other public and non-
profit headquarters in the DC area.
FACTORS FOR THE PATTERN OF FUNCTIONAL TYPES 
AND THE FINANCES OF ASIAN AMERICAN 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
The remaining sections of this chapter report the results of fur-
ther statistical analysis,5 beginning with factors differentiating Asian
American nonprofit organizations by functional type (religious, cul-
tural, service and public-interest), and then factors associated with
the finances of these organizations.  Factors for the functional type of
an Asian American nonprofit organization include location in larger
or smaller metropolitan areas, suburban or central city location, the
extent of community organizing at the metropolitan area level, Asian
American ethnic diversity in a metropolitan area, social economic
characteristics of Asian Americans at the 3-digit zip code level, and an
organization’s attributes including its ethnic identity and history. 
Although 70 percent of Asian American nonprofits are located in
Los Angeles, New York, or San Francisco metropolitan areas, differ-
ent functional types are not equally likely to locate in these top three
areas.   Religious organizations are so numerous everywhere that the
pattern of their distribution between the above three metropolises
and the other seven metropolitan areas remains uncertain.  Cultural
or service organizations are less likely to locate in the top three areas,
whereas public interest organizations are just the opposite.  One ex-
planation is that both cultural and service organizations serve a local
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Asian American community, but a lot of the public interest organiza-
tions, such as foundations or professional associations, may serve a
wider regional or national clientele.  Thus, these public interest or-
ganizations are more likely than cultural or service agencies to locate
in the three largest metropolitan areas.  Religious organizations are
more likely to be found in the suburban areas, where land may be
more abundant for a congregation of a large number of worshippers.
Service or public interest organizations as a group or separately are
more likely to locate in city centers, where the majority of their target
clientele may reside.  Asian American public interest organizations
are also more likely to locate in metropolitan areas where community
organizing in the general population is more active, as measured by
the larger number of nonprofit organizations per 1,000 residents.  This
same pattern also holds for Asian American cultural organizations,
but not necessarily for service organizations.  On the other hand, re-
ligious organizations tend to stay away from metropolitan areas with
active community organizing, and concentrate instead in areas with
more diverse Asian American ethnic populations.  Secular Asian
American nonprofits as a group serve a more homogeneous popula-
tion than the religious organizations do.  But it is unclear whether the
extent of ethnic homogeneity of the clientele among Asian American
cultural, service, and public interest organizations is the same or not. 
Religious organizations also tend to locate in middle class com-
munities.  They are less likely than the secular Asian American non-
profits to locate in more well-off areas characterized by Asian
American households with higher levels of both education and home
ownership.  Asian American churches or temples are also less likely
to be found in very poor neighborhoods characterized by higher per-
centages of Asian Americans below the poverty line and unem-
ployed.  The socioeconomic context of the local Asian American
community does not seem to have any observable relationship with
the presence of cultural organizations, but it has mixed effects on
service and public interest organizations.   As a group, Asian Ameri-
can service or public interest organizations are more likely to locate
in poorer Asian American communities with high poverty and high
unemployment rates.  Moreover, Asian American service organiza-
tions are more likely to locate in communities with higher concen-
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trations of foreign-born Asian Americans and those who do not speak
English well.  But public interest organizations are less likely to locate
in these areas.  This may indicate that most of these service organi-
zations are there to assist Asian American immigrants to integrate
economically to the larger community by providing English classes,
job training, and similar services in the same community clients re-
side.  But a sufficiently large number of the public interest organiza-
tions may be situated in communities where their leaders reside,
many of whom may be second generation Asian Americans and flu-
ent in English.  
In terms of organizational attributes, Asian American service
and public interest organizations as a group or separately are more
likely to have a pan-Asian American focus.  Asian American religious
organizations are distinctively organized along the lines of ethnic
identities.  This is consistent with the earlier observation that Asian
American churches and temples are located in more ethnically het-
erogeneous communities.  Pan-Asian American religious organiza-
tions hardly exist, primarily because religious activities are conducted
in each ethnic group’s native language or dialect.  The data is not con-
clusive regarding whether the cultural organizations in this study are
more pan-Asian American than ethnic-based, or vice versa.   Asian
American religious organizations are more likely than their secular
counterparts to be formed in earlier rather than later decades of the
twentieth century.  Both cultural and service organizations are more
likely to be formed in recent decades.  The ambiguity of the histori-
cal pattern of public interest organizations can be attributed to the
large number of civic organizations formed in the 1960s, such as the
local offices of the Japanese American Citizens Leagues and the Chi-
nese American Citizens Alliance, as well as the rise of more contem-
porary advocacy and professional organizations in recent decades.  
In contrast to Asian American religious organizations, Asian
American secular nonprofits tend to be younger, more pan-Asian
American in focus, and are more likely to be found in central city
well-off central cities or low-income communities within metropoli-
tan areas with a more homogeneous ethnic population and a rela-
tively more active general population in community organizing.  The
seemingly contradictory location pattern of secular Asian American
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nonprofits in both wealthy and poor communities is actually consis-
tent with not only the different operational modes of different types
of nonprofits, but also the well-established bimodal distribution of
Asian Americans of diverse socioeconomic background.   A signifi-
cant segment of Asian Americans is highly educated and wealthy,
who are more likely to be the leaders of public interest organizations.
Some other significant segments of the Asian American population
are relatively less educated and poorer, and are more likely to be the
clients of service organizations.
The location pattern of secular Asian American nonprofits gen-
erally applies to Asian American service and public interest organi-
zations as a group, except for the ethnic homogeneity context and the
wealth variable.  At the level of individual functional types, the loca-
tion pattern of cultural, service, and public interest organizations is
less consistent.  However, metropolitan location, the general popula-
tion’s community activism, socioeconomic context, pan-Asian Amer-
ican identity, and a nonprofit’s history still account for some of the
differences among these three types of Asian American nonprofits.
The homogeneity of community interest is the only non-factor.
FINANCES OF ASIAN AMERICAN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
The descriptive results in earlier sections are based on the num-
ber of organizations, which is one measure of the size and diversity
of Asian American nonprofit organizations.  The finances of these or-
ganizations may also provide some measure of their scale of opera-
tion.  Although the information in the completed Form 990 is not
audited by the Internal Revenue Service, studies cited earlier show
that the financial information is generally reliable — especially at the
aggregate level.  Out of the approximately 2,400 Asian American non-
profits included in this study, less than 750 of them have filed Form
990 or Form 990 EZ.   Much fewer of them has sufficient financial data
for statistical analysis.  The data indicate that, excluding religious or-
ganizations, less than half of the Asian American nonprofits in the
study have annual revenue in excess of $25,000.  The percent with fi-
nancial data varies with functional type: 49 percent for cultural or-
ganizations, 56 percent for service organizations, and 45 percent for
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public-interest organizations.  Although religious organizations are
not required to file Form 990 or 990EZ, sixty-seven of them have done
so anyway.  Some of them are para-church organizations or have sig-
nificant service components.  Taking into consideration organizations
not included in this study, it is likely that smaller organizations con-
stitute the majority of Asian American nonprofits in these metropol-
itan areas.  Whether smaller organizations together have greater
impact than their larger counterparts on the Asian American com-
munity requires further research.  
The key financial measures reported here include average total
asset, average total revenue, average government support, and aver-
age net income.  Net income is the difference between total revenue
and total expense.  These financial measures are five-year averages
from 1998 to 2002 for each Asian American nonprofit organization
with the available data.  A very small number of them also include
2003 data.  Form 990, but not Form 990EZ, reports broad categories of
funding sources, including the amount of government support.  Table
3 presents a comparison of the means of these financial variables
among different categories of Asian American nonprofits.  Not all the
results are statistically significant.  While the average total asset of
the 714 Asian American nonprofits just exceeds $1 million, half of
them have less than $86,000 in total asset. Similarly, while their aver-
age annual revenue is about $800,000 — half of which comes from
government sources — half of these Asian American nonprofits have
less than $90,000 in annual total revenue.  Since this study includes
only medium and large nonprofits, the average and median financial
measures of the size of all Asian American nonprofits are likely to be
significantly lower.   
For the more than 700 larger Asian American nonprofits with fi-
nancial data in the sample, there are statistically significant financial
differences between two broad functional types, between metropoli-
tan locations, and between pan-Asian American and ethnic organi-
zations.  Financially, Asian American service and public interest
organizations as a group are larger than their religious and cultural
counterparts.  This observation is supported by both means compar-
ison and regression analysis that isolate the impact of different fac-
tors. These service and public interest organizations’ average
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revenue, average net income, and average government support are
each three to six times that of the religious and cultural organizations
as a group.   This is consistent with earlier suggestions that it takes
more resources to provide services through service agencies or to act
as an effective voice through public interest organizations than to pro-
mote spiritual enrichment or cultural preservation.  In fact, govern-
ment funding plays a significant role in this development as it
contributes 60 percent of the average total revenue of these service
and public interest organizations but only 20 percent of the same for
cultural and religious organizations.  However, the differences in av-
erage total asset are not statistically significant, nor are the differences
of all financial measures among the four individual functional types
of Asian American nonprofits.  Although all the financial measures of
Asian American nonprofits in the top five metropolitan areas are
larger than those in the second-tier of the top 10 metropolitan areas,
only the difference in average total revenue is statistically significant.
Asian American nonprofits in the Los Angeles, New York, San Fran-
cisco, DC, or Chicago metropolitan areas receive, on average, three
times the revenue of their counterparts in Philadelphia, Boston, De-
troit, Dallas, or Houston.  Pan-Asian American nonprofits, although
they are fewer in number, are three to five times larger than the eth-
nic organizations in terms of the average total asset, average total rev-
enue, and average government support.  Regression analysis
confirms this larger scale of operation on the part of Pan-Asian Amer-
ican nonprofit organizations.  This pattern is similar to the compari-
son between the fewer but larger Hispanic American organizations
and their more numerous but generally smaller Asian American
counterparts (Hung 2007).  
There are other possible factors for the variations in the financial
size, as measured by total asset or annual revenue, of Asian American
nonprofit organizations in the top 10 metropolitan areas.  These fac-
tors may include organizational attributes, management capability,
and community context.  Organizational attributes are clearly the
most dominant factors for the differences in Asian American non-
profit finances.  In addition to functional type and ethnic identity dis-
cussed above, more established organizations uniformly have more
total assets as well as higher annual revenue, which attest to the sus-
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tainability and effectiveness of these nonprofits.   The ability to so-
licit government financial support, to generate a surplus in the form
of net income, and the expense on fundraising activities can be used
as measures of a nonprofit’s management capacity to run a success-
ful operation.   While larger Asian American nonprofit organizations
may get more government support, run larger surpluses, and spend
more on fundraising, their management capacity is not necessarily
superior to smaller organizations in enhancing Asian American non-
profit organizations’ financial position in terms of total asset or total
revenue.  
The only relevant contextual factor is the size of the Asian Amer-
ican population in a 3-digit zip code area where the Asian American
nonprofits are located.  Both the average total asset and total revenue
of these organizations are larger in communities with more Asian
Americans.  This may be a demand factor since more resources are
needed to serve a larger clientele.  Or, it could be a supply factor.  In
areas with more Asian Americans, Asian American nonprofits may
receive more financial support from them.  Both the supply and de-
mand factors may exist simultaneously, although testing the relative
effect of the two factors is beyond the scope of this chapter.  No other
contextual factor is relevant.  In particular, wealthier Asian American
communities do not necessarily contribute more money to their local
Asian American organizations.  This is a fundraising challenge for
these nonprofits.  
These results reinforce the importance of pan-Asian American
organizations and more established Asian American nonprofits.
They are the most robust factors in understanding the nature of dif-
ferent functional types of Asian American organizations as well as
their financial positions.  Asian American service and public interest
nonprofits as a whole are more likely to be younger and have a pan-
Asian American focus.  Older organizations and pan-Asian Ameri-
can nonprofits, on average, tend to have larger annual revenue and
total assets.  More established pan-Asian American service organiza-
tions have the largest annual revenue among Asian American non-
profits.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This chapter presents a general profile of Asian American non-
profit organizations in the 10 largest U.S. metropolitan areas.   The
heterogeneous collective interests that give rise to nonprofit organi-
zations in general apply equally well to account for the presence of
Asian American nonprofits in this chapter.  Asian American non-
profits in the ten largest U.S. metropolitan areas were primarily
formed in the last few decades of the twentieth century — largely in
response to the diverse needs of the rapidly growing Asian American
population.  Significant ethnic and functional diversity exist among
Asian American nonprofit organizations.  As a group, they remain a
numerically insignificant part of the nonprofit sector.  
Nevertheless, the functional types reflect the heterogeneity of
needs — from spiritual enrichment and cultural preservation within
Asian American communities, to fostering economic assimilation and
cultivating Asian American voices in relation to the larger society.
These nonprofits together play a balancing act between facilitating
political and economic integration while maintaining separate Asian
American identities.  Asian American religious organizations are
clearly different from their secular counterparts in terms of their eth-
nic identities, the ethnic heterogeneity and socioeconomic context of
Table 3.  Comparison of Means Among Different Cateories of Asian American Nonprofit Organizations (*** p < 0.01) 
N
Average
Age of 
NPOs
N AverageTotal Asset N
Average
Total
Revenue
N
Average
Total
Government 
Support 
N Average NetIncome
Religious NPOs 966 17.8*** 66 $473,377 67 $427,519 50 $88,671 67 $43,929
Cultural NPOs 511 14.9*** 246 $829,391 251 $693,694 175 $506,600 251 $60,579
Service NPOs 394 14.7*** 221 $1,401,463 222 $839,869 181 $353,108 222 $81,081
Public Interest NPOs 510 16.4*** 179 $1,626,939 180 $1,022,805 143 $478,610 180 $32,025
Religious or Cultural NPOs 1479 16.8** 338 $957,669 341 414970*** 250 90949*** 341 27551***
Service or Public Interest 
NPOs 904 15.7** 376 $1,363,415 381 1134416*** 300 675683*** 381 85348***
NPOs in LA, NY, SF, DC, or 
Chicago
1971 16.7*** 595 $1,312,390 602 894521*** 459 $471,159 602 $60,309
NPOs in the other top 10 
CMSAs
412 15.0*** 119 $466,083 120 293466*** 91 $100,881 120 $46,721
Asian Ethnic Subgroup NPOs 2048 16.8*** 559 776094*** 564 538654*** 423 212411*** 563 $53,947
Pan Asian American NPOs 335 13.6*** 155 2596771*** 158 1708334*** 127 1067659*** 159 $72,580
All Asian American NPOs 2383 16.3 714 $1,171,339 722 $794,622 550 $409,895 722 $58,051
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the client base, the activism of the larger community, as well as geo-
graphic location.  Although pan-Asian American organizations are
few in numbers, their scale of operation is actually larger, at least in
financial terms, than the other Asian American ethnic nonprofits.  It
is not a coincidence that Asian American service or public interest or-
ganizations tend to have a pan-Asian American focus.  
With continued growth of the Asian American population in the
foreseeable future, Asian American nonprofits will likely increase in
both number and organization size.  Some projections of the growth
of foreign-born Asian Americans suggest that adult immigrants will
continue to constitute a significant proportion of the Asian American
population.  The Asian American population, unlike their Hispanic-
Latino American counterpart, will not grow to the point of becoming
a significant clientele of mainstream organizations, except for com-
munities where Asian Americans are the largest minority group. To
the extent that the religious, cultural, service, or public interest needs
of foreign-born Asian Americans are not met by existing mainstream
organizations (public, private, or nonprofit), the demand for ethnic
based organizations will persist.  The result may be either the expan-
sion of existing ethnic-based Asian American nonprofit organizations
or the creation of new organizations — especially in new settlement
areas outside of traditional central city enclaves. As Asian American
organizations expand into communities with Asian American popu-
lations that are less concentrated than their counterparts in traditional
central city enclaves, there are both opportunities and challenges.
The physical boundaries of an ethnic enclave are no longer there.  Ex-
isting mainstream organizations in these communities can be both
collaborators and competitors in meeting various needs of the local
Asian American population.  Race relations in a more mixed com-
munity is inevitably a potential issue.   
Pan-Asian American nonprofit organizations are, by far, few and
new.  The maturing of the Asian American population with the grow-
ing U.S. born generation will provide an expanding pool of human
and financial resources for the development of pan-Asian American
organizations.   Therefore, pan-Asian American and ethnic-based or-
ganizations are both likely to grow.   The challenge is whether they
will grow separately and independently, or in some coordination
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with each other — making use of the strengths of both types of Asian
American nonprofit organizations to advance the Asian American
community.  One determinant for the pattern of growth can be the
extent of shared common interests relative to the differences among
the ethnic communities they serve.   A related factor is the develop-
ment of ethnic and pan-Asian identities in the Asian American pop-
ulation.  Given the continued importance of Asian American
nonprofit organizations, more research is necessary to understand
how these nonprofits function and impact inside and outside Asian
American communities.  
Notes
i These websites have begun to charge data access fees for funded research.
Free access to data for unfunded research is subject to website approval. 
ii The Census Bureau definition of these CMSAs is:
New York—Northern New Jersey—Long Island, NY—NJ—CT—PA CMSA
Los Angeles—Riverside—Orange County, CA CMSA
Chicago—Gary—Kenosha, IL—IN—WI CMSA
Washington—Baltimore, DC—MD—VA—WV CMSA
San Francisco—Oakland—San Jose, CA CMSA
Philadelphia—Wilmington—Atlantic City, PA—NJ—DE—MD CMSA
Boston—Worcester—Lawrence, MA—NH—ME—CT CMSA
Detroit—Ann Arbor—Flint, MI CMSA
Dallas—Fort Worth, TX CMSA
Houston—Galveston—Brazoria, TX CMSA
iii Both the NCCS and guidestar.org websites allow interactive search up to 50
miles of a zip code.
iv Searching for Indian nonprofits requires distinguishing between American
Indian and Asian Indian organizations, only the latter is included in the re-
sults.
v Please see Hung (2005) for a full discussion of the regression models and
detailed analysis.  
vi Based on personal communication with Professor Paul Ong, who has cal-
culated some projections of the Asian American population based on U.S.
Census data.
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Partisanship Acquisition 
for Asian Americans  
Taeku Lee
University of California, Berkeley
It is the best of times and the worst of times for Asian Ameri-
cans in electoral politics in the United States today.  Two vignettes il-
lustrate this tale.  The first is the story of Harvinder Anand, a
businessman who runs a chemical manufacturing company that op-
erates in the United States, India, China, and Thailand.  Anand lives
in the tony Long Island exurb of Laurel Hollow, New York, where he
was elected mayor in 2007.  Anand, who with a Sikh turban and beard
in a 95 percent white upper crust community, represents what the
New York Times reports as a new political phenomenon (Vitello 2007,
B1).  He is an Indian-American who – like Louisiana State Governor
Bobby Jindal, New Jersey Assemblyman Upendra Chivukula, Ohio
State Representative Jay Goyal, and Maryland State Delegate and Ma-
jority Leader Kumar Barve – find political success among electorates
in which they are “the tiniest of minorities.”  
Anand’s initiation into politics in the United States, notably,
came through civic engagement.  Upon moving to a gated commu-
nity in Laurel Hollow, Anand organized his neighbors to form a heat-
ing oil buyers’ co-op and coordinate demands for a more unified
garbage collection system. Perhaps as a consequence, Anand’s neigh-
bors in Laurel Hollow neither saw him as a partisan, polarizing fig-
ure nor marked him racially or as an immigrant. Here the New York
Times article quotes John Fitteron, a village trustee: “‘Harry is just a
highly capable individual who, like all of us, wants to give something
back to the community” (Vitello 2007, B1).  Thus while Anand de-
scribes himself as a Reagan Republican, he ran unopposed and re-
marked, “At the end of the day, I am a businessman.  I believe in
efficiency and cost-effectiveness” (Vitello 2007, B1). 
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Further westward along the Jericho Turnpike in multiethnic
Queens, we find Morshed Alam.  Like Anand, Alam is an immigrant
and a chemist by trade.  Unlike Anand, Alam is also a laundromat
owner, a one-time student leader in Bangladesh’s struggle for inde-
pendence, and a hardened veteran of politics.  Alam’s rocky inaugu-
ration into party politics, American-style, came in 1996 when he
decided to challenge Republican State Senator Frank Padavan, a 13-
term incumbent who was quite public and vocal about his nativist
views on immigration and demographic change in Queens. The
Queens County Democratic Party, however, did not greet Alam’s po-
litical ambition with open arms, or even begrudging recognition.
Rather, Alam faced a relentless onslaught of pressure to quit the race.
The pressure ranged from a legal challenge to the Board of Elections
to physical threat and bodily harm.  As Alam puts it, “even when I
won the Democratic primary … I went through every kind of hell in
that race ... I was sent to the hospital with two broken bones around
my eyes (Lehrer and Sloan 2003, 373-374).”  
Alam survived the physical attacks, but was outspent by the Re-
publican incumbent $500,000 to $25,000, never received the backing
of the county party organization, and ultimately failed to prevail elec-
torally.  Nonetheless, he won 42 percent of the vote in the general
election, recruited a multi-ethnic rainbow of immigrants into his own
organization, the New American Democratic Club, and, ultimately,
put the predominantly white Democratic establishment in Queens
County on notice that naturalized immigrants like himself could no
longer be ignored. Of note, Alam’s campaign was expressly partisan
and polarizing and his strategy in the face of the Queens County
Democratic Party’s opposition to his candidacy was to work in
earnest to build a successful multi-racial, multi-ethnic coalition. Alam
proudly remarks, “[m]y campaign committee was made up of a
Colombian-American, a Jewish-American, a Black-American, a union
worker, and a conservative Republican.  It’s not like years ago when
you were Irish in an Irish neighborhood, or Italian in an Italian neigh-
borhood (Lehrer and Sloan 2003, 373-374).”
Alam’s political fortunes present a bold relief to Anand’s.  Yet
there is also common bedrock to both stories.  Namely, Alam shares
with Anand a common point of departure through his civic engage-
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ment.  Prior to his bid for elected office, Alam was active as a former
local AFL-CIO chapter president, a leader in the New York-based
American Bangladesh Friendship Association, an organizer of neigh-
borhood community groups to combat hate crimes, and a member of
the Queens community school board.  Moreover, in both cases, the
role of political parties in seeking out and shepherding new immi-
grants into the main-line of American politics ranges from invisible to
outright hostile. Neither Anand nor Alam entered into politics as a
result of being recruited into party activism or groomed for elected of-
fice by the Democratic or Republican parties.  
The role of political parties in particular differs starkly from our
ballyhooed remembrances of the central role played by parties in in-
corporating previous waves of immigrants from the late 19th and
early 20th centuries.  As many accounts have it, the late 19th century
and early 20th century in America represented a golden age of im-
migration.  These immigrants came from distant lands (predomi-
nantly European) and were absorbed into America’s economic
markets, assimilated into its social customs, and incorporated by its
political institutions.  This period is, at least in our collective memory,
one that represents a model for the inclusion of newcomers into a plu-
ralist political system, with local political parties playing the critical
intermediary role in this process of incorporation.  As one scholar of
immigration describes it,
On a typical day in the 1890s, thousands of immigrants
arrived at Ellis Island in New York. For many, learning
English and acculturating to America would be the
work of years, even decades. But often it would be a
matter of only a few weeks or even days before they re-
ceived a visit from a Tammany Hall ward heeler or be-
fore friends or family brought them along to some
event at the local precinct hall. Long before many of
those newcomers fully understood what it was to be
American, they knew quite well what it meant to be a
Democrat or a Republican (Schier 2002, 16).
To be sure, scholars who have taken a less nostalgic look at white
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immigrant incorporation at the turn of the last century conclude that
the willingness of parties to incorporate new citizens was not equal
across all immigrant groups (Ignatiev 1995; Jacobson 1998), or all his-
torical contexts (Mayhew 1986), or all electoral circumstances (Erie
1990).  Other organizations like neighborhood associations, unions,
churches, and ethnic voluntary associations were vital to the incor-
poration of new immigrant groups (Sterne 2001).  Yet the incongruity
to today’s parties is conspicuous. There has been much careful study
of how today’s political parties compare with those of yesteryear.  For
the most part, this body of work has concluded that today’s parties
lack the organizational capacity, the political incentives, the cultural
literacy, and perhaps even the democratic resolve to shepherd new
immigrants into the political process and secure their loyalties to a
particular political party (e.g., Jones-Correa 1998a; Anderson and
Cohen 2005; Kim 2006; Rogers 2006; Wong 2006).
If the two major parties are reluctant to bring Asian Americans
– the largest growth rate segment of the U.S. population since the
1970s – into the political fold, then we are pressed to ask: how does a
predominantly immigrant electorate like the Asian American com-
munity become politicized?  Which factors keep Asian Americans
from becoming politically active and which factors act as a stimulus
to political activism?  In the absence of responsive and responsible
parties, one site that many scholars have recently looked to is the in-
stitutional influence of organizations in civil society and the individ-
ual effects of civic engagement (see, e.g., Ramakrishnan 2006; Rogers
2006; Wong 2006b; Ecklund 2007; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad
2008).  We do the same in this chapter.
Civic engagement as an alternative site for the politicization of
Asian Americans is salient in our vignettes of Anand and Alam.  Both
individuals share a common pathway into politics through their in-
volvement in non-electoral participation and organizing.  Yet as our
stylized description of the experiences of Anand and Alam suggest,
“civic engagement” is neither uniform nor rooted in a shared immi-
grant experience.  In Anand’s case, civic participation is motivated
by the collective and consensual interests of a socioeconomically and
(for the most part) racially homogeneous gated community.  Alam’s
participation, by contrast, is defined by the politics of a far more so-
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cioeconomically and racially diverse community and deeply rooted
in organizations – like labor unions, civil rights organizations, ethnic
associations – that engage in contentious and identitarian politics.
One vignette echoes the assimilationist view of Asian immigrants
who model the American Dream; the other does not.
In this essay, I examine civic engagement as a potential pathway
to the political engagement of Asian Americans.  Specifically, I argue
that the relationship that we form to a political party is a key marker
of our political orientation and activism.  A plurality (and in some
surveys, majority) of Asian Americans, however, do not identify with
a political party.  I then present the argument for looking to civic en-
gagement as a pathway to partisanship acquisition.  Specifically, I ex-
amine the direct effects of civic engagement on party identification
as well as an indirect effect, through the formation of panethnic iden-
tity.  Then, drawing on statistical analysis of the 2000-2001 Pilot Na-
tional Asian American Politics Study, I examine three different kinds
of civic engagement – working to solve a community problem, orga-
nizational membership in an ethnic association, and religious partic-
ipation.  The analysis shows that Asian Americans with higher levels
of civic engagement are in fact more likely to identify with a political
party and, for at least one measure of engagement, also more likely
to develop a strong sense of panethnic identity (which then leads to
a greater likelihood of identifying as a Democrat). Party identifica-
tion, in turn, is a key factor in how politically active Asian Americans
are.  The essay concludes with several important qualifications and
rejoinders on these results.
Party Identification and Political Incorporation
For better or worse, the American people have hung their most
deeply held political convictions and sentiments, anxieties and aspi-
rations with a political party for about as long as they have existed.
Martin Van Buren, founder of the first political machine in New York
and principal architect of the first national political party (the Jack-
sonian Democrats), writes of “an unbroken succession … Neither the
influences of marriage connections, nor of sectarian prejudices, nor
any of the strong motives which often determine the ordinary actions
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of men, have … been sufficient to override the bias of party organi-
zation and sympathy, devotion to which has, on both sides, as a rule,
been a master-passion of their members (1867, 7).”  Today, our un-
derstanding and analysis of this “master-passion” rests chiefly on the
concept of party identification. Virtually every published work in po-
litical science on public opinion, voting behavior, and political par-
ticipation using survey data includes some version of the party
identification scale. And given this seeming ubiquity, it is little sur-
prise to find, in study after study, that “the psychological attachment
of individuals to one or the other of the major parties … reveals more
about their political attitudes and behaviors than any other single
opinion (Keefe and Hetherington 2003, 169)” and that “party identi-
fication remains the single most important determinant of individ-
ual voting decisions (Kinder and Sears 1985, 686).”  
The reasons why party identification is so central to the way that
Americans think and act on politics are clear.  Partisan habits are
something that Americans are born into, starting with the partisan-
ship of their parents and sustained through pre-adult and early adult
socialization (Campbell et al. 1960). For adults, it is a psychological at-
tachment that serves as a critical means to navigate a political infor-
mation environment that is often saturated with complex details and
hortatory messages (Fiorina 1981; Popkin 1991).  Voters can do with-
out encyclopedic knowledge about each candidate’s issue positions
and can navigate strategic communications by simply knowing
which party and politicians they trust (and which they do not) and
then using partisan cues to figure out “who is for what” (Lupia and
McCubbins 1998).  In effect, in the U.S., “Democrat,” “Republican,”
and “Independent” are the defining identities in the political realm
(Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).  
What, then, do we know about the party attachments of Asian
Americans?  The answer, it turns out, is not so easy to decipher.  For
one thing, there is a dearth of systematic, reliable data on which to
base our expectations.  A large random sample of U.S. adults – as in
a pre-election survey or an exit poll – will contain only a handful of
persons of Asian descent, and typically with a bias for those Asians
who are more educated, well-off, assimilated into life in the U.S., and
proficient in English.  The costs of obtaining a larger, unbiased sam-
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ple, moreover, can be prohibitive; it is simply difficult to find a sam-
ple design for a population that is linguistically heterogeneous and
geographically dispersed across ethnic subgroups, yet locally con-
centrated within ethnic subgroups, as Asian Americans are (e.g., see
Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004).  As a result, the quality of data on
Asian American mass opinion is less than ideal. An example is the
striking “house” effects between two exit polls fielded in California
following the 1996 general elections.  The Voter New Services exit
poll found Asian Americans to be more Republican than Democratic
(48 percent to 32 percent), while the Los Angeles Times found the op-
posite – Asian American Democrats here appeared to outweigh Asian
Republicans (44 percent to 33 percent).i
Notwithstanding the elusive nature of Asian American public
opinion, a pattern of Democratic partisanship has begun to emerge.
According to one review of twelve national, state-level, and metro-
politan-level surveys in the 1990s, the roughly even split in Asian
American partisanship begins to take a discernibly Democratic turn
by the 1998 off-year elections (Lien 2001).  This leaning has become
even more sharp in recent years.  In the post-election 2000-2001 Pilot
National Asian American Politics Study (PNAAPS) – the first multi-
city, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual academic survey of Asian Americans
– Democratic identifiers outnumbered Republican identifiers by more
than two-to-one.  Moreover, Democrats outnumbered Republicans
for every ethnic subgroup in the PNAAPS except for Vietnamese
American respondents (who leaned, but only modestly, toward the
Republican Party).  
This partiality is also mirrored in how Asians vote.  According
to the Voter News Service exit polls, a solid majority of Asian Amer-
icans voted for Al Gore over George W. Bush in 2000 (55 percent to
41).   In the 2004 presidential election, the National Election Pool
(NEP) exit polls found a 56-44 split in favor of John Kerry over George
W. Bush and, in the most recent 2006 elections, Asian American vot-
ers split 62-37 in favor of Democratic congressional candidates.  In
the 2006 mid-term elections, NEP exit polls found a 70-26 split in
favor of Dianne Feinstein in the California race for U.S. Senate in Cal-
ifornia, the only state in which sufficient numbers of Asian Ameri-
cans were polled to gauge their vote choices.  In local, multi-lingual,
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multi-ethnic exit polls in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York
City the margins are even more decisive for Democratic candidates.
Moreover, voter registration studies in 2004 and 2006 by the Asian
American Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York and Asian
Pacific American Legal Center in Southern California found marked
increases in the number of Asian American registered Democrats.
So, two features define what we know about Asian American
partisanship: our measures often vary across polls and, between the
Republican and Democratic parties, Asian Americans lean Demo-
cratic.  These features, important as they are, mask another (perhaps
more central) defining feature: the plurality, and in many surveys,
majority of Asian Americans choose not to identify with any political
party at all.  In the 1993-94 Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality
(Bobo et al. 2000), only 39 percent of respondents chose to identify as
a Republican or a Democrat (11 percent identified as Independents,
fully 55 percent chose the response option, “something else,” and 6
percent reported being unsure or refused to answer the question).  In
the 2000-2001 PNAAPS, shown below in Table 1, only half of the re-
spondents chose to identify as a Republican or Democrat (with 13
percent Independents, 20 percent volunteered that they did not think
in partisan terms, and 18 percent reported being unsure or refused to
answer the question). Thus while many political observers chomp at
the bit to divide the electorate into Red and Blue segments, many
Asian Americans themselves first wonder what it means to be a par-
tisan.
Table 1.  Patterns of Party Identification among Asian Americans 
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, an 
Independent, or of another political affiliation?” 
 Chinese Filipino Indian Japanese Korean Vietnamese ALL 
Republican 8% 20% 13% 9% 21% 15% 14% 
Democrat 32% 40% 44% 40% 43% 12% 36% 
Independent 3% 14% 23% 20% 12% 15% 13% 
Not sure / 
Refused
24% 13% 14% 15% 16% 28% 18%
Don’t think in
these terms 
33% 13% 6% 18% 8% 31% 20%
TOTAL N 308 266 141 198 168 137 1218 
Data: PNAAPS (2001) 
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Elsewhere, I discuss at length possible explanations for this rel-
ative absence of partisanship among many Asian Americans (Hajnal
and Lee 2006, Lee and Hajnal 2008).  There are two kernels of the ar-
gument.  First, partisanship acquisition for Asian Americans should
be thought of as a sequence: in the first step, Asian Americans need
to see the traditional categories of partisanship – “Democrat,” “Re-
publican,” and even “Independent” – as meaningful choices; once
they view these categories as meaningful, they then choose between
them.  The second key to the argument is that – for a population that
is predominantly first and second generation – prior political social-
ization cannot be presumed.  In its absence, partisanship is explained
as a function of three factors: information, ideology, and identity.  Un-
certain information about why party competition is important and
where parties stand on key issues drives the first step of being parti-
san or apartisan.   Ideological commitments to particular issues and
beliefs or a strong racial identity drive the second step of identifying
as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent.  
This phenomenon of “apartisanship” is related to the general
finding that, across multiple measures of immigrant political incor-
poration, Asian Americans appear far from fully included and well
represented in democratic life in the U.S.  In a sense, the attachments
that immigrant-based ethnic communities like Asian Americans form,
or fail to form, to a political party are an important and underexamined
dimension of immigrant political incorporation. Table 2 summarizes
the basic patterns of under-participation in terms of the three widely
studied stages of formal political incorporation.  
Table 2. Political Incorporation: From Citizenship to Voting 
Whites African
Americans 
Latinos Asian
Americans 
TOTAL
% citizen 97.9 93.7 59.3 67.5 91.3
% registered 73.5
(75.1)
64.4
(68.7)
34.3
(57.8)
35.0
(51.9)
65.9
(72.2)
% voted 65.8
(89.5)
56.3
(87.4)
28.0
(81.6)
29.8
(85.1)
58.3
(88.5)
Source: 2004 American Community Survey.  For “% registered” and “% voted” rows,
the top figure in each cell is the proportion of all adults in that group; the figure in 
parentheses is the proportion of those adults from the previous row (e.g., the proportion 
of all whites who are registered is 73.5 percent; the proportion of all whites who are 
registered and citizens is 75.1 percent).
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The three key steps here are whether a newcomer to the United
States has established citizenship, whether that citizen (if eligible) reg-
isters to vote, and whether that registered voter actually casts a vote
come Election Day.  The table compares levels of incorporation of
whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans.  The main
point of this table is quite clear.  Asian Americans (and Latinos) lag
behind both whites and African Americans at each step in this process
of political incorporation.   The proportion of Asian Americans who
are citizens is roughly only two in three; the proportion who are reg-
istered is roughly only one in three; the proportion who vote is about
three in ten.
This underparticipation in politics is also mirrored by data on
the levels of political representation across racial and ethnic groups.
If representation is measured by matching the proportion of legisla-
tors in a group to the population proportion of that group, African
Americans come the closest to parity in representation, with Latinos
and Asian Americans lagging substantially behind.  This under-rep-
resentation is shown quite clearly in Table 3: according to the 2006
American Community Survey, Asian Americans (even allowing for
the more inclusive “alone or in combination” categorization) were
just under 5 percent of the U.S. population, but only roughly one per-
cent of members of the House and of state legislatures.ii
A wide range of explanations have been offered for this incom-
plete incorporation of Asian Americans into the main lines of Amer-
ican politics.  At the individual level, some scholars suggest that
Asian Americans are simply less interested in politics (Cain, Kiewiet,
and Uhlaner1991; Tam 1995) or more interested in the politics of their
home country (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Barone 2001); others sug-
gest the proper focus should be on the process of political socializa-
Table 3.  Minority Representation in Elected Office, 2006 
TOTAL African
Americans 
Latinos Asian
Americans 
Native
House 438
(100%)
41
(9.4%)
25
(5.7%)
4
(0.9%)
1
(0.2%)
State
Legislature
7382
(100%)
530
(7.2%)
229
(3.1%)
85
(1.1%)
47
(0.6%)
Source: Lien, Pinderhughes, Hardy-Fanta, and Sierra, 2007.  
Americans
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tion (W.T. Cho 1999; Wong 2001) and the development of
ethnic/panethnic identity (Lien 1997; Wong 2006b).  At the institu-
tional level, scholars have either pointed to a logic of party competi-
tion that systematically excludes racialized minorities like Asian
Americans (Kim 2006; see also Frymer 1999 and Fraga and Leal 2004)
or to historical changes in party politics like weakened local party or-
ganizations, candidate centered elections, selective and strategic mo-
bilization efforts, and assumptions about the political interests and
aptitude of groups like Asian Americans (Wong 2006b).
Civic Engagement and Political Incorporation
In the absence of a demonstrable role of political parties in the
political incorporation of Asian Americans and given the over-
whelming numbers of Asian Americans who do not think in partisan
terms, the question is: how do Asian Americans come to terms with
partisan politics?  One place that scholars have increasingly turned to
is civic institutions and civil society (Ecklund and Park 2005; Ra-
makrishnan and Viramontes 2006; Wong 2006b; Ecklund 2007; Ra-
makrishnan and Bloemraad 2008).  The reasons for doing so are quite
clear.  Civic institutions like labor unions, social service organizations,
ethnic associations, and religious institutions can act as a mediating
influence and organizational bridge between newcomers and the po-
litical system writ large.  From political philosophers like Carole Pate-
man (1970) to empirical political scientists like Sidney Verba, Kay
Schlozman, and Henry Brady (1995), civic engagement is viewed as
developing key civic skills like political communication and organ-
izing and in nurturing a sense of psychological engagement and ef-
ficacy in the realm of public affairs. Moreover, beyond reasons why
civic institutions may nurture a greater sense of political engagement
and incorporation, there is a tide of sentiment viewing volunteerism
and civic engagement as a tonic for democratic ills in America
(Skocpol and Fiorina 1999; Putnam 2000; Galston 2000; Macedo 2005).
As with any idea on which hopes are heavily pinned, there is
much debate over what civic engagement is and whether it helps or
harms the flourishing of democratic politics (see, e.g., Skocpol and
Fiorina 1999; Putnam 2000).  When the term is used in this essay, it
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refers to individual and collective actions that aim to address an issue
of public concern and that are located in civil society.  Broken down
into its component words, the term “engagement” prima facie denotes
actions and behaviors, not attitudes and beliefs.  Its modifier, “civic,”
is more tendentious and up for grabs.  For some, civic refers to the ob-
ligations of citizenship and the impulse to act in pursuit of the pub-
lic interest.  For others, civic refers to action that is rooted in civil
society, where civil society is an arena of voluntary, uncoerced dis-
course and action that is independent of the state and the market (and
in some variants, the family).  
The first definition is more commonplace.  In Democracy at Risk,
a publication of the American Political Science Association’s Com-
mittee on Civic Education and Engagement, civic engagement is de-
fined as including “any activity, individual or collective, devoted to
influencing the collective life of the policy (Macedo 2005, 6 [emphasis in
original]).”  Here “civic engagement most obviously includes voting”
and also electoral precursors to voting like working for a political can-
didate or campaign, attending a political rally, contributing money
to a candidate or campaign, wearing a button or displaying a bumper
sticker for a candidate or campaign, and trying to persuade a friend,
neighbor, or stranger to vote for a candidate or issue. 
In this essay, I use civic engagement in the narrower second
sense that distinguishes between the formal realms of electoral, leg-
islative, bureaucratic, and judicial politics and the informal realm of
civic institutions and civil society.  The boundaries between formal
politics and civic engagement are, no doubt, porous.  This choice is
made on several grounds.  First, the central argument in this essay is
explicitly about the potential for engagement in civil society to serve
as a pathway into partisanship and, as a result, into formal political
engagement writ large.  To avoid a tautology where political activity
begets political activity, we need to define civic engagement in a way
that distinguishes it from the main lines of politics per se.   Second,
civil society is interesting to examine separately from other spheres of
life.  It is in its role as a “third sector” (beyond government and the
private sector) that we are interested in civil society as a pathway to
the political incorporation of Asian Americans into the formal realm
of elections and government.  It is also in this role that civil society
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acts as a potentially important site for the empowerment of margin-
alized populations and the mobilization of politics outside the main
lines. Finally, activity in civil society is important to examine on its
own terms as a counter to pervasive and totalizing indictments about
the absence or presence of political action and agency among Asian
Americans.  That is, just because Asian Americans vote at rates that
fall significantly below that of other groups does not necessarily
imply that Asian Americans are inactive or uninterested in being en-
gaged.  Thus civic engagement, as we use the term in this essay, en-
compasses a range of specific activities such as working in a soup
kitchen, serving on a neighborhood association, and so on, but ex-
cludes formal modes of political participation in the electoral arena
(for a similar distinction, see Zukin et al. 2006).
Figure 1 presents this central argument about civic engagement
more schematically.  There are two ways in which civic engagement
can potentially act as a pathway to politics writ large.  The first is by
propelling Asian Americans to view partisan categories as meaning-
ful (1).  In the process of being engaged and feeling efficacious, Asian
Americans may be further empowered to stake their ground as a De-
mocrat, Republican, or Independent.  This identification with a po-
litical party (or as an Independent) then defines one’s degree of
political inclusion and incorporation.  The second route to politics is
indirect, through the formation of a sense of ethnic or panethnic iden-
tity (2).  As Figure 1 shows, in this second route, civic engagement
promotes a greater sense of ethnic or panethnic identity that, in turn
defines both the partisanship (3) and the political attitudes and ac-
tion of Asian Americans.  Finally, Figure 1 also considers the extent to
Figure 1.  Civic Engagement as a Pathway to Politics 
P
 Civic M Party Political 
 Engagement   Identification   Incorporation 
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which civic engagement may directly increase one’s chances of be-
coming politically active and incorporated, without the mediating ef-
fects of partisanship or panethnic identification (4).
A complete empirical test of all pathways in this figure together
requires the kind of statistical testing and plain length in text that go
beyond the aims of this volume.iii An alternate strategy, which we
adopt here, is to examine the first key relationship in some detail –
whether civic engagement influences one’s degree of partisanship (1).
Then, as a second order of business, we also look for evidence for the
following additional relationships: (2) whether civic engagement in-
fluences one’s perceptions of panethnic linked fate; (3) whether one’s
panethnic linked fate influences one’s partisanship; (4) whether one’s
civic engagement influences one’s formal political incorporation.  In
the following sections, we briefly detail the data and measures we
use and the approach we take to testing for the independent effects of
civic engagement on each of these four relationships.  To preview, the
results are strongest between civic engagement and whether or not
one has views about the partisan system of political competition in
the United States (1), with more mixed and selective (depending on
which measure of civic engagement we examine) results for the re-
maining outcomes.  The results also vary in several crucial respects
between foreign-born and U.S.-born Asian Americans.
Data and Measurement
This account of the relationship between civic engagement and
party identification is examined using data from the 2000-2001 Pilot
National Asian American Politics Study (PNAAPS). The PNAAPS is
the primary multi-city, multi-ethnic, and multi-lingual survey of
Asian Americans, fielded over ten weeks after the November elec-
tion (see Lien et al. 2001 and Lien et al. 2004).  Six primary Asian eth-
nic groups — Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, South Asian, and
Vietnamese — and five major metropolitan centers of large Asian
American populations — Los Angeles, Honolulu, the San Francisco
Bay Area, Chicago, and New York — are represented.  Interviews
were conducted by telephone.  Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese re-
spondents were given the choice of a non-English language interview.
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The resulting sample yielded 1,218 adult Asians: 308 Chinese, 168 Ko-
rean, 137 Vietnamese, 198 Japanese, 266 Filipino, and 141 South Asian
Americans.
Before we can describe what the PNAAPS shows about the re-
lationship between civic engagement and party identification, we
must first detail what we mean, in survey terms, when we speak of
these concepts.  With civic engagement, the PNAAPS includes three
different measures.  The question wording for these three measures
is as follows:
1. “During the past four years, have you participated in any of the
following types of political activity in your community? …
Worked with others in your community to solve a problem?”
2. “Do you belong to any organization or take part in any activities
that represent the interests and viewpoints of [R’s ETHNIC
GROUP] or other Asians in America?  [IF YES] How active are
you as a member?  Are you very active, somewhat active, not
too active, or not active at all?”
3. “How often do you attend religious services?  Would you say …
every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few
times a year, or never?”
None of these alone are an ideal measure.  These questions, for
one thing, were not designed to directly test for civic engagement,
but rather intended to measure other things – political participation,
ethnic solidarity, and religiosity, in the case of the three items above.
Activities and organization membership on behalf of ethnic/paneth-
nic interests may strike some as too particularistic to represent the
general concept of civic engagement.  Religiosity may strike others
as denoting a particular, morally-laden and perhaps biographically
prefigured form of voluntary association within the rubric of “civil
society.”  Yet, taken together, the three measures here capture impor-
tant and distinct dimensions of civic engagement.iv The value in ex-
amining all three simultaneously, rather than making strong claims
on behalf of any one measure, is in acknowledging the heterogeneity
and multidimensionality of associational forms and, by corollary,
their possible influences on partisanship and political incorporation.
In the PNAAPS, 21 percent of respondents reported having worked
to solve a community problem, 15 percent belonged to an ethnic as-
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sociation, and fully 51 percent reported attending religious services at
least once or twice a month.  
With party identification, we begin with the standard question
format. All respondents are first asked, “Generally speaking, do you
usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independ-
ent, or what?”  Those who self-identify with a party are then asked,
“Would you call yourself a strong [Republican/Democrat] or not a
very strong [Republican/Democrat]?”  And those who self-identify as
an Independent are asked, “Do you think of yourself as closer to the
Republican or Democratic Party?”  This sequence of questions is typ-
ically used to measure party identification along a continuum from
strongly identifying as a Republican to strongly identifying as a De-
mocrat.v
For our purposes, we view party identification as a sequence of
two choices: (1) whether or not individuals think in partisan terms
(“partisans” or “apartisans”); (2) how they think of themselves in par-
tisan terms (“Democrat,” “Republican,” or “Independent”).  Here
identifying as an “Independent” is considered a form of partisan
thinking because: (1) Asian Americans who self-identify as Inde-
pendents can be shown to be distinct in their political orientation and
immigrant experiences from those who are apartisan; (2) the category
of “Independent” exists, in the American political landscape, only in
relation to the categories of “Democrat” and “Republican” and can
therefore be thought of as partisan in this relational sense.  The term
“apartisan” is reserved for respondents who refuse to answer the
question, who indicate that they are unsure of how to answer the
question, or who explicitly volunteer that they do not think in parti-
san terms.  In the PNAAPS, roughly 36 percent of respondents iden-
tified themselves as Democrats, only 14 percent as Republicans and
13 percent as Independents, and fully 38 percent were apartisans.  
From Civic Engagement to Partisanship
As we noted before, our first order of business is to see if civic
engagement is positively associated with a greater degree of attach-
ment to partisanship and a specific major political party.  Recall that
the importance of looking to partisanship is that it has such a well-es-
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tablished influence on one’s political attitudes and actions.  Before
we dive into a full, elaborate statistical test of the effects of civic en-
gagement on the partisanship of Asian Americans (and, in ensuing
sections, panethnic identification and political participation), it is first
worth a look at whether the basic patterns on these outcome meas-
ures vary by civic engagement.  Table 4 thus shows the degree to
which party identification varies by each measure of civic engage-
ment. There is a clear tendency toward holding a view on party pol-
itics – that is, identifying as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent
– among Asian Americans who are civically engaged, across all three
measures of civic engagement.
• Across the board, between 40 and 44 percent of Asian Americans
who were not civically engaged had no view towards political par-
ties or Independents; only a range from 21 percent to 31 percent of
those who were civically engaged were similarly apartisan.  
• Beyond this effect on thinking in partisan terms, there are varying
effects between our three measures of civic engagement of party
choice itself.  Asian Americans who attended religious services
regularly were significantly more likely to identify as Republican
(20 percent) than those who do not attend religious services (less
than 8 percent).  By contrast, respondents who belonged to an eth-
nic or panethnic organization (and to a lesser extent, respondents
who worked to solve a community problem) were likelier to iden-
tify as a Democrat than as a Republican.  
Table 4.  Measures of Civic Engagement, by Party Identification 
Worked with others in community to solve a problem
 Democrat Republican Independent Apartisan 
Yes 42.6% 15.9% 15.9% 25.5% 
No 33.8% 13.5% 12.2% 40.6% 
Membership in an ethnic / panethnic organization 
Yes 46.4% 18.8% 13.8% 21.0% 
No 33.8% 13.0% 12.8% 40.4% 
Attend religious services at least 1-2 times each month  
Yes 37.3% 19.7% 12.1% 30.8% 
No 33.9% 7.5% 14.2% 44.4% 
Cell entries are row percentages. 
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• The likelihood of identifying as an Independent does not appear
to vary with one’s civic engagement.
One might raise the important consideration that these meas-
ures of civic engagement may vary in critical ways by key markers of
difference within the broad and often totalizing category of “Asian
American.”  Specifically, many key features of Asian American so-
cial, economic, and political life vary by ethnic group and by gener-
ation and the number of years an immigrant has spent in the United
States.  Perhaps, to follow the argument, civic engagement is reduced
to belonging to a particularly engaged or religious Asian ethnicity;
or civic engagement belies one’s degree of acculturation in the U.S.,
varying by length of time spent in the U.S.  If so, perhaps the seem-
ing effect of civic engagement on Asian American partisanship is spu-
rious, with patterns of party identification being instead a function of
these other factors.  
Table 5 shows the extent to which patterns of civic engagement
vary by ethnic/national origin, at least for the three measures of civic
engagement to which we have access in the PNAAPS data.  Here,
there are no consistent effects across measures of civic engagement.
Koreans appear to be the most religious ethnic sub-group, but they
are far less likely to collaborate with other community members to
solve a problem or to belong to an ethnic or panethnic organization.
Similarly, Japanese are the second most likely group to report work-
ing on a community problem, but the second least likely group to re-
Table 5.  Measures of Civic Engagement, by Ethnicity/National Origin
Worked with others in community to solve a problem
 Chinese Korean Vietnam Japanese Filipino So. Asian
Yes 16.3% 11.3% 12.6% 27.2% 23.5% 35.5%
No 83.7% 88.7% 87.4% 72.8% 76.5% 64.5%
Membership in an ethnic / panethnic organization 
Yes 5.2% 8.9% 8.0% 22.7% 22.2% 24.8% 
No 94.8% 91.1% 92.0% 77.3% 77.8% 75.2% 
Attend religious services at least 1-2 times each month  
Yes 25.4% 77.6% 44.1% 34.7% 74.0% 62.5% 
No 74.6% 22.4% 55.9% 65.3% 26.0% 37.5% 
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port frequent attendance in religious services.  That said, there is
some within-group consistency: Chinese appear across all measures
to be relatively less civically engaged (somewhat also true of Viet-
namese); Filipinos and South Asians by comparison appear across all
measures to be relatively highly engaged in civic life.  
Table 6 looks at the variation in civic engagement by generation
and number of years in the United States among the Asian American
first generation. Tenure in the U.S. is grouped into four ranges: be-
tween 1 and 5 years, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 19 years, and 20 years or more.
The basic results of Table 6 are summarized below.
• Levels of work on community problems for PNAAPS respondents
increase with time in the U.S. and generation.  
• Levels of membership in an ethnic/panethnic organization are
highest among the second generation.  
• Levels of religiosity increase with time in the U.S., but decline
across generations.  
• There are no consistent effects across measures of civic engage-
ment.  
This possible variation across generation/tenure in the U.S. is
especially important to examine given Ong’s (see Chapter One) Cen-
sus projections for the Asian American population.  Beyond the pro-
jection that the population is likely to continue to grow, foreign-born
Asians will continue to be a majority even in 2030.  Given this likely
continued significance of the foreign-born population within the
Table 6.  Measures of Civic Engagement, by Generation and Years in the U.S.
Worked with others in community to solve a problem
1-5 years 6-10 years 11-19 yrs 20+ years 2nd gen 3rd gen+ 
Yes 16.1% 15.6% 13.6% 23.4% 29.2% 34.2%
No 83.9% 84.4% 86.4% 76.6% 70.8% 65.8%
Membership in an ethnic / panethnic organization 
Yes 11.8% 11.3% 13.6% 14.8% 25.6% 13.1% 
No 88.2% 88.7% 86.4% 85.2% 74.4% 86.9% 
Attend religious services at least 1-2 times each month  
Yes 47.2% 52.3% 58.0% 59.1% 41.7% 40.5% 
No 52.8% 47.7% 42.0% 40.9% 58.3% 59.5% 
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Asian American community into the future, we explicitly compare
the influence of civic engagement between the foreign-born and U.S.-
born Asian American population in our subsequent statistical analy-
sis.  For now, it is valuable to keep in mind that these two factors –
ethnic/national origin groups and generational/tenure in U.S. effects
– have some bearing on civic engagement, but do not explain the total
variance of why some Asian Americans are “joiners” and others are
not.  Other factors come to mind as possibly varying with one’s level
of civic engagement and one’s patterns of party identification, such as
income, education, age, and sex of respondent.  Here we use statisti-
cal regression methods that allow us to “control for” the possibility
that these other factors influence party identification and isolate the
independent effect of civic engagement on one’s party identification.
Table 7 presents the streamlined “marginal effects” of a sequence of
three such regressions: 
1. In the first, Asian Americans who are “apartisan” are compared
to those who are able to identify with one of the three conven-
tional “partisan” categories of “Democrat,” “Republican,” or
“Independent.”  
2. Of those who identify with a conventional partisan category, the
second regression compares Asian Americans who identify as
Independents from those who identify with one of the two major
parties. 
3. Finally, the third regression compares – among major party iden-
tifiers – those who identify as Democrats to those who identify
as Republicans.
That is, in the first regression, we test for the effect of civic en-
gagement – and other “control” factors (ethnic/national origin, gen-
eration, years lived in the U.S., age, sex, education, family income) –
on whether Asian Americans are apartisans or not; in the second, on
whether Asian Americans are Independents or not; in the third, on
whether Asian Americans are Democrats or Republicans. To compare
the effect of civic engagement among the foreign-born and U.S.-born
respondents – in the context of Ong’s 2030 projections – we also re-ran
our regressions to include an “interaction term” that measures the
joint occurrence of being foreign-born and civically engaged. 
In Table 7 below, we simplify the results of our regression analy-
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sis into “marginal effects.” Marginal effects, or predicted probabili-
ties, are a way of focusing our attention on the primary variable of in-
terest.   In this case, the cell entries represent the independent effect
of each kind of civic engagement on each kind of partisanship, hold-
ing all other factors in the regression model to their mean value.  For
each measure of civic engagement, Table 7 shows in the first row the
primary effect of civic engagement that does not differentiate between
U.S.-born and foreign-born.  In the two following rows, Table 7 shows
the revised analyses that allow for an explicit comparison by nativity.
The summary effects of Table 7 follow:
Table 7.  Marginal Effects of Civic Engagement on Party Identification^ 
APARTISAN INDEPENDENT DEMOCRAT
Worked with others to solve 
common problem
–8.5%**
(–0.9 to –16.1) 
not sig. not sig.
U.S.-born not sig. not sig. 13.4%**
(–4.2 to 27.4) 
Foreign-born –11.7%*
(+3.8 to –24.0) 
not sig. –25.5%**
(–.01 to –.49) 
Membership in 
ethnic/panethnic
organization
–14.3%**
(–6.2 to –22.5) 
not sig. not sig.
U.S.-born –15.6%*
(.02 to –29.2) 
not sig. not sig. 
Foreign-born not sig. not sig. not sig. 
Attend religious services 1-2 
times each month 
–8.7%**
(–1.3 to –15.9) 
–8.2%**
(–1.3 to –15.1) 
–19.1%**
(–10.6 to –27.6) 
U.S.-born not sig. –17.0%**
(–.03 to –.31)
–22.7%**
(–.08 to –35.8) 
Foreign-born –14.5%**
(.00 to –28.0) 
not sig. not sig. 
^ Cell entries are predicted effects of changing from the minimum value to the maximum value of each 
measure of civic engagement on party identification and its 95 percent confidence interval. 
* Statistically significant at the p<.10 level.
** Statistically significant at the p<.05 level. 
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Community problem-solving
• Asian Americans who work with others in their community to
solve a common problem are on average, 8.5 percent less likely to
be apartisan than those who do not engage in such community
problem-solving work.  
• Community problem-solving work does not appear to have any
other statistically significant effects on one’s partisanship as a first-
order effect — it neither distinguishes Independents from major
party identifiers nor does it distinguish Democrats from Republi-
cans.  
• These effects are altered when we differentiate between the effects
of civic engagement for foreign-born and U.S.-born respondents.
In the first distinction between apartisans and those who identify
as a “Democrat,” “Republican,” or “Independent,” the effect of
community problem-solving turns out to hold primarily among
foreign-born Asian Americans.  For respondents not born in the
U.S., community problem-solving work decreases one’s likelihood
of being apartisan by about 11.7 percent; this mode of community
engagement has no effect on partisanship for U.S.-born Asian
Americans.
• Differentiating between U.S.-born and foreign-born also reveals a
strong effect on the choice between identifying as a Democrat and
Republican.  Foreign-born who work with others in their com-
munity are 25.5 percent more likely to identify as a Republican;
U.S.-born who work with others in their community are 13.4 per-
cent more likely to identify as a Democrat.  These opposite effects
between U.S.-born and foreign-born appear to have canceled each
other out when nativity is not explicitly taken into account.
• This last finding suggests that not all forms of “community prob-
lem-solving” are alike, and that the kind of work with others on
one’s community (and perhaps even how the word “community”
is interpreted and defined) differs markedly between Asian Amer-
icans born in the United States and those born abroad.  Here it is
tempting to speculate further on the difference in community en-
gagement, but the data used for this study do not allow us to get
to the root of this divergence between the foreign-born and U.S.-
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born Asian American population.
Working for an ethnic/panethnic organization or issue
• Asian Americans who belong to an ethnic or panethnic organiza-
tion (or work on ethnic or panethnic issues) are on average 14.3
percent less likely to be apartisan than non-belongers.  
• Belonging to organizations or taking part in activities representing
ethnic/panethnic interests does not appear to influence the choice
to identify as an Independent or the choice between identifying
with one of the major parties.
• Unlike working with others in one’s community, the effect of en-
gagement on ethnic/panethnic activities appears to be primarily
among the U.S.-born.  U.S.-born respondents engaged by this
measure are 15.6 percent less likely to be apartisan, with no sig-
nificant effects on foreign-born respondents.
• The absence of any statistically significant effects on the remaining
two stages of party identification does not change with the addi-
tion of an interactive term.
Religious engagement
• Religiosity affects each stage of party identification: Asian Amer-
icans who attend religious services frequently are 8.7 percent less
likely to be apartisans, 8.2 percent less likely to be an Independent,
and 19.1 percent more likely to identify as a Republican.
• When we compare U.S.-born to foreign-born Asian Americans, the
effects are more selective again.  In the first stage, foreign-born
who attend religious services often are 14.5 percent less likely to be
apartisans than their foreign-born counterparts who do not attend
religious services.
• In the second stage, U.S.-born who are religious are 17 percent
more likely to identify with a major party than as Independents;
there is no effect of religiosity for foreign-born Asian Americans.
• In the final stage of identifying as a Republican or Democrat, the
effect is again among the U.S.-born.  U.S.-born respondents who
are active attendees of religious services are 22.7 percent more
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likely to identify as a Republican.  Again, there is no effect of reli-
giosity on identifying between the Democrats and Republicans for
foreign-born respondents.
These effects are pretty strong.  To give a sense of where they
stand relative to other factors that we control for, in the first regres-
sion, one’s family income and number of years in the U.S. also sig-
nificantly influence whether or not Asian Americans are apartisan or
identify with a partisan choice.  In the case where our measure of civic
engagement is working to solve a problem in one’s community, the
marginal effect of family income — between respondents to the
PNAAPS in the lowest income category and those in the highest —
on apartisanship is 15 percent (the higher the family income, the like-
lier one is to identify with a partisan choice).  With respect to the vari-
able of years in the U.S., Asian immigrants who have lived in the U.S.
just one year are 6 percent likelier to be apartisan than Asian immi-
grants who have lived in the U.S. for 20 years.  
The upshot here is pretty clear.  Active engagement in non-po-
litical spheres of civic life induces greater understanding of and iden-
tification with partisan politics.  With some modes, engagement
further shapes the particular content of one’s partisan politics: highly
religious Asian Americans are also less likely to identify as either In-
dependents or Democrats, favoring instead allegiance to the Repub-
lican Party.  
Partisanship Through Panethnic Linked Fate
A second relationship to examine is whether civic engagement
politicizes Asian Americans by engendering a greater sense of
panethnic identity.  As many other scholars have noted, Asian Amer-
ican “panethnicity” is an especially distinct kind of social group iden-
tity that is characterized by the simultaneous coexistence of externally
perceived homogeneity and internally lived heterogeneity (Espiritu
1992; Lowe 1996; Lien 2001; Kibria 2002; Okamoto 2003; Vo 2004; Ma-
suoka 2006; Okamoto 2006). For Asian Americans, the extent of the
ambiguity and internal diversity group boundaries begins with the
ethnic/national origins covered under the broad rubric of “Asian,”
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which includes Chinese (mainland, Taiwanese, Hong Kong), Fil-
ipinos, Hmong, Indians, Japanese, Koreans, Malays, Pakistanis, Thais,
Vietnamese, and, by some accounts, even Pacific Islanders and Arabs.
Further weakening the case for panethnic identity is the sheer diver-
sity of languages, religions, cultural orientations, political economies,
and immigration histories characterizing persons defined as Asian
American.  Yet, under the right historical and organizational circum-
stances, Americans of divergent Asian national origins, languages,
cultures, religions affiliations, immigration histories, collective mem-
ories, and structural positions in global and local economies are able
to mobilize into a panethnic collectivity (Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 2003;
Vo 2004; Okamoto 2006).  
Here I build on a previous work using the PNAAPS that demon-
strates that panethnicity can also influence the everyday attitudes and
actions of Asian Americans (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Lee 2005)
and that social contextual factors are an important determinant of
panethnic identity formation among Asian Americans (Masuoka
2006).  The PNAAPS includes three different measures of panethnic-
ity: (1) perceptions that Asians in America share a common culture;
(2) self-identification as an “Asian American”; (3) perceptions that
Asians in America share a “linked fate.”  In previous work, I demon-
strate that the conception of panethnicity that has the greatest effect
in defining the political orientation of Asian Americans is the third,
linked fate conception (Lee 2005).   Thus we focus on this measure
here.  In the PNAAPS, this common fate question asks respondents if
they “think what happens generally to other groups of Asians in this
country will affect what happens in your life.”  Following Dawson
(1994), perceptions of linked fate can be thought of as a heuristic that
simplifies political choice along a panethnic group utility calculus —
what is best for me, individually, is determined by what I perceive to
be in the best interests for my in-group, collectively.  
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Table 8 shows the extent to which civic engagement varies with
one’s strength of panethnic linked fate.  Across all three measures,
Asian Americans who strongly agree that what happens to other
Asian Americans affects what happens in their lives are likelier to be
civically engaged than their counterparts who reject such a linked
fate.  The greater likelihood of being engaged is most pronounced in
the case of membership in an ethnic/panethnic organization, where
24 percent of strong panethnic identifiers hold such organizational
ties in comparison to only 13 percent of non-identifiers. 
As with the relationship between civic engagement and party
identification, we further tested for the robustness of this effect by
controlling again for a range of other factors that could plausibly co-
vary with one’s panethnic identification – ethnic/national origin
group, generation, tenure in the U.S., age, gender, family income, and
educational attainment.  The results, shown in Table 9, are mixed
across measures of civic engagement.  When we do not differentiate
between U.S.-born and foreign-born, Asian Americans who work
with others in their community to solve a common problem are 10.5
percent more likely than Asian Americans who do not engage in such
work to perceive their fates to other Asian Americans as somewhat or
strongly linked.  Engagement in ethnic/panethnic organizations or
in religious activity, however, do not appear to have any direct effect
on one’s perceptions of panethnic linked fate.  
Table 8.  Strength of Panethnic Linked Fate, by Measures of Civic Engagement 
 No linked 
fate 
A little Somewhat Strong 
linked fate 
Worked with others to 
solve a community 
problem
17.2% 15.9% 23.7% 25.5% 
Membership in an ethnic / 
panethnic organization 
13.4% 15.9% 14.6% 24.2% 
Attend relig. services 1-2
times per month or more 
46.5% 52.8% 54.5% 57.2% 
Cell entries are row percentages. 
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When we explicitly contrast these effects for U.S.-born and for-
eign-born, we again reveal some hidden and pronounced effects.
With engagement with others in one’s community, we now see that
this effect is isolated to the U.S.-born, who are about 11 percent more
likely to believe in a moderate and strong sense of linked fate.  There
is no effect of community problem-solving work on panethnic iden-
tification for foreign-born respondents.  More strikingly, the other two
measures of engagement now shows some statistically significant re-
lationships to a panethnic linked fate identity.  
• U.S.-born Asian Americans who belong to ethnic or panethnic ac-
tivities or organizations are 16 percent more likely to believe in a
panethnic linked fate strongly or somewhat.  
• The effect cuts in the opposite direction foreign-born, who are
about 19 percent less likely to hold somewhat or strongly to a
panethnic linked fate identity.  
• With religiosity, it is foreign-born Asian Americans who attend re-
ligious services regularly who are more likely (by about 11 per-
cent) to believe their fates are somewhat or strongly linked to that
of other Asians in America.  
• U.S.-born who are highly religious, by contrast, are almost 17 per-
cent less likely to adhere to a sense of linked fate.  
As with party identification, the influence of civic engagement on
Table 9.  Marginal Effects of Civic Engagement on Panethnic Linked Fate 
A little linked Somewhat 
linked
Strongly linked 
fates 
Worked with others to solve 
community problem
–0.4% 4.9% 5.6% 
Born in U.S. –0.4% 4.9% 6.0% 
Born outside U.S. not sig. not sig. not sig.
Membership in (pan)ethnic 
organization
not sig. not sig. not sig.
Born in U.S. –0.9% 6.3% 9.7% 
Born outside U.S. –0.8% –11.3% –7.3% 
Attend relig. services 1-2 times 
each month or more 
not sig. not sig. not sig.
Born in U.S. 0.2% –5.4% 5.5% 
Born outside U.S. –0.4% 8.4% 9.1% 
Cell entries are row percentages. 
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panethnic linked fate with religiosity and ethnic/panethnic activity
appear to be concealed by the opposite effects between the U.S.-born
and foreign-born.  Again, it is inviting to theorize about the basis for
these divergent effects of civic engagement for U.S.-born and non-
U.S.-born Asian Americans, but such considerations exceed the grasp
of the PNAAPS data used in this chapter.  The key point to under-
score is that the critical differences are missed by simply examining
Asian Americans as a single, monolithic group.
These findings, taken together, demonstrate the importance of
civic engagement on Asian American panethnic identity.  It further
turns out that when Asian Americans believe their fates are linked to
that of all other Asians in America, it has a significant and sizeable ef-
fect on their partisanship.  As before, party identification is examined
in three steps: (1) being apartisan or identifying with a partisan cate-
gory; (2) being Independent or identifying with a major party; (3)
identifying as a Democrat or a Republican.  The effects of panethnic
linked fate are as follows:vi
• Asian Americans who strongly believe their fates are linked are
10 percent less likely to be apartisan than those who reject the idea
of a common destiny outright;
• A linked fate orientation has no bearing on one’s likelihood of
identifying as an Independent or with a major party;
• A strong linked fate orientation increases one’s likelihood of iden-
tifying as a Democrat by 14 percent.
From Civic Engagement to Formal Political Incorporation
We have thus far examined the various ways in which civic en-
gagement spurs the politicization of Asian Americans.  Recall from
Figure 1 that there are a number of possible relationships between
civic engagement, partisanship, panethnic identity, and the political
incorporation of Asian Americans.  The most consistent effect we find
is the association between all three measures of civic engagement and
partisanship: Asian Americans who are not active in civic life are less
likely to view the partisan categories of “Democrat,” “Republican,”
and “Independent” as a meaningful choice.  We also see more selec-
tive evidence for an indirect pathway to partisanship through paneth-
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nic identity: Asian Americans who actively work with others in their
community on common problems are more likely to hold a strong
sense of panethnic linked fate, and this common fate orientation then
decreases the likelihood of being apartisan and increases the likeli-
hood of identifying as a Democrat rather than a Republican.
The remaining question is whether civic engagement also di-
rectly potentiates the formal political incorporation of Asian Ameri-
cans.  By formal political incorporation we mean the three keys to
democratic inclusion in American political life: citizenship, voter reg-
istration, and voter turnout.  There are other measures we might also
examine, including other modes of political participation, such as
contributing money to a campaign or candidate, contacting a public
official or political representative, and attending a public meeting or
protest march.  Also, the term “political incorporation” itself is much
more encompassing than the sometimes ritualistic acts of obtaining
legal status and fulfilling one’s civic duties.  Broadly speaking, we
care about political incorporation because the term denotes the
process of successive stages of inclusion into all arenas of democratic
decision-making.  Importantly, full incorporation and inclusion per-
force also involves one’s subjective membership and ownership in
our politics, such as a sense of belonging, agency, and voice.
Focusing for the moment on the three most commonly exam-
ined formal measures of political incorporation, Table 10 shows the
marginal effects of each measure of civic engagement on citizenship,
voter registration, and voter turnout.  As with Table 7, these marginal
effects are calculated holding the other “control” variables in our re-
gression model – age, education, family income, gender, number of
years in the U.S. as an immigrant, immigrant generation, and eth-
nic/national origin group – at their mean values. 
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The results support the promise held by many for civic engage-
ment as a pathway to political incorporation.  
• All three measures of civic engagement increase the likelihood of
citizenship by about 5 percent. 
• Asian Americans who are active in their civic life are also likelier
to have registered to vote by a range of 8 to 13 percent, compared
to Asian Americans who are not civically engaged.  
• The largest effects are found for the act of voting itself.  Asian
Americans who work with others in their community to solve
common problems are 8 percent likelier to have voted; participa-
tion in ethnic and panethnic organizations and activities increases
one’s chances of voting by 18 percent; attending religious services
frequently increases voting by 17 percent.
• Differentiating between foreign-born and U.S.-born alters these
results somewhat.  The most prominent among these is that the
effect of civic engagement among U.S.-born increases one’s likeli-
hood of voting by 22.9 percent; among foreign-born, it decreases
one’s likelihood of voting by 19.5 percent.  Similarly, but to a much
lesser degree, civic engagement among U.S.-born increases one’s
likelihood of being registered to vote; among foreign-born it may
decrease one’s likelihood of being registered, but the effect is not
statistically significant.  There is also some moderate evidence that
the effect of religiosity and of participation in ethnic/panethnic
Table 10. Marginal Effects of Civic Engagement on Formal Political 
Incorporation^
Citizenship Voter 
Registration
Voting†
Worked with others to solve 
common problem
5.2%*
(–0.4 to 10.8) 
8.4%*
(–0.4 to 17.1) 
8.1%*
(–1.1 to 17.4) 
Membership in (pan)ethnic 
organization
4.5%*
(–1.8 to 10.8) 
13.3%**
(3.9 to 22.7) 
18.1%**
(7.7 to 28.5) 
Attend religious services 1-2 
times each month 
5.0%*
(–0.8 to 10.9) 
11.2%**
(2.7 to 19.7) 
17.3%**
(8.8 to 25.8) 
^ Cell entries are predicted effects of changing from the minimum value to the maximum value of each 
measure of civic engagement on party identification and its 95 percent confidence interval. 
† Voting is measured as respondent self-reports of voting in the 2000 presidential election.   
* Statistically significant at the p<.10 level.
** Statistically significant at the p<.05 level. 
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activities or organizations on voting is primarily an effect among
U.S.-born Asian Americans. 
Summary and Discussion
Asian Americans are widely noted for their relative absence in
spheres of political life.  This is so, both at the mass level of political
participation and at the elite level of political representation.  Often,
this relative absence is explained by turning a critical, incriminating
eye either to the interests and incentives of individuals: either indict-
ing Asian Americans for being politically apathetic or non-Asian
American party elites and non-Asian American rank-and-file parti-
sans for being unwilling to support the candidacy of Asian Ameri-
cans running for elected office.  In these pages, we focus instead on
the institutional role of political parties and the relationship that rank-
and-file Asian Americans have to the party system in America and
to either major party.  We have discussed the extent to which the at-
tachments, that Asian Americans form (and fail to form) to the system
of party competition in America, serves as a critical bridge to their
politicization; we also followed the lead of many current scholars in
looking to civic engagement as a key prior step to developing parti-
sanship.  
The analysis here has focused on three rather distinct measures
of civic engagement found in the 2001 Pilot National Asian Ameri-
can Politics Survey: the general experience of working with fellow
community members on a problem of common interest; participation
in an ethnic or panethnic organization or activity; and attendance in
religious services.  We find a strong and significant role for civic en-
gagement in determining whether Asian Americans are partisan or
apartisan and a selective relationship between religiosity and Re-
publican Party affiliation.  We also find that community problem-
solving begets a greater sense of panethnic identity, which in turn
begets greater partisan ties and, more specifically, greater Democratic
Party affiliation.  Finally, we find that all three measures of civic en-
gagement triggers the political incorporation of Asian Americans
from citizenship acquisition to voter registration to voting itself.  
Taken together, these results strongly affirm the promise that
238 Trajectory of Civic and Political Engagement
many imbue to the workaday, seemingly non-political, forms of en-
gagement in civil society.  These results, however, should be taken
with a dose of precaution.  Three reasons, in particular, prompt our
circumspection.  First, each of the relationships that Figure 1 repre-
sents as one-way influences might well be two-way relationships.
Panethnic identification may foster greater activity in civic life, not
just the other way around; partisanship may foster a heightened
sense of panethnic identification, not just the other way around; for-
mal political incorporation (especially the acts of registering to vote
and voting itself) may foster a greater sense of partisanship, not just
the other way around.  Perhaps the least likely of these is that parti-
sanship may foster greater civic engagement, as it is difficult to imag-
ine how identifying with a major party itself would foster working
with others in one’s community or greater attendance at religious
services.  
To further complicate matters, a second reason to be circumspect
is that it is also possible that both civic engagement and party affili-
ation are the result of some other underlying processes of immigrant
acculturation and political incorporation.  In the analysis presented
here, I have deliberately specified only a minimal set of factors to in-
clude in the statistical analysis as “control variables.”  In reality, civic
engagement and partisanship almost certainly interact in more com-
plex ways with panethnic identification, immigrant socialization, and
key structural contexts of immigrant political incorporation (e.g., de-
mographic composition, organizational density, social networks, local
and global political economy, party competition, and electoral rules).
These results, strictly speaking, thus represent more of a “plausibil-
ity” test for the role of civic engagement in the politicization of Asian
Americans than a definitive, discriminating causal analysis.  Having
made this requisite caveat, it is still important to note that even if civic
engagement and partisanship are not causally related, the forces or
interventions that motivate one may very well motivate the other.  
A final reason to be cautious in how we use these findings is re-
flected in the varied, sometime starkly opposite, findings we obtain
when we explicitly compare the effects of civic engagement between
U.S.-born and foreign-born Asian Americans.  There are numerous
possible realities on the ground that could support this divergence.
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Perhaps most obvious among these is that the kind of civic ties that
newcomers from Asia hold may differ in fundamental respects from
those that the Asian American second generation and beyond hold.
As our results suggest, the forms of civic engagement in which Asian-
born respondents participate often push further away from partisan-
ship and political incorporation, while the civic engagement of
U.S.-born respondents consistently pull respondents to draw brighter
lines between parties, between identities, and towards formal politi-
cal inclusion.  
There is, on this point, simply more research to be done.  We
have no reason to expect that one’s country of birth is the only area
in which the effects of civic ties on Asian American politics may di-
verge.  Regional differences and the diversity of ethnic/national ori-
gin groups are two other potential dimensions of divergence that bear
further examination.  In addition, while we have examined three dis-
tinct kinds of civic ties in this essay, there are many others that might
differ in their politicizing effects, such as labor unions, community-
based organizations, hometown associations, and so on.  Finally, with
regard to projections into the future, there is no magic oracle here.
Perhaps the clearest implication based on the present research, how-
ever, is that if the two major political parties continue to shun Asian
American voters and candidates or otherwise hedge their bets in
wooing them, the influence of a panoply of civic organizations and
forms of associational life will surely continue. 
Notes
i Two other key considerations, beyond the availability of data are the repre-
sentativeness of the sample and the quality of the data.  On the first, exit
polls only survey voters after they have voted, some surveys poll likely vot-
ers, some only poll adults living in metropolitan areas with a high propor-
tion of Asian Americans, some only poll Asian Americans with certain
surnames, some only poll certain ethnic subgroups within these “paneth-
nic” groups, and so on.  On the second, some surveys only conduct inter-
views only in English while others allow for non-English interviews; some
surveys tolerate response rates as low as 25 percent for a telephone inter-
view while others endeavor to reach much higher response rates and con-
duct face-to-face interviews; some surveys aim to ask questions in as neutral
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a manner as possible while others lead respondents with their question
wording (see, e.g., Lee 2001).
ii African Americans were roughly 13 percent of the U.S. population by the
“alone or in combination” grouping (and 12.4 percent if counted as “Black
or African American alone”).  Native Americans were 1.4 percent of the pop-
ulation when counted “alone or in combination” and 0.8 percent “alone.”
iii There are two remaining pathways shown in Figure 1 that we do not exam-
ine here: the relationship between party identification and political incor-
poration and between panethnic identification and political incorporation.
Elsewhere I test for these effects and find strong effects for both (Lee 2003;
Lee and Hajnal 2008).
iv Vietnamese and Asian Indians were oversampled to generate a sufficiently
large number of respondents for analysis.  Other details of the survey
methodology can be found in Lien et al 2001). 
v The inter-item correlations between these three items are not strong enough
to consider scaling the items together into an index of civic engagement.
vi By convention, “weak” Democrats and Republicans are those individuals
who identify with these corresponding parties but whose identification is
not strong.  “Leaner” Democrats and Republicans are those individuals who
choose to identify as an Independent to the initial question but are willing
to acknowledge a partisan bent, with the term “pure Independents” re-
served to those individuals who identify as an Independent to the initial
question but reject any partisan inclinations to the follow-up question. 
vii These results are not shown in a table, but are available on request.
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Organizing Asian Americans 
into Labor Unions
Marlene Kim
University of Massachusetts Boston
Introduction
Historically and currently, unions have been an important vehi-
cle for engaging the public in civic activities.  Unions have a long his-
tory of political mobilization, including endorsing candidates for
state, local, and national elections, and using their members to get
out the vote for candidates who can advance workers’ interests (Kut-
tner 1987; Ferguson and Rogers 1986).  As with the case of other racial
minorities, however, the history of labor unions and organizing
Asians has been blemished by a racially exclusionary past.  
Fortunately, times have changed and so have labor unions. Be-
ginning in the late twentieth century, efforts by unions to organize
Asians have been fruitful for both unions and workers, recruiting
thousands of Asians as union members, raising wages and increasing
workplace democracy.  Moreover, through participating in union ac-
tivities that impart political knowledge and leadership skills, Asian
Americans have become active in a broad range of civic activities,
ranging from political mobilization efforts, get out the vote efforts,
and greater community involvement.
This chapter surveys the history of labor unions, including their
different strategies for civic engagement and the extent to which they
organized Asian workers.  It examines unions as a cross-ethnic insti-
tution that builds the capacity for civic engagement — including de-
veloping leadership potential — by providing skills, experience, and
opportunities that allow workers to be involved and effective.  Par-
ticular attention is paid to the Asian and Pacific American Labor As-
sociation’s (APALA) efforts to organize and politically mobilize Asian
Americans.  The chapter concludes with assessing the challenges, as
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well as the future, of organizing Asians into labor unions. 
For the purposes of this chapter, civic engagement is defined as
participation in one’s community (local, national or global) with the
purpose of influencing, improving or participating in society as a po-
litically informed or engaged citizen.  This definition includes: par-
ticipating in community or organizational activities and events with
the goal of aiding or improving the community or its members; un-
derstanding the needs or problems that community members face;
keeping informed about the community and world events; or aiding
society in other ways that bring about positive change or increase  the
understanding of a community or social problem (e.g. writing, lec-
turing, teaching, organizing activities, fundraising, and/or partici-
pating in the political process).
The latter part of this essay draws from the experience, knowl-
edge and insights from the nation’s top Asian labor leaders, includ-
ing: May Chen, International Vice President of UNITE/HERE and
Manager of Local 23-25 in New York City, who is a leader in organ-
izing, educating and representing garment workers and other Asian
immigrant workers; Maria Somma, Health Care Organizing Coordi-
nator of the United Steelworkers and President of APALA, who has
been a leader in organizing nurses and other health care profession-
als, occupations which employ large numbers of Asians; Gloria T.
Caoile, Executive Director of APALA and former assistant to the pres-
ident of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees (AFSCME), who has been instrumental in organizing
professional workers as well as casino workers, significant segments
of the population of unionized Asians; and Kent Wong, Director of
the UCLA Center for Labor Research and Education and the found-
ing president of the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance (APALA).
Phone interviews of these labor leaders were conducted during the
summer and fall of 2007.  
In addition, this chapter draws from previous research, “Women
of Color and Unions,” in Perspectives on Work (see Kim 2005), and the
phone interview of Katie Quan during August of 2004 which in-
formed this publication.  Ms. Quan is the former International Vice
President of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Em-
ployees (UNITE) and is currently Associate Chair of the Center for
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Labor Research and Education at the Institute for Research on Labor
and Employment, University of California, Berkeley.  She was in-
strumental in organizing garment workers in New York City as well
as Asian workers in San Francisco.  I thank all of these truly extraor-
dinary labor leaders for their insights on this topic.  They continue to
be leaders in the labor movement and a true inspiration for myself
and for many others.  
A Brief History of Labor Unions and Asian Workers 
Historically, labor unions have sought to improve the standard
of living for workers through collective action, thus the very activity
of organizing and working together to achieve the common goal of
workplace improvement has required civic engagement.  Because
labor unions used different strategies to improve working people’s
lives, the type of civil engagement they employed varied over time.i
One of the earliest strategies was overtly political.  In 1828, the
first labor party in the United States was founded when the Philadel-
phia Mechanics Union of Trade Associations transformed itself into
the Workingmen’s Party.  As with labor parties that exist in other
countries today, the idea behind this strategy was to become a polit-
ical party similar to the Democrat and Republican political parties.
As a labor party, it would nominate and then try to elect one of its
members to local public office who would pass legislation favorable
towards improving all workers’ (not just its own members) and
working class’ lives.  Such legislative goals included universal and
free education, the ten-hour work day (the work day at that time was
twelve hours), the right to vote for those without property, eradicat-
ing debtors’ prison and monopolies, prohibiting child labor, and end-
ing the compulsory militia.  Other unions replicated this strategy, and
soon labor parties sprouted in other cities, including New York,
Boston, Newark, and Pittsburgh.  In part, this strategy was success-
ful; its platform was adopted by the then-Democratic Party of An-
drew Jackson, but the depressions in 1828-31 and 1837-50 destroyed
these new political parties. 
In 1869, the Knights of Labor was formed.  It followed another
strategy to improve the bargaining clout of workers:  an inclusive
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union.  Membership was open to workers and non-workers, the un-
employed, farmers, shopkeepers, small employers, and skilled and
unskilled workers. Even black workers, who were usually excluded
from organized labor during this time, were allowed to join this
union.  The idea behind the strategy of “one big union” was that if
everyone belonged to the same union, its large membership would
exert enough power so that employers would meet their demands.  
The political platform of the Knights of Labor included an eight-
hour work day (the work day by then was ten hours), homesteading
on public land, prohibiting child labor, establishing income and in-
heritance taxes, and adult education.  They followed a strategy of
“revolutionary unionism”— so named because of their desire to
transform the economic system into one of worker cooperatives.  To
this end they organized communities and educated them about the
problems of the capitalist economic system.  The height of the Knights
of Labor was the movement for the eight-hour work day in 1886,
which culminated in a nationwide strike, involving 300,000 workers
from Kentucky, Texas, and Virginia to St Louis, Detroit, Grand
Rapids, New York, Boston, and New Haven. Workers across Euro-
pean ethnicities — Poles, Germans, Bohemians —united across the
U.S. by walking off their jobs and into the street.
In 1886, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded.
It followed yet a third strategy to improve workers’ lives.  Known as
“business unionism,” the AFL tried to improve the wages and work-
ing conditions of its members through collective bargaining, a process
of reaching an agreement between workers and their employers re-
garding workers’ wages, working conditions, training and other
terms of employment.  The impetus for employers to reach an agree-
ment with workers and avoid a strike was the loss of sales and rev-
enue during a strike; for workers, the motivation was the loss of
earnings.  Thus the mutual economic benefit that employers and em-
ployees provided each other (jobs and wages for employees, sales
and production for employers) and the fact that each would suffer an
economic loss if an agreement were not reached provided a mutual
incentive to be reasonable during negotiations and to reach a settle-
ment.
Members of craft unions that formed the AFL included highly-
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skilled trade workers such as blacksmiths, carpenters, masons, coop-
ers, tailors, and printers.  These unions only admitted those working
in their craft, thus omitting unskilled and semi-skilled workers en-
tirely.  This strategy of exclusion was purposeful: the bargaining
power of these skilled workers was achieved by restricting those who
could learn and perform their craft, effectively limiting competition
for their jobs. Thus the AFL unions bargained to control the appren-
ticeship program, including who can become apprentices, and in
doing so, kept out of the craft any outsiders, which usually included
immigrant and black workers.  
This strategy of exclusion worked.  The high skill level of these
craft workers and their limited numbers gave them bargaining power
to demand relatively high wages when economic times were good.
When times were bad, however, even skilled workers failed to main-
tain their living standards. 
Besides being exclusionary, the AFL unions largely ignored po-
litical and electoral activities, including political and reformist poli-
cies.  Historically they opposed policies like the minimum wage and
Social Security that could help a wide swath of workers beyond their
members. Instead, AFL unions concentrated only on immediate wage
increases and job related issues for their own members.  Because they
only helped their own members and excluded many, most workers
failed to benefit from their actions.  Thus, both historically and cur-
rently, AFL unions have been relatively more politically conservative
and exclusionary in practice than unions that have followed other
strategies of improving workers’ lives, such as the CIO. 
The Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO), first established
in 1935 as the Committee of Industrial Organizationii, followed yet a
fourth strategy — one of industrial unionism.  The CIO organized all
workers along industry lines — skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled —
who worked in mass-produced industries.  Thus there would be one
union for all workers in the auto industry, including semi-skilled, un-
skilled, and skilled, though they might work for General Motors,
Chrysler, or Ford.  There would be another union for all workers in
steel, and another for those in rubber.  The idea behind this strategy
is that the union gains power from having everyone organized in one
industry.  If every worker in one industry, like auto, belonged to one
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union, such as the United Auto Workers Union, the union could strike
against one auto plant and have all the workers in that plant walk
out and shut down the factory.  In addition, the union could negoti-
ate the same wages for all workers no matter who their employer.  In
this way, workers don’t compete against each other (competing for
the lowest labor costs gives employers a cost advantage, driving
higher wage competitors out of business), since labor costs would be
the same in all companies in a given industry.
As this review of labor history illustrates, workers have always
sought to improve their lives by engaging in civic activities, using
numerous strategies to achieve these — by forming political parties
and through business, revolutionary and industrial unionism.  Their
inclusiveness regarding who they allowed to become members as
well as the extent to which they engaged in the political and electoral
process varied by the strategy they used. 
Yet throughout this history, organized labor has had to contend
with a hostile political and legal climate in the U.S.  Today, neither
the Knights of Labor nor the Philadelphia Mechanics Trade Union
exist.  The demise of the Knights of Labor occurred after eight po-
licemen were killed by a bomb in Chicago during the 1886 strike for
the eight-hour day and the state charged the leadership of this union
with these murders, executing four of them (but later exonerated all
eight because of a lack of evidence).  The Workingmen’s Party was a
victim of hard economic times that eroded the resolve of workers who
tried to improve their lives when there were others willing to take
their jobs for less pay.
Both unions were also victims of the unforgiving laws in the
U.S., which were slow to protect workers who wanted to organize
into unions and failed to punish employers who used ruthless tactics
to break unions.  Unions could flourish only after the Wagner Act was
passed in 1935.  This law protected the right to organize workers into
unions and established penalties for companies that tried to prevent
organizing.  
But subsequent changes in the law — namely, the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1955 — allowed for decertification of unions and
weakened the ability of unions to organize workers.  The result is that
the number of workers organized into unions peaked at one-third in
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1955 but has been declining ever since.  This decline has accelerated
in the last two decades, so that today only 12 percent of workers be-
long to unions.  The decline of unions has been attributed to weak
enforcement of the laws today and flaws in the labor laws that allow
employers to prevent union organizing efforts (Freeman and Medoff
1984; Brofenbrenner 1994; Dannin and Wagar 2000).  In contrast, in
the government sector, union organizing and membership has in-
creased, due to passage of federal and state laws beginning in the
1960s that have allowed for public sector unions to exist and to bar-
gain collectively (Freeman 1986), and because the government sector
has not resisted the unionization of workers.  The post-war period
also resulted in increased numbers of professional workers, and with
these, a proliferation of employee associations for these workers.      
The legacy of this relatively hostile legal and political history is
that today, the only types of unions that exist are business and in-
dustrial unions, which merged in 1935 into the federation known as
the AFL-CIO.iii The mechanism modern unions use to improve work-
ing conditions is to organize workers into local unions and to raise
wages, and improve working conditions through collective bargain-
ing with employers.  Yet, modern unions have not turned their backs
on other forms of civic engagement, as this essay will demonstrate.
Historically as well as today, many unions have been involved in elec-
toral politics as well as local community coalitions to improve the
lives of working people.
Asian Workers 
Historically, Asians have faced the same difficulty of a hostile
political and legal climate impeding their efforts to improve their
wages and working conditions by organizing into unions.  The con-
sequence is that, like those of white workers, the vast majority of their
strikes failed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
But Asians also faced the additional obstacle of racism.  Like other
racial minorities during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, Asians were relegated to the jobs that no one else wanted —
those that were the lowest-paying and that had the worst working
conditions.iv
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Moreover, throughout this history of trying to improve the lot of
workers, organized labor largely neglected to organize Asian Amer-
icans and, at their worst, participated in excluding them from the
more lucrative jobs. Shut out of labor unions and placed in the worst
jobs in the U.S. — in agriculture, building railroads, and working in
mines — Asians organized themselves into independent labor or-
ganizations that existed outside of the mainstream labor movement.
Though stereotyped as unlikely to join labor unions and take mili-
tant action, in fact, Asians participated in and led numerous strikes.  
The earliest strikes occurred while building the transcontinental
railroads under dangerous and brutal conditions.  In 1867, two thou-
sandv Chinese railroad workers struck against the Central Pacific
Railroad for higher wages, equal pay and hours (compared to white
workers), an end to corporal punishment and for the ability to leave
their jobs if they chose.  Chinese workers also struck against the
Houston and Texas Central Railroad in 1870 over their wages and
failure of the company to comply with their contract.  The Chinese
workers lost both of these strikes due to brutal labor tactics by em-
ployers. 
With low pay and oppressive working conditions, the agricul-
tural sector experienced numerous organizing drives and strikes by
Asian workers.  In Hawaii, dissatisfaction over the exploitative con-
ditions on the plantations, including segregated housing and jobs,
low wages, and abusive overseers, led to many strikes.  These in-
cluded: 1,200 Japanese cane cutters and loaders in Wailua who struck
in 1904 for higher wages; 7,000 Japanese workers who struck the
major plantations in Oahu in 1909 for receiving lower wages than
Portuguese and Puerto Rican workers; and 2,000 Filipino workers
who struck in 1924 for higher pay, an eight-hour day, and better hous-
ing.  Strikes by Japanese workers over abusive actions by overseers
also occurred in Maui in 1904 and in Waipahu in 1906.  
Perhaps the most notable strike on the islands was the six-month
strike in 1919 when Japanese and Filipino workers banded their sep-
arate labor organizations together into a combined multiethnic labor
organization, the Hawaii Laborers’ Association.  The union’s 8,000
Japanese, Filipino, Puerto Rican and Spanish workers demanded
higher pay and an eight-hour day.  Although this strike, like all the
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others on the islands, was lost by the workers, it is notable for unit-
ing workers of many diverse nationalities. 
Strikes in agriculture penetrated the mainland as well.  As early
as 1880, Chinese fruit pickers in Santa Clara, California, struck for
higher wages (Takaki 1993).  In 1903, Japanese and Mexican farm
workers in Oxnard, California, joined together into the multiracial
organization the Japanese-Mexican Labor Association, as 1,200 work-
ers struck for higher wages.  Like many strikes before the Wagner Act
was passed in 1935, this strike was marred by violence.  When strik-
ers demonstrated in front of labor camps that housed strikebreakers,
shots were fired, killing one Mexican worker and wounding two
Japanese and two Mexican workers.  Blame for the violence fell on
the labor union, resulting in the jailing of the leaders of the Japanese-
Mexican Labor Association (Chan 1991).  
Violence was common during other strikes, as well.  In 1933, 700
Filipino lettuce pickers struck in Salinas Valley, California.  This union
grew to 2,000 workers and joined the 1934 strike in Monterey with
an AFL affiliate union, the Vegetable Packers Association. During this
latter strike, labor leaders were arrested, two workers were shot, and
the labor camp where hundreds of Filipino farm workers lived was
burned to the ground (Chan 1991).
Notably, strikes by Asian workers were not limited to white
owners or employers.  In 1875, Chinese garment workers struck a
Chinese sweatshop owner in San Francisco for higher wages.  In
Hawaii, 300 plantation workers struck in 1891 to protest a Chinese
labor contractor who allegedly cheated them (Chan 1991).   Asian
workers, in other words, are similar to other workers: they organize
for the same reasons other workers organize — for higher wages, bet-
ter working conditions, fairness, and respect.  
Despite their low pay, abusive working conditions, and demon-
strated commitment to union organizing, Asian workers remained
outside of organized labor.  In part, this was because of the outright
refusal of organized labor to include Asian workers.  When the
Hawaii Laborers’ Association applied for membership into the AFL
in 1920, the AFL never took up the matter (Chan 1991).  When the Fil-
ipino lettuce pickers asked the AFL to form a union for them, the AFL
refused, leaving the workers no choice but to form their own inde-
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pendent union (Chan 1991).  During the 1903 strike by the Japanese-
Mexican Labor Association, the AFL mediated an agreement between
workers and growers, after the murder and wounding of workers.
But after the strike when the union applied for membership, the AFL
stated that it would admit the union only if Chinese and Japanese
workers were excluded from membership (it was willing to accept
Mexican workers).  The Mexican secretary of the union refused this
condition and thus membership into the AFL, aptly stating:
Our Japanese here were the first to recognize the impor-
tance of cooperating and uniting in demanding a fair wage
scale… We have fought and lived on very short rations with our
Japanese brothers, and toiled with them in the fields…We would
be false to them and to ourselves and to the cause of unionism
if we now accepted privileges for ourselves which are not ac-
corded to them (Chan 1991, 87).  
Unions also ventured into the political realm to broaden their
exclusion of Asians.  The Seaman’s International Union, an AFL af-
filiate, pressured Congress to forbid foreign sailors from working on
U.S. ships and asked immigration officials to arrest and deport Chi-
nese sailors (Chan 1991).  Even the inclusive Knights of Labor, whose
strategy was to organize every person in a community and included
African Americans, excluded Chinese workers (the Chinese were the
only Asians on the U.S. mainland at that time) along with liquor store
owners, professional gamblers, stockbrokers, lawyers, bankers, and
other “economic parasites.”  Moreover, the leadership of the Knights
of Labor pushed for the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and its exten-
sions, excluding Chinese laborers from immigrating to the United
States.  After its passage, the union leadership tried to extend this law
to exclude Japanese and Koreans as well, but this attempt failed.
It was only in 1936 that the AFL accepted into its fold the Field
Workers Union, a Mexican and Filipino union of farm workers (Chan
1991).  Later, in 1940, the AFL admitted the Federated Agricultural
Laborers Association, a Filipino union, after it successfully repre-
sented thousands of farm laborers in a series of strikes in central Cal-
ifornia (Chan 1991). By the 1960s, when Filipino and Mexican farm
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worker organizations joined forces to form the United Farm Workers
Union, the AFL admitted them as well. 
There were rare exceptions to the exclusionary policies of labor
unions.  Generally, these exceptions were among CIO unions, which
were more inclusive than others, given their strategy of organizing
all workers.  Both the canning industry and the National Maritime
Union (NMU) admitted Asian workers into their CIO unions (Friday
1994; Chan 1991).  The NMU in fact, was formed by workers who dis-
agreed with the Seaman’s International Union’s exclusionary poli-
cies.  The NMU invited Chinese workers to join a strike it called in
1936.  Chinese sailors agreed to join the strike after the union pledged
to address Chinese workers’ concerns of equal treatment by race.  The
NMU also admitted black sailors into its union; its constitution was
unusual in that it prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color,
creed, national origin, or political affiliation (Chan 1991).    
Why were Asian workers anathema to organized labor?  Of
course, as historians argue, labor unions often refused to admit other
ethnics, even other white ethnic workers (Saxton 1971).  Additionally,
labor unions reflected the social views of their time, which included
racism.  The labor unions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries had segregated labor unions for African Americans, if they
bothered to admit them at all. 
Like other racial minorities during this time period, Asians were
subject to anti-miscegenation laws, which forbade Asians to marry
whites.   These laws were removed from the books only in 1967 (Chan
1991).  School segregation by race often prohibited  Chinese, Japanese
and Korean children from attending the white schools, instead rele-
gating them to the “Oriental” or black schools.  Residential segrega-
tion limited Asians to live within Chinatowns and other undesirable
neighborhoods because of racially exclusive covenants or practices
by realtors and landlords that restricted where Asians could live.  
Being immigrants brought their own woes in addition to those
based on race alone.  Asians immigrants were subject to particular
laws that taxed them, such as the Foreign Miner’s Tax in 1850 and
1882 that subjected Chinese miners to pay $3 per month in California.
Other laws restricted Asians from owning or leasing land, beginning
in 1913 with the Alien Land Law in California.  Subsequent restrictive
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land laws passed in California and in other states during the 1920s
and 1930s restricted working as tenants on the land.  
Moreover, Asians were singled out for exclusionary treatment,
especially in U.S. immigration laws.  These laws began with the Chi-
nese Exclusion Act of 1882 which barred Chinese laborers from en-
tering the U.S., the Gentleman’s Agreement in 1907 that prevented
the immigration of Japanese laborers, and the Immigration Act of
1924 which excluded  “aliens ineligible for citizenship,” thus effec-
tively ending Japanese immigration.
Asian immigrants could be so targeted because they lacked po-
litical power. Because they were nonwhite and nonwhite immigrants
were ineligible for U.S. citizenship, the Chinese were unable to be-
come naturalized citizens and thus vote. This practice was upheld by
two U.S. Supreme Court cases in 1922 (Ozawa v. United States) and
1923 (United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind), which ruled that Asian im-
migrants were ineligible to become naturalized U.S. citizens (Chan
1991).     
Thus labor leaders and their members reflected the views of a
larger society that condoned these practices and restricted the rights
and opportunities of Asian immigrants.  It is no wonder that Asian
workers were limited to jobs that were low-paying and least desir-
able.  During the late nineteenth century, when the Chinese worked
in manufacturing, they were hired in the lowest paying manufactur-
ing jobs in urban areas.  When they worked in the same industries as
whites, they worked in the lowest paying occupations, and when
they worked in the same occupations as white workers, they were
paid less (Takaki 1993). 
Anti-Chinese sentiments appeared in the late nineteenth cen-
tury across the West.  The Chinese, seen as a competitive threat by
white miners, were robbed, attacked, run out of the lucrative gold
mines and, in some cases, killed.  In the farmlands across the West,
Asian workers were run out of fields.  Even the worst manufacturing
jobs were too good for the Chinese. White workers, able to work in
the West after completion of the transcontinental railroads, wanted
these jobs for themselves during the trying years of the depression of
the 1890s.  They drove the Chinese out of these jobs through boy-
cotting products made by Chinese labor in 1886 as well as through vi-
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olence (Takaki 1993; Saxton 1971; Chan 1991). 
Factories and stores that employed Chinese workers were
burned; housing where the Chinese slept went up in flames.  This
began in the 1870s but found more frequency and organization dur-
ing the 1880s and 1890s.  Known as the “driving out,” residents of
towns forcibly expelled the Chinese from towns across the West.
They did this by beating, robbing, shooting, killing, lynching, and
maiming the Chinese and loading them into trains and shipping them
out of town.  Arsonists burned buildings in Chinatowns; in some
towns, entire Chinatowns were burned to the ground.  Across the
West, unarmed Chinese were murdered in cold blood.   
Driven out of mining, factories, fields, railroads, and construc-
tion, the only jobs left for the Chinese were self-employment as store
and restaurant owners and laundry workers, or manufacturing eth-
nic products that only their fellow ethnics bought, jobs that white
workers did not want.  
Asians who arrived in the early twentieth century were not im-
mune from racial violence and circumscribed employment opportu-
nities.  In 1908, a mob robbed Asian Indians and drove them out of
Live Oak, California, setting their camp on fire.  In San Francisco,
Japanese immigrants were physically attacked in 1906; in separate in-
cidents that year, still others were stoned — a famous Japanese seis-
mologist was one of these fatal victims.  In 1921, Japanese immigrants
were forced to leave Turlock, California, or be lynched if they refused
or returned.  Korean farm laborers were similarly threatened with vi-
olence if they worked the orchards in Hemet, California, in 1913, as
were Filipino workers, who were driven out of Washington’s Yakima
Valley in 1928.  In 1930, Filipino farm workers were attacked by a mob
of 400 whites in Palm Beach, who killed two Filipino workers and
beat up dozens more (Chan 1991).
With few exceptions (see Friday 1994), Asians were not organ-
ized into unions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.  This was in part because of union leadership, but also in part
because they did not work in industries that were unionized, due to
employers, co-workers and a society that wouldn’t allow them to
work in other, more lucrative types of employment.  This reflected
racially prevalent attitudes and practices that segregated minority
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workers in the lowest paid jobs that no one else wanted and enforced
job, educational and residential segregation through law and vio-
lence.  
Fortunately, times have changed.  Racially segregated labor
unions became illegal after passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Changes in immigration priorities after the 1965 Immigration Act al-
lowed many more Asians to immigrate to the United States as
refugees, skilled workers who are in short supply, or as family mem-
bers uniting with those living here.  The result was a rapid increase
of Asian workers to the United States, so much so that today, most
Asians in the U.S. are immigrants (Ong et al. 1994).  These immigrants
are diverse culturally and historically, coming from countries like
South Korea and the Philippines, in which labor unions were free and
strong, and others, in which labor unions were mere puppets of the
state or of employers.  
One consequence of the 1965 immigration law is that Asian im-
migrants are bimodal.  Those reuniting with family or entering the
U.S. as refugees often have relatively low levels of English language
abilities and formal educations, such as those from Southeast Asian
countries.  These immigrants work in lower paid industries, such as
in garment, restaurant, hotel and personal service.  The immigrants
that fill occupations where there exist labor shortages, however, such
as nurses from the Philippines and engineers and information tech-
nology professionals from India, have relatively high levels of formal
educations, English language abilities and technical skills and earn
relatively high wages (Ong et al. 1994; Kim and Mar 2007).  
The diversity of Asian workers today — by skill level, English
language ability, country of origin, and experiences with unions in
their ancestral countries — have numerous implications when or-
ganizing Asians into unions, as the next section explains.  
Labor Unions, APALA, Civic Participation and Asians Today
Today, 11 percent of Asian workers belong to labor unions (for
comparison, 12 percent of all workers belong to labor unions; Bureau
of Labor Statistics 2008).  With the growth of Asian immigrants into
the U.S., unions changed their views and tactics during the late twen-
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tieth century.  Many labor unions began to understand that it was in
their best interests to include Asian workers in their unions, since in-
cluding them was better than competing against their lower wages if
they remained unorganized.  Lower cost and unorganized workers
produce lower priced products and services that put unionized em-
ployers at a competitive disadvantage.  Perhaps the greatest change
was that Asians were being successfully organized into labor unions
in garment, hotel, restaurant, and meatpacking industries, often by
Asian organizers, and that Asian organizers were needed in order to
communicate to workers in their own language and to understand
the nuances of the many Asian cultures.
With unions needing Asians to organize workers, and the
unions’ promises of higher pay, greater benefits and protections in
the workplace for Asians, a marriage of mutual benefit was obvious
to both Asians and unions.vi This was formalized in 1992, when the
AFL-CIO formed the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance
(APALA).  
The purpose of this organization is two-fold: 1) To train new or-
ganizers to organize Asians into labor unions and assist labor unions
during organizing campaigns of Asian workers, and 2) To mobilize
Asian voters to increase Asian American participation in the political
process.
As a result of APALA’s training efforts, there is a new generation
of people who have been trained and recruited into unions, more
union organizing campaigns involving Asian Americans, and an ex-
panded capacity of unions to reach out to Asian American workers
(Wong 2007).  Consequently, there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of Asians who have been organized.  Across the nation,
20,000 Asian American workers have been organized into unions
within the last five years (Wong 2007).    
An example can be seen in APALA’s organizing efforts in Los
Angeles’ health care industry, which employs many Asian workers.
The union density increased from six to 65 percent in health care as a
result of the work of many APA organizers, some who were recruited
through APALA’s efforts. In Los Angeles, 74,000 workers joined the
Long Term Care Union of the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) in 1999 (Wong 2007).  In another example, APALA helped mo-
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bilize the Filipino community to support the San Francisco Airport
workers’ unionization campaign, 90 percent of who were Filipino
(Caoile 2007). 
Labor took notice.  “There was a sense from labor unions that
Asians are invisible and not interested in organizing,” May Chen, In-
ternational Vice President of UNITE/HERE and Manager of Local
23-25 in New York City, explains.  “But the many Asian organizers
who have participated in the labor movement and the successful cam-
paigns proved them wrong.  It showed that Asians were interested in
organizing and were good at it” (Chen 2007)    
APALA also mobilizes voters to increase Asian American par-
ticipation in the political process.  As Chen describes, “Political ac-
tivism and political education are the nuts and bolts of a union.”
Unions register voters in workplaces and in communities, and teach
members who their representatives are and how to visit and lobby
them.  They educate their members about issues pressing to commu-
nities, such as immigration reform, help shape talking points about
these issues, and send their members to lobby state and local politi-
cians.  These union members then take these skills back to their com-
munities, teaching others about the issues and how they can effect
political change (Chen 2007). 
During elections, APALA is active in voter education and mobi-
lization efforts, including this current national election.  Currently,
APALA is training its members for the national election, including
voter registration, voter education, and get out the vote efforts (Wong
2007).  During the 2006 election, APALA worked with community
groups on political mobilization campaigns, including one in Ne-
vada, since many Asians in Las Vegas work in the gaming industry.
They helped register Asians to vote and helped with voter protection,
in terms of having access to ballots in their language and access to
the polls.  They had a phone bank in many different Asian languages,
registered and mobilized numerous Asians to vote, and ran classes
on what to do at the polls and citizens’ rights at the polls.  The result
was that the Asian Pacific American vote spiked in Nevada (Somma
2007).
Part of APALA’s ongoing political education efforts include a
Congressional Voter Guide that describes issues that affect Asian Pa-
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cific Americans, such as immigration rights, civil rights, and work-
ers’ rights.  It also states APALA’s position on these issues and how
Senate and House Congressional Representatives voted — whether
with or against APALA.  Although they don’t tell voters how to vote,
by explaining the bills that have come before Congress and how Con-
gressional Representatives voted, APALA informs the Asian Pacific
American community about whether or not their representatives are
voting for their interests (Caoile 2007; Somma 2007).  Educating vot-
ers about how Congressional leaders stand on issues pertinent to
Asian workers has made a difference.  As Caoile states, “Harry Reid
won by only a few thousand votes in the last election.  Those are our
votes; they made a difference.  In California, Asian Pacific Americans
play a major role, providing a swing vote.”
Politicians have noticed.  “Now when we ask for a meeting,
Congressional leaders meet with us.  It took time to organize the com-
munity, to tell the community that you should have a voice.  Now
that we have mobilized Asian Pacific Americans and have the num-
bers in our organization, we do have a voice and political clout,” says
Caoile.  An example of the new political clout of Asian Pacific Amer-
icans occurred during 2006.  Caoile explained that “as the voter guide
was going to press, there was one issue that one member of Congress
hadn’t decided on.  We didn’t know how he was going to vote.  We
called his office and said we were going to put him down as voting
against us.  He changed his vote because of this and voted with us!”
APALA is also advancing legislative issues pertinent to Asian
Americans, such as immigration and Asian American workers’ rights.
It has worked on campaigns to defeat anti-immigrant and anti-civil
rights bills in Congress and referendums in California, and to sup-
port bills in Congress that strengthen workers’ rights.  It has mobi-
lized workers for immigration reform and helped elect to the
California State Assembly Ted Lieu, who is sympathetic to labor and
Asian Pacific Americans’ interests (Caoile 2007).  In California and
Washington, APALA members hold elected office, and many Asian
legislators, national and statewide, come to APALA for assistance.
APALA works with them on voter mobilization and protection
(Somma 2007).
“Overall, the labor movement is an activist force,” Kent Wong
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states.  “Bringing Asians into the labor movement enhances their par-
ticipation on various fronts.”  This is because many unions also are in-
volved in larger issues of concern to their members, such as economic
and social justice issues, and with Asian and Hispanic workers, im-
migrant issues as well.  In Los Angeles, labor unions and their mem-
bers have been active on immigrant workers’ rights.  The culmination
of these efforts occurred on May 1, 2006, when Los Angeles held a
demonstration for workers’ and immigrant rights, attracting the
largest turnout for a “May Day” demonstration in U.S. history (Wong
2007). 
Maria Somma, Health Care Organizing Coordinator of the
United Steel Workers, says that when she organizes, she explicitly in-
volves the union in pertinent community issues, such as education,
crime, tax policy and access to health care.  Even without a union-
ization drive, union members often work with community activists
around local social and economic justice issues.  Often ad hoc al-
liances are created among community organizations, including faith
based organizations, and labor members work on specific local com-
munity issues.  In Washington Heights, a Dominican neighborhood
in New York City, there was medical maltreatment resulting from the
lack of translators in the hospitals.  Although the city already had a
language access law, unions and community organizations success-
fully pressured the city to enforce it.  In other areas of New York,
unions and community groups helped launch campaigns to build
playgrounds in immigrant communities.  In Queens, unions and
community organizations campaigned to include Muslim holidays
in school schedules.  Most recently, unions and community organi-
zations joined together to press the state of New York to allow dri-
ver’s licenses for illegal immigrants (Chen 2007).  
“Community and labor are the same,” concludes Caoile.  “Labor
plays an important role in communities.”  Once Asians become po-
litically active, they participate in other community activities, such
as becoming school board members or getting involved in other com-
munity issues (Caoile 2007; Chen 2007; Quan 2004).  There appears to
be a spill-over effect from union activities to broader community in-
volvement (Chen 2007).  “Union members see how being involved in
the community is similar to protecting workplace rights,” says
Organizing Asian Americans in to Labor Unions  259
Somma.  “The biggest problem with immigrants is lack of knowledge
regarding their rights and the laws.  But if you teach them that they
can have an impact on their living and working conditions, if you
mobilize and educate them, you may get them involved in voting,
supporting a union drive, or protesting English Only bills.”  
Katie Quan, former International Vice President of the Union of
Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) has wit-
nessed many union members undertaking personal transformations
in their lives as a result of organizing.  By standing up to their em-
ployers and organizing with fellow workers in the community, work-
ers realize that they can change the conditions of their livelihoods
through working together.  Union experience gives them self-confi-
dence as well as imparts knowledge, skills (such as writing press re-
leases and speaking to the media), and leadership abilities to
challenge and improve social and economic injustices.  They then
bring these skills back to their communities to improve a variety of
social problems.  “They learn how to do things they never envisioned
they’d do before,” Quan says.  As Quan explains, many garment
workers move up the ranks in the labor movement.  Others take the
skills they learned and become active in their community around
other issues, such as police brutality and gentrification.  Thus the
skills learned while working with unions gives them a sense of per-
sonal empowerment that transforms them, so that they become com-
munity leaders around other issues as a result (Quan 2004; Kim 2005).
Challenges in Organizing Asians
U.S. Labor Law
Many of the challenges to organizing Asians are the same ones
that face many other workers:  the laws in the United States are so
weak that it is easy for employers to prevent union organizing (Bro-
fenbrenner 1994).  Employers often fire workers who are sympathetic
to the union; thus when it comes time to vote for the union, many
people who would have voted for the union are no longer employed
(Freeman and Medoff 1984).  If they don’t fire these workers, em-
ployers can transfer them to the worst jobs or otherwise make their
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working conditions less desirable so that these workers will quit
(Levitt 1993).  Employers can also intimidate workers, stating that
they will lose their jobs if a union is elected. Although these activities
are illegal, the fines employers face are low and it takes years for un-
fair labor practice charges to make their way to hearings; by then the
union election has long been held, usually with the union losing and
the employer paying a small fine.  
These activities by employers erode the support unions have
from workers.  When the most visible union supporters are being
fired, laid off or are quitting from their harassment, fewer union sup-
porters remain.  Those remaining workers who support the union
would be rightfully afraid of losing their job when they see the most
visible supporters fired or harassed.  The result is that workers are
less likely to vocally support the union, become active in the union-
ization drive, or vote for the union.  
Such was the case of organizing workers in the largest Chinese
newspaper in Los Angeles, the Chinese Daily News.  The workers
voted for the union, but management undertook a five-year battle
with the workers, firing many of the pro-union workers, harassing
some of the pro-union workers that remained, and stalling contract
negotiations (Wong 2007).  The tactics worked.  A second union elec-
tion was held, in which the union was defeated.  Workers were too
afraid to vote for the union a second time.  Eventually, the illegal prac-
tices of management were heard in court, and workers received some
compensation, but it was too late.  The newspaper remains non-union
(Wong 2007).  Because unfair labor practices are heard many years
later and the fines and back pay workers receive are so meager, cor-
porations lack any strong disincentives to break the law. 
Cultural Sensitivity
In addition to these challenges, any good union organizer tai-
lors a given campaign to fit the needs and background of its mem-
bers.  Among Asian immigrants, English is not their first language
and their cultural identity (at least during the first generation) often
remains with their home country.  These immigrants have assump-
tions and biases about unions rooted in their experiences in their
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home countries, so organizers often need to educate these workers
about unions in the U.S., explaining that the union will not be con-
trolled by the company or by the government, that it would truly be
independent, and that members would have a say about union ac-
tivities and their leadership (Somma 2007; Chen 2007).  
For Asian immigrant workers, having someone who speaks
their language and comes from their culture (or at least understands
it) is critical (Somma 2007; Chen 2007).  Many of the organizers em-
phasized this point: 
You have to understand the culture, talk to the workers,
learn their ethnicity, speak their language, signal that you un-
derstand who they are.  You have to have Asian organizers, folks
who look like the workers, so that if someone looks like the
workers and understands them, Asians figure the union is okay
if this Asian believes in it. Workers are more trusting if there is
an Asian organizer and if the organizer understands their cul-
tural background (Chen 2007; Caoile 2007).  
As Chen explains, the general approach to organizing Asians is
similar to any group: talk to workers, understand their assumptions
about unions, and communicate what the union will do for them.
This involves identifying the key issues for workers and including
these in the organizing campaign.  Organizers culturally attuned to
the workers will most likely understand the important issues for
these workers and thus how to approach them.  For Asian immi-
grants, addressing their needs for health care benefits and other
workplace benefits is often important, as well as communicating to
workers that with a union they would have recourse for any prob-
lems that arise, including problems of discrimination.   Having a
place to go where they can bring their problems is critical and often
helps win them over to the union side.  For U.S.-born Asian workers,
often education and health benefits are more important than to other
workers (Chen 2007).  
Also important to any union campaign is knowing the leaders in
the community, understanding the power structure of the commu-
nity, and obtaining the approval of these people and organizations.
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This is also best done by someone who speaks the language and
comes from those communities (Somma 2007).  Somma recalls, “We
were organizing technical employees among which were many
(about 15%) Filipinos.  There were two to three key Asian leaders.
Once you got them, you got the majority [of workers] through the
leaders in the worksite.  It’s like going to the elders; you have to find
the leaders, understand the power structure.  Once you have [their
support], you have the rest of the workers.”     
Unions that heed this advice will succeed; those that don’t, fail.
An organizing drive from the United Auto Workers illustrates this.
Caoile said, “When they first started to organize casino workers in
Atlantic City, they did fliers, letters.  The UAW said that the Asians
didn’t respond.”  The lead organizer was Asian but didn’t speak the
language.   So they called Caoile for advice on how to reach these
workers (Caoile 2007; Somma 2007).
APALA sent in Chinese speakers and mailed letters to all the
workers in their native language, describing APALA, what unions
were, what their legal rights were, and how unions could improve
their workplaces (Somma 2007).  The union took out radio ads on the
local Chinese radio station, as well as ads in ethnic papers to describe
the organizing drive (Somma 2007; Caoile 2007).  Caoile told the
union which organizations they should call to get their support, who
the leaders were in the community, the restaurants workers fre-
quented, and where the workers lived and shopped, so that organiz-
ers could visit these places to talk to workers.  The UAW followed
this advice, putting ads in ethnic papers and translating the material
into different languages.  The first time they had a union election,
they lost.  The second time, after following this advice, they won.
They then started organizing in Connecticut. Because they knew
what to do this time, Caoile says, they won.  
As Quan emphasizes, “In organizing people of color, it’s im-
portant to understand the social networks and the fabric of the par-
ticular ethnic or racial community.  Who are the important players in
the community?  Who can you ally with to build a platform?  You
can’t just pass out leaflets or you’d be viewed as an outsider with no
credibility.  Instead, you have to find out what the key organizations
and networks are.  In the Chinese community, the media is impor-
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tant.  The Chinese read one to two newspapers a day.  They take the
newspapers’ word as the truth; if the newspaper says something is so,
they believe it is right.  So in organizing these workers, important
matters must appear in a newspaper, making media campaigns im-
portant in organizing these workers.”
Organizational affiliation is also important, Quan states.  “You
need to gain the support of organizations that are respected in the
community.  With the Chinese community, these were clubs and as-
sociations, of which there are many.  Joining community organiza-
tions and having them as sponsors was important to lending
credibility towards your issues.  For Koreans, churches were the im-
portant institutions to involve.”
In 1989, Quan was the head of organizing garment workers in
San Francisco.  “All of the targeted shops were comprised of Chinese
immigrants.  To establish roots and credibility in the Chinese com-
munity, we established a worker center in Chinatown.  It was a bold
move for unions to come to Chinatown.  People told me that the
unionization drive would never work, that the conservative elements
in the Chinese community would oppose the unionization drive and
break the windows of the center.”  
For the opening of the center, Quan sent out invitations on red
cardboard.  She had visited all of the Chinese associations and invited
the leaders to come to the opening ceremony.  But a week before the
opening, her boss questioned her, telling her that she was doing
everything wrong — that she should use white paper for the invita-
tions, for example.  “I told him, ‘No, it had to be on red paper,’” Quan
says, knowing the cultural significance of the color red to the Chinese
community.
The opening was a huge success.  “The mayor came, the leaders
came, there was a lion’s dance.  The place was packed full of Chinese
workers.  The center was welcomed, and the members were thrilled.
They felt that the union was sinking roots into the community and
that it knew how to do things right.”  (Quan 2004)  Knowing the so-
cial fabric of the Chinese community and respecting the culture was
key to success.
Internal Union Dynamics
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Another challenge of organizing Asian workers is the composi-
tion of the labor movement, which lacks diversity.  Most of the lead-
ers in labor remain white men who hold the power in the labor
movement and make the decisions (Wong 2007).  Asians speak of the
existence of double standards and a glass ceiling in unions.  As Quan
explains, “You’re ghettoized.  There is a glass ceiling.  From my own
life, I spoke to the head of my union and told him I wanted to become
management, which meant heading a local.  He asked, “Do you speak
Spanish?”  I didn’t speak Spanish, but that didn’t stop the Jewish men
from heading local unions and it hadn’t stopped him.  I was viewed
as ripe for only Chinese speaking people.”  Although Quan believes
this is changing a bit, her observations of other Asian organizers is
that “you tend to stay in the Asian community.”  “I applied for re-
gional director position in LA, where most of the workers were
Latino,” she said.  “I had more seniority and was more skilled than
the other applicants, but someone else who was not Asian was cho-
sen.  I was told that I should stay in Northern California in the Asian
population.  If I had been white and male I would have had different
experiences; I’d have gone farther quicker.”
Perceptions of Asians
Perhaps the greatest challenge, however, is one of perception.
Many people view Asians as apolitical.  Currently, Asians are less
likely to participate in the political process (see Chapter 1 by Ong and
Scott).  But this is changing.  As Caoile states, “Asians may have been
complacent.  At one time a lot of Asian Pacific Americans didn’t get
involved in electoral politics.  But now they know that you need to be
involved in electoral politics, that the political process affects the de-
cisions about your health care, the schools your kids attend.  Asians
are engaged in political action now.”  
Because two-thirds of Asians are immigrants, they may be less
participatory in the electoral system.  This status also may make them
more afraid of organizing into a union because they have so much
more to lose.  As Caoile explains, “They have families back home
looking to them for survival — they are supporting an entire family.
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In New Jersey, there are a lot of Filipina nurses.  For most, it’s their
first job.  They work the worst shifts — the night shift, the holiday
shift.   During an organization drive, they said they couldn’t join the
union or they’d get fired and their entire family wouldn’t eat back
home.”  
“But if an Asian Pacific American talks to them outside of the
workplace and educates workers, and tells them they can’t be fired
from an organization drive, they get stronger.  They talk to each other,
find out they’re all in the same boat, that they all get the holiday
shifts.  They begin to see their problems not as individual but collec-
tive ones, and realize that the solution is a collective one as well.  They
think, maybe we do have a voice.  They begin to complain, fear is no
longer part of them.  They ask why they get the worst shifts, and then
they see a change — they’re treated better because they know their
rights and can’t be forced to work the worst shifts.”  (Caoile 2007)  
Somma agrees.  “Immigrants are hard to organize because of
language, culture, and because they have more to lose.  It’s not just
their job but their whole family; a lot is on the line.  In my personal
experience in organizing nurses, once you show that the union is a
valid and legal vehicle, that the union can’t harm you, and that there
is power in the collective, workers join the union.”   
The rapid increase of immigrant workers in the United States is
a reason unions need to contend with them.  As Somma states, im-
migrants are the fastest-growing sector in union membership.  In-
deed, the proportion of union members who are immigrants has
increased from 9 to 11 percent from 1996 to 2004, and the number of
immigrants in the U.S. increased 48% in the United States between
1996 and 2004 (Migration Policy Institute 2004).  Thus immigrants are
a growing population among union members because of the in-
creased number of immigrant workers in the United States.  
As these illustrations show and as Wong emphasizes, “Asians
can be political.  They are political.  Whether activated through com-
munity work or labor unions, the younger Asian Americans are hav-
ing an impact in politics including the electoral arena.”
For this reason, politicians are no longer ignoring them.    
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The Future of Labor Unions as a 
Vehicle for Civic Engagement
The Future for Asians
“Our time has come,” says Caoile,  “we are a growing popula-
tion.”  Indeed, the future for organizing Asians is bright, since Asians
are concentrated in many areas that are growing, including health
care, hospitals, service industries and education (Caoile 2007; Somma
2007; Wong 2007).  These are sectors that unions have targeted for or-
ganizing drives.  As Caoile states, SEIU and AFSCME are organizing
in these areas.  Asians also work in many occupations that have been
targeted for organizing, including post-secondary teachers, registered
nurses, lab technicians, gaming service workers, and airport conces-
sion and Hudson News stands in airports (APALA nd; Chen 2007).  In
addition, Asians disproportionately work in the public and health
care sectors, where there are higher unionization rates than in other
industries (Wong 2007).   The result is that Asians are the fastest grow-
ing ethnic group to join unions (Somma 2007).
Asians are also concentrated in geographic locations that are
amenable to unions.  Asians are concentrated in urban areas where
union density is significant, Wong states.  “For example, the largest
union density is in Hawaii.  Hawaii has very progressive social poli-
cies.  It is the only state with universal health care.  There is a history
of having progressive social legislation and legislators.  Asians hold
political office in Hawaii, they are involved in political activities and
in labor unions.  Labor has a link with communities and has influ-
ence in Hawaii.”  Other areas where Asians are concentrated include
New York, California and Massachusetts, which also have high union
densities.
According to Somma, the AFL-CIO is examining organizing pro-
fessional workers, including registered nurses, health care workers,
technicians, respiratory therapists, radiologists, laboratory profes-
sionals, IT occupations (where the Communications Workers of
America are organizing), and educators, since all of these occupations
are growing.  The AFL-CIO is also forming relationships with pro-
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fessional organizations that have a large number of Asian workers,
such as accountants and pharmacists, exploring whether or not col-
lective bargaining can advance these professions.    
If immigration laws change so that higher educated immigrants
are preferred over less skilled immigrants, these professional organ-
izations will be critical to protecting Asian workers.  But even with-
out changes in the immigration laws, higher educated Asians in
public service, education, and medicine will continue to find them-
selves courted by unions.  Because Asians work in both high- and
low-paid jobs that are unionized, Asians will continue to play a role
in unionization efforts.     
Replenishing Organizers
Organizing is difficult work.  It involves travel and working
around the clock during a campaign, including many nights and
weekends.  With so much at stake — lower profits for employers, pos-
sible lost jobs for workers who can be illegally fired when they or-
ganize — the work can be highly confrontational and emotionally
taxing.  The result for many organizers is burnout.  After a few years
of this lifestyle, many organizers move on to other jobs.  This has been
no different among Asian organizers.  As Chen explains, this pattern
is exacerbated by the fact that the Organizing Institute at the AFL-
CIO has focused exclusively on training college graduates to be or-
ganizers.  These college graduates have families that expected their
sons and daughters to go into law or medicine, but instead they be-
came organizers.  Many of these young college graduates conse-
quently organize for five to ten years and then go to law school (Chen
2007).
Certainly, unions benefited from the talents of these young or-
ganizers during their stints as organizers, and many do stay in the
labor movement, including many stars such as Norman Yen, a Brown
graduate, who is currently running an affiliate union in Texas.
But as May Chen suggests, part of the solution may be in train-
ing rank and file workers to become organizers, as well as college
graduates.  “There are a lot of Chinese, Filipino, and Vietnamese
workers working in hotels.  These workers won’t go to law school or
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medical school.  They really appreciate what the union did for their
families, that it raised wages, allowed their kids to get good educa-
tions and was their entrée into the middle class.  We need to get these
people involved in organizing, because once you do, they do an
amazing job.”  
Chen explains that when UNITE HERE organized a TJ MAXX in
Pennsylvania, she sent some rank and file activists to help organize
it.  “They got along instantly with the workers there because they
were similar to them.  They were enthusiastic about the union, and it
showed.  It won over workers; they won the trust of workers quickly.
They were hard workers and they did a great job.”     
The Future for Unions
While Asians are poised to become union members and become
active in civic engagement, the future for labor unions, without
changes in the law, is more problematic.  Unionization rates have
fallen from one-third percent to only 12 percent of workers today.
Much of this decline is because of management’s resistance to unions
and use of illegal tactics, such as those used by the Chinese Daily
News, to prevent unions from organizing workers (Brofenbrenner
1994; Freeman and Medoff 1984).  
Only with additional legislation can these problems cede.  Such
legislation would allow unions to file injunctions against employers,
allow financial penalties against employers for threats, intimidation,
lies, distortion, and plant closings as a result of union campaigns, and
increase penalties for employers who break the law.  Currently, fines
are so low that it is economically worthwhile to break the laws, since
doing so incurs a small cost and saves much more by keeping out a
union.  In addition, reducing the time between filing unfair labor
practices and receiving a judgment from the National Labor Relations
Board would benefit workers.  Finally, allowing unions to be officially
recognized after a majority of workers sign cards stating their desire
to have a union, which is the case in Canada, would also prevent abu-
sive employer practices and aid organizing efforts (Brofenbrenner
1994). 
Another challenge is urging unions to organize workers.  Many
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national unions have chosen not to undertake such expensive, diffi-
cult campaigns (Wong 2007).  Or they organize shop by shop, which
is why they lose, Wong says.  What unions need is strategic organiz-
ing — analyzing industries to see which are growing and where
unions can win elections, having a comprehensive organizing cam-
paign, with industry-wide targets, committing the necessary re-
sources, involving the community, conducting corporate research,
and having an effective media campaign.  These are all elements of
successful organizing campaigns.  
Conclusion
Historically, few Asians belonged to unions, reflecting a society
that excluded, or at best, ignored, Asian workers.  But with changes
in attitudes about race, and with APALA and unions reaching out to
organize Asian Pacific Americans, race is no longer a barrier.  Instead,
today, the barriers to unionizing Asian workers — employer resist-
ance and weak national laws — are those that confront all workers.
Thus Asians hold a common agenda with other workers, and civic
participation across racial lines will further the cause of Asians, as
well as all workers.
Today, Asians are organizing Asian workers into labor unions.
The very activity of organizing into unions often transforms and em-
powers workers when they experience that by working together they
can change the conditions of their lives.  Consequently, unionized
workers use their newfound tools of collective action to participate
broadly in their local community and in the larger society, and in
doing so, improve their schools, neighborhoods, and nation.
Notes
i This review of labor history is based upon Lee Balliet (1987).  
ii It changed its name in 1936.
iii Recently, however, some unions, including the Service Employees Interna-
tional Union and the Teamsters, have splintered off from the AFL-CIO but con-
tinue to follow either the industrial or business unionism model.  
iv This review of the history of Asian workers and unions is based on Takaki
(1993) and Chan (1991).  
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v According to Chan (1991), two thousand struck; according to Takaki (1993), it
was five thousand. 
vi Among full-time wage and salary workers, the median usual weekly earnings
for union members was $863; for non-union members it was $663 (Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2008; see also Freeman and Medoff, 1984, for the union wage
premium).
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